Anthony Macri

The parties brought multiple motions regarding temporary spousal support, child support, and a section 30 assessment.

The respondent sought temporary spousal support based on an alleged income disparity, but the court dismissed the motion, finding his income evidence unreliable due to significant unreported cash deposits.

Both parties' motions for temporary child support were dismissed given the equal parenting schedule and the inability to accurately determine the respondent's income.

The applicant's motion for a section 30 assessment was granted to address the children's struggles and the high-conflict co-parenting dynamic.

The applicant brought a motion under the Partition Act for the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home and for an order requiring the respondent to vacate the property to facilitate repairs and staging.

The respondent consented to the sale but opposed vacating the home, citing financial hardship and the need to accommodate her adult son.

The court granted the motion, ordering the respondent to vacate by a specified date, finding that vacant possession was necessary to maximize the sale price and that the respondent had sufficient notice to find alternative accommodation.

The net proceeds were ordered to be divided equally on closing, with the respondent's share subject to deductions for her portion of repair costs and any registered liens.

The applicant father sought an order to enroll the three-year-old child in a full-time preschool program at K.B. Daycare, five days per week.

The respondent mother opposed the enrollment on her parenting days and sought transfer of the custody and access proceedings to the Superior Court of Justice to consolidate with her property and support claims.

The court granted the transfer to the Superior Court and ordered the child enrolled in the full-time program but exempted the child from attendance on the mother's parenting days, without prejudice to the father renewing the motion once the child starts junior kindergarten.

The court found that avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and consolidating all family law issues in one court served the interests of justice, despite concerns about delay.

The respondent father sought to change the access provisions of a 2009 custody and access order, requesting either a 45/55 shared parenting schedule (as recommended by the Office of the Children's Lawyer in 2013) or a 50/50 equal time-sharing arrangement.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and sought to maintain the status quo with discretionary overnight access contingent on the father providing proof of stable accommodation.

The court found a material change in circumstances since 2009, including the child's aging, ongoing parental conflict, the child's special needs (ADHD diagnosis), and changes in the father's living situation.

However, the court determined that a shared parenting arrangement was not feasible due to the father's unstable housing and employment history, the high level of parental conflict, and the lack of cooperation necessary for shared custody to function effectively.

The court reinstated overnight alternating weekend access conditioned on the father maintaining stable living accommodation with his partner, Ms. Dubin, while maintaining the mother's sole custody.

The applicant mother sought to change the child support provisions of a separation agreement, requesting that the respondent father pay the full table amount of child support and his proportionate share of special or extraordinary expenses for the children's hockey and other activities.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing that the separation agreement required the applicant to pay 100% of special expenses and that he had not agreed in writing to any such expenses.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including a substantial decrease in the applicant's income and a significant increase in the children's extraordinary expenses.

The court ordered the respondent to contribute 40% of a reasonable amount for sports and extracurricular activities, along with a contribution to orthodontic expenses and a retroactive payment for prior years.

The children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the father's appeal of a child protection order for delay or, in the alternative, on the merits.

The father had experienced delays in obtaining legal aid and transcripts, and had recently been charged with criminal offences resulting in a bail condition prohibiting contact with the child.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the delay was not unreasonable given the circumstances and that the appeal had merit.

The court emphasized that the father is presumed innocent of the criminal charges and that the appeal could be heard before the expiration of the current supervision order.

The applicant sought leave to proceed with custody motions under the Child and Family Services Act and interim custody relief.

The respondent sought an adjournment, and her counsel moved to be removed from the record.

The court granted leave for the applicant's motions and adjourned the interim relief motion on terms that maintained the children's residence with the paternal grandmother, where they had been living for three years.

The court also granted the respondent's counsel's motion to be removed from the record.

The decision highlighted the parents' ongoing high-conflict dynamic and psychological issues, which negatively impacted the children's well-being.

A motion brought by the maternal grandmother of two young children to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding.

The children were apprehended following the arrest of both parents on serious charges involving child sexual abuse and exploitation.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the motion, arguing that the grandmother's plan could be presented by the mother and that adding her would cause undue delay.

The court granted the motion, finding that adding the grandmother as a party was in the best interests of the children, that she had a legal interest in the proceeding, that her plan merited serious consideration, and that she had demonstrated commitment and cooperation.

The court limited her participation to the issue of disposition.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order placing a child in the custody of her maternal grandparents pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, with no access to her mother.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing there were triable issues regarding the child's placement and access.

The court found no genuine issues requiring trial and granted the Society's motion.

The child had been apprehended following the mother's arrest for assault.

She was placed with her grandparents in British Columbia and received therapeutic treatment.

Electronic contact between the child and mother caused significant emotional distress, manifested in nightmares and behavioral problems.

The child consistently expressed that she did not wish to have contact with her mother or return to her care.

The court found the mother had not taken responsibility for her abuse, had not engaged in appropriate treatment for her mental health issues, and had engaged in abusive and threatening behavior toward the grandparents and service providers.

The court ordered custody to the grandparents with no access to the mother, subject to the child's future wishes.

A motion brought by the Children's Aid Society to suspend direct access between a seven-year-old child in care and his mother, and to restrict access to written communication only.

The child had experienced significant trauma from domestic violence and parental substance abuse.

Following apprehension, the child exhibited severe behavioral and emotional dysregulation, with escalations occurring before and after access visits with his mother.

The court found that the child's circumstances had changed dramatically since the initial temporary access order, and that direct access was contributing to his crisis.

The motion was granted, suspending direct access and permitting only written correspondence screened by the society.

Following an eight-day family law trial, the court determined the costs award.

Although the respondent was largely successful on the main issues, including equalization and spousal support, he engaged in significant unreasonable behaviour, including ignoring trial management orders, raising irrelevant allegations, and failing to deliver materials on time.

The court reduced the respondent's costs claim from $80,285 to $50,000 to reflect this unreasonable conduct.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court awarded costs to the child protection society against the respondent parents for two of three motions brought by the parents.

The parents' motion to vary a temporary care and custody order was dismissed, as was their motion to remove a psychiatrist's report from the court record.

The parents also brought six contempt motions (five against individual society workers and one against the agency itself), all of which were dismissed.

The court found the parents' conduct in bringing these motions, particularly the contempt motions based on flawed evidence and material misrepresentations, to be exceptional and warranting costs awards.

The court awarded costs of $4,222.83 on the variation motion and $7,008.04 on the contempt motions, but declined to award costs on the motion to remove the medical report.

The applicant and respondent separated after a 12-year marriage.

The trial addressed equalization of net family property, child and spousal support, and the enforceability of an Iranian marriage contract and foreign judgment.

The court found the applicant owned several properties in Iran and included them in her net family property.

The court refused to enforce an Iranian default judgment regarding a gold coin pledge because the respondent had no notice of the foreign proceeding.

The court imputed income to both parties due to inadequate financial disclosure, ordered the applicant to pay an equalization payment of $227,530, ordered the respondent to pay child support, and dismissed the applicant's claims for spousal support and a restraining order.

A mother sought to bring a status review application to challenge a Crown wardship order made in 2014.

The Children's Aid Society moved to strike the application as statute barred under subsection 65.1(7) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the application was statute barred because it was issued within the prohibited period running from the service of a Notice of Appeal through six months following the final disposition of that appeal.

The court also found that even if the application were not statute barred, the mother would not meet the test for leave to proceed under subsection 65.1(5) of the Act.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in the care of the children's aid society for over four years and consistently expressed a strong desire not to have contact with the mother, following allegations of physical and sexual abuse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no triable issue regarding access, as the mother could not establish that an ongoing relationship would be meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's reliance on hearsay evidence from the child's therapists and social workers, which is expressly permitted under the governing child protection legislation.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order awarding sole custody of two children to the respondent father.

The mother argued the trial judge erred by proceeding in her absence, demonstrated bias, and ignored evidence of her good parenting and the father's domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the custody and bias issues, finding no error in the trial judge's conduct or factual findings.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a miscalculation of child support arrears agreed upon by the parties.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion on a status review application seeking to place a child in the care of her grandparents pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent mother challenged the court's jurisdiction to make such an order, arguing that because a section 57.1 order is deemed to be made under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of that Act, including that the child be habitually resident in Ontario.

The court rejected this argument and found it had jurisdiction to make the order, holding that the deeming provision does not restrict the court's authority to make the initial custody order and that the Legislature would have explicitly stated such a restriction if intended.

The appellant appealed an order of Crown wardship and, in the alternative, sought an order for access to the child.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the appeal against the Crown wardship order, limiting the appeal to the issue of access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the Crown wardship order as abandoned so that the child could be immediately placed for adoption.

The Court reserved its decision on the issue of access.

A child protection society sought a summary judgment motion to determine whether it could order parents to pay support pursuant to section 60 of the Child and Family Services Act for a child made a Crown Ward.

The parents argued that section 60 only applies to temporary care and custody or society wardship, not Crown wardship, and that Crown wardship terminates parental rights.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that Crown wardship does not terminate the parent-child relationship and that section 60 applies to children placed in the care of a society, including Crown Wards.

The court granted the motion and ordered the parents to pay $3,000 per month for the child's care.

In a high-conflict family dispute, both parents brought competing motions seeking sole custody of two children and changes to an interim parenting arrangement.

The father sought sole custody or expanded decision-making authority and restoration of mid‑week overnight parenting time that the mother had unilaterally terminated.

The mother sought sole custody and elimination of weekday overnights, arguing the arrangement caused stress and behavioural regression for one child.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of maintaining the status quo on interim custody and access motions absent compelling evidence affecting the children’s best interests.

Finding the evidence contradictory and largely untested, and noting the longstanding de facto arrangement of weekday overnights with the father, the court declined to change custody and restored the previous access schedule.