Family and Matrimonial Law

The father brought a motion to enforce a 2013 parenting order, alleging the mother's non-compliance.

The mother argued the children, aged 13 and 15, refused contact due to the father's emotionally abusive and combative conduct, which included involving police, interfering with their activities, and making false allegations.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding the mother's inability to force contact reasonable given the father's egregious behaviour.

The court also imposed restrictions on the father's future motions to prevent further harassment and misuse of the court system.

This case concerned a dispute over the primary residence of an 8-year-old child, Paislee, following the parents' separation.

The applicant father sought to maintain Paislee's primary residence in Mitchell, Ontario, while the respondent mother sought to relocate Paislee to Sarnia, Ontario, where the mother resided with her new partner and their children.

The court applied the best interests of the child test under sections 39.4(3) and 24(3) of the Children's Law Reform Act, giving significant weight to Paislee's expressed views and preferences, her bond with her half and step-siblings, and concerns regarding her relationship with the father's new partner.

The court ultimately granted the mother's request for primary residence in Sarnia, effective September 1, 2024, with joint decision-making responsibility and a revised parenting schedule.

This decision addresses a voir dire application by the Kenora-Rainy River Districts Child and Family Services to admit out-of-court utterances made by two young children (ages 7 and 5) in a child protection proceeding.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule from R. v. Khan, assessing both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that requiring the children to testify would cause emotional harm, satisfying necessity.

It admitted statements made to child protection workers due to their training, contemporaneous notes, and lack of fabrication motive.

However, statements reported by the children's grandmother were deemed inadmissible due to reliability concerns.

The court also admitted the "voice of the children" memo from the Office of the Children's Lawyer, but cautioned against counsel acting as a witness and recommended best practices for future interviews.

This was a three-day trial concerning an amended protection application by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) seeking extended society care for a 17-year-old youth with severe special needs.

The parents, largely uncooperative and unrepresented, sought the youth's immediate return to their care, including a plan to return to China.

The court found the youth in need of protection under ss. 74(2)(b) and (e) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, due to neglect and the parents' inability to meet his high needs and consistent refusal of services.

The court determined that extended society care was in the youth's best interests, primarily to ensure access to crucial lifelong adult services after he turns 18, which would not be available under a supervision order or parental care.

The parents' plan was deemed insufficient and lacking in detail.

The court granted extended society care with specified access to the parents.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion.

The respondent mother, F.G., sought to retract her consent to a final custody order placing her 21-month-old son with the maternal grandmother, D.N., which had been made pursuant to an agreed statement of facts.

The court denied the mother's request to retract consent, finding that her arguments did not meet the criteria under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules for setting aside an order, and the alleged "new evidence" was not a valid ground.

The court also found that the Society met the test for summary judgment under Rule 16(6) of the Family Law Rules, as there was no genuine issue for trial regarding disposition and access.

The final order for custody with the maternal grandmother remained in effect, and the final order regarding access to the mother was granted as sought by the Society.

The father brought a motion seeking a temporary change in the primary residence of his two children (ages 8 and 10) from the mother to himself.

This was based on disclosures made by the children to their counsel regarding the mother's verbal abuse and excessive punishment.

The mother opposed the motion and sought the children's immediate return.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that the disclosures, while concerning, did not amount to "compelling circumstances" to justify disturbing the six-year status quo.

The court ordered the children to resume primary residence with the mother, with protective terms regarding parental conduct and discipline.

This family law trial decision addresses parenting arrangements, decision-making responsibility, and child support arrears.

The applicant mother sought primary residence and sole decision-making due to a history of family violence.

The self-represented respondent father sought equal parenting.

The court acknowledged past family violence but found a significant reduction in risk and improved cooperation between the parties over the past four years.

Primary residence was granted to the mother, while decision-making for education and serious medical issues was ordered to be joint.

The father was ordered to pay ongoing child support and substantial arrears based on an imputed income, with a credit for past rent payments.

International travel with the children was permitted for both parents under specific conditions.

This decision addresses a motion for costs brought by the mother against the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) in a child protection proceeding.

The mother sought full recovery costs of $12,577, alleging the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, including late service of materials, mistaken pleadings, and untimely conduct.

The CAS argued against costs, citing its statutory obligations and the specific subrule for child protection cases.

The court reviewed principles for awarding costs against child protection agencies, emphasizing that while not immune, they should not be penalized for carrying out their mandate unless their conduct is patently unfair and indefensible.

The court found the CAS acted reasonably and thoroughly, dismissing the mother's claim for costs.

This decision addresses the quantum of costs awarded to the father, O’Neil Orlando Nelson, following his largely successful motion to change a previous order.

The court reviewed the principles of costs, emphasizing their modern purposes beyond mere indemnification, including encouraging settlement, sanctioning inappropriate behaviour, and ensuring cases are dealt with justly.

The mother, Camelia Dacianne Davidson, failed to comply with court orders for parenting time and did not make any offers to settle, while the father made repeated offers that mirrored the trial outcome.

The court found the father's position reasonable and his lawyer's time and rates appropriate.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment in a matrimonial property dispute.

The trial judge found that a declaration of trust and a $300,000 second mortgage were sham documents designed to defeat the respondent wife's interest in the matrimonial condominium.

The trial judge awarded the respondent an equalization payment of $100,500 and rejected an unequal division of property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, finding no basis to interfere with the credibility assessments or the detailed reasons for finding the documents to be shams.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The father brought a motion regarding the residence and schooling of the parties' daughter, which was subsequently settled.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The mother sought full indemnity costs, arguing the settlement mirrored her early offers and the status quo.

The father sought partial recovery costs, claiming his motion was necessary due to the mother's "self-help" actions and that the settlement reflected his offers.

The court, acknowledging the difficulty in determining success in settled cases, found that the final settlement left the parties in the same position as before the father's motion.

The court awarded the mother partial recovery costs of $8,500, finding her counsel's billed hours excessive but recognizing the father's motion had no substantive effect on the children's arrangements.

The applicants filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent society failed to provide them with an opportunity to be heard and meaningful explanations regarding their adoption of a child.

The applicants had requested additional information about the child and expressed concerns about delays in the placement process.

The Board found that the society deliberately withheld available information without explanation and failed to adequately explain delays in responding to the provincial ministry.

The Board ordered the society to provide detailed written explanations for the delays and the misinformation provided regarding the requirement of a Statement of Live Birth.

The applicants, former foster parents, filed a complaint against the children's aid society for failing to provide reasons why an adoption placement was not made and for failing to respond to their request for an Internal Complaint Review Panel (ICRP).

The Board found that the society closed the applicants' adoption file without written notice and failed to process their complaint.

The Board ordered the society to provide written reasons for the file closure, explain the steps required for a general adoption application, and process the ICRP request in accordance with the regulations.

The applicant applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board seeking a review of the respondent society's decisions regarding access to her children and alleged inaccuracies in her file.

The Board dismissed the application without a full hearing.

The Board found it lacked jurisdiction to review the access issue because the children had already been made Crown wards with no access by court order.

Furthermore, the Board held that the applicant must first exhaust the society's internal complaint process before seeking a review of the file inaccuracies.

The Applicant father filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging the respondent Society failed to hear his concerns regarding the mother's physical discipline and neglect of their children, and failed to provide reasons for its decisions.

The Board found that the Society did not give the Applicant an opportunity to be heard about his concerns or about the decisions taken in response to third-party allegations.

The Board ordered the Society to provide a detailed written explanation to the Applicant regarding its response to the allegations and its decision-making process.

The Applicant filed a complaint against the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto, alleging that the Society failed to give her an opportunity to be heard and failed to provide reasons for decisions affecting her interests regarding her infant son.

The Board found that the Society met its obligations in most instances, including her request for support prior to apprehension, concerns about her son's constipation and clothing, and requests for information.

However, the Board found that the Society failed to properly communicate with the Applicant regarding her concerns about her son's skin rash and her request for a change in family services worker.

The applicant, a 12-year-old child, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board for a review of her emergency admission to a secure treatment program.

The Board assessed whether the criteria for admission under section 124(2) of the Child and Family Services Act were met.

The Board found that the child did not have a mental disorder within the meaning of the Act, as her capacity to make reasoned judgments was not grossly impaired.

Consequently, the criteria for emergency admission were not satisfied, and the Board ordered the child's release from the secure treatment program.

The applicant father applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board for a review of his treatment by the respondent children's aid society, alleging the society failed to hear his concerns or provide reasons for its decisions.

The society submitted that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the subject matter of the complaint was currently before the Superior Court in a child protection application.

The Board agreed, finding that the court proceeding encompassed the issues raised in the complaint.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicants, the aunt and uncle of a Crown ward, applied to adopt her.

The Children's Aid Society refused the application before completing the homestudy, citing the severe and destructive history of the child's biological parents in disrupting family placements.

The applicants requested a review by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board found that the applicants were excellent candidates who had the maturity and resources to protect the child from her biological parents.

The Board rescinded the Society's decision, concluding that adoption by the applicants was in the child's best interests, subject to the completion of the homestudy visitation phase.

The applicant mother filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board against the Children's Aid Society regarding access to her children, communication, and counselling.

The Society argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the issues were already decided by or currently before the courts in a status review proceeding.

The Board agreed, finding that the complaints mirrored the issues raised in the applicant's motion for leave to commence a status review.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.