Anthony Macri

The mother appealed an order granting summary judgment in a child protection proceeding that made the child a Crown ward without access.

The motion judge had concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, given the child’s prolonged time in care, consistent refusal to return to the mother, and the statutory limits on continued Society wardship under the Child and Family Services Act.

On appeal, the mother argued the wrong legal test was applied and that the judge relied excessively on hearsay statements attributed to the child.

The court held that the correct summary judgment test was applied and that even if the expanded fact‑finding powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure had been considered, the outcome would have been the same.

The evidence established no triable issue, and the motion judge properly relied on professional reports reflecting the child’s consistent views and therapeutic assessments.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a 15-year-old child was in need of protection and an order making her a Crown ward.

The child had been in the society's care since February 2013 following a crisis involving self-harm and suicidal ideation.

The child consistently refused to return to her adoptive parents' care or permit them involvement in her treatment.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues requiring trial and that the child should be returned to their care.

The court granted the society's motion, finding the child was in need of protection under multiple grounds and that Crown wardship was the appropriate disposition.

The court rejected the parents' arguments regarding procedural fairness and the admissibility of evidence, and found that the child's wishes and best interests clearly supported the society's position.

A child protection agency sought an order dispensing with service of child protection documents on the respondent father, arguing that service would place the child and mother at grave risk of harm.

The father had a history of serious violence, including aggravated assault of a child resulting in brain and abdominal injuries, and had been incarcerated.

The court rejected the application to dispense with service, finding that the Family Law Rules do not permit dispensing with service based on best interests of the child alone.

However, the court ordered that service proceed with protective safeguards, including redaction of identifying information about the mother and child, restriction of the father's access to the court file, and a separate hearing date without the mother and child present.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for Crown wardship with no access for a 6.5-year-old child with severe behavioural and mental health needs, arguing he was adoptable.

The grandmother sought the child's return or, alternatively, access.

The court found the child could not safely be returned to the grandmother and ordered Crown wardship.

However, the court rejected the Society's plan for adoption, finding the child required long-term residential treatment and was not currently adoptable.

The court granted access to the grandmother and sister, finding the relationship was meaningful and beneficial, and that access would not impair foreseeable opportunities for adoption.

This is a dispositional phase decision in a child protection matter involving two children, J.C. (age 6½) and N.Y. (age 11), who were apprehended from their grandmother's care.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for J.C., arguing he was adoptable.

The grandmother sought return of J.C. to her care or, alternatively, access if Crown wardship was ordered.

The court found that J.C. had serious behavioral and mental health issues requiring long-term residential treatment and was not adoptable in the foreseeable future.

The court made J.C. a Crown ward but granted access to his grandmother and sister, finding that such access would not impair future adoption opportunities and that the familial relationships were meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship without access, arguing that the admission of hearsay, opinion, and business records evidence violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the Family Law Rules do not prohibit hearsay on summary judgment motions and the mother had consented to the protection finding without objecting to the evidence below.

The court found that admissible evidence and the mother's own admissions justified the disposition, as she had not presented an adequate plan for the care of the children, leaving no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order making a child a Crown ward.

The child had been apprehended in December 2009, placed with the mother in February 2011 under supervision, and re-apprehended in April 2011 after the mother violated multiple court-ordered conditions.

The mother sought to resume care; the father sought a custody order for the paternal grandmother in England.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the motion, making the child a Crown ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The court found the mother's plan to resume care had no air of reality given her pattern of emotional instability, poor judgment, inability to comply with court orders, and failure to engage in meaningful counselling or supportive services.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision placing the child with the mother under the supervision of the Children's Aid Society.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that this placement was in the best interests of the child, and that placement with the appellant was not.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a child protection order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to set aside the order and dismissed the appeal.

The appeal was heard subject to the publication ban provisions of the Child and Family Services Act.