Anthony Macri

The children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the father's appeal of a child protection order for delay or, in the alternative, on the merits.

The father had experienced delays in obtaining legal aid and transcripts, and had recently been charged with criminal offences resulting in a bail condition prohibiting contact with the child.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the delay was not unreasonable given the circumstances and that the appeal had merit.

The court emphasized that the father is presumed innocent of the criminal charges and that the appeal could be heard before the expiration of the current supervision order.

The applicant sought leave to proceed with custody motions under the Child and Family Services Act and interim custody relief.

The respondent sought an adjournment, and her counsel moved to be removed from the record.

The court granted leave for the applicant's motions and adjourned the interim relief motion on terms that maintained the children's residence with the paternal grandmother, where they had been living for three years.

The court also granted the respondent's counsel's motion to be removed from the record.

The decision highlighted the parents' ongoing high-conflict dynamic and psychological issues, which negatively impacted the children's well-being.

A motion brought by the maternal grandmother of two young children to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding.

The children were apprehended following the arrest of both parents on serious charges involving child sexual abuse and exploitation.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the motion, arguing that the grandmother's plan could be presented by the mother and that adding her would cause undue delay.

The court granted the motion, finding that adding the grandmother as a party was in the best interests of the children, that she had a legal interest in the proceeding, that her plan merited serious consideration, and that she had demonstrated commitment and cooperation.

The court limited her participation to the issue of disposition.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order placing a child in the custody of her maternal grandparents pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, with no access to her mother.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing there were triable issues regarding the child's placement and access.

The court found no genuine issues requiring trial and granted the Society's motion.

The child had been apprehended following the mother's arrest for assault.

She was placed with her grandparents in British Columbia and received therapeutic treatment.

Electronic contact between the child and mother caused significant emotional distress, manifested in nightmares and behavioral problems.

The child consistently expressed that she did not wish to have contact with her mother or return to her care.

The court found the mother had not taken responsibility for her abuse, had not engaged in appropriate treatment for her mental health issues, and had engaged in abusive and threatening behavior toward the grandparents and service providers.

The court ordered custody to the grandparents with no access to the mother, subject to the child's future wishes.

A motion brought by the Children's Aid Society to suspend direct access between a seven-year-old child in care and his mother, and to restrict access to written communication only.

The child had experienced significant trauma from domestic violence and parental substance abuse.

Following apprehension, the child exhibited severe behavioral and emotional dysregulation, with escalations occurring before and after access visits with his mother.

The court found that the child's circumstances had changed dramatically since the initial temporary access order, and that direct access was contributing to his crisis.

The motion was granted, suspending direct access and permitting only written correspondence screened by the society.

Following an eight-day family law trial, the court determined the costs award.

Although the respondent was largely successful on the main issues, including equalization and spousal support, he engaged in significant unreasonable behaviour, including ignoring trial management orders, raising irrelevant allegations, and failing to deliver materials on time.

The court reduced the respondent's costs claim from $80,285 to $50,000 to reflect this unreasonable conduct.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court awarded costs to the child protection society against the respondent parents for two of three motions brought by the parents.

The parents' motion to vary a temporary care and custody order was dismissed, as was their motion to remove a psychiatrist's report from the court record.

The parents also brought six contempt motions (five against individual society workers and one against the agency itself), all of which were dismissed.

The court found the parents' conduct in bringing these motions, particularly the contempt motions based on flawed evidence and material misrepresentations, to be exceptional and warranting costs awards.

The court awarded costs of $4,222.83 on the variation motion and $7,008.04 on the contempt motions, but declined to award costs on the motion to remove the medical report.

The applicant and respondent separated after a 12-year marriage.

The trial addressed equalization of net family property, child and spousal support, and the enforceability of an Iranian marriage contract and foreign judgment.

The court found the applicant owned several properties in Iran and included them in her net family property.

The court refused to enforce an Iranian default judgment regarding a gold coin pledge because the respondent had no notice of the foreign proceeding.

The court imputed income to both parties due to inadequate financial disclosure, ordered the applicant to pay an equalization payment of $227,530, ordered the respondent to pay child support, and dismissed the applicant's claims for spousal support and a restraining order.

A mother sought to bring a status review application to challenge a Crown wardship order made in 2014.

The Children's Aid Society moved to strike the application as statute barred under subsection 65.1(7) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the application was statute barred because it was issued within the prohibited period running from the service of a Notice of Appeal through six months following the final disposition of that appeal.

The court also found that even if the application were not statute barred, the mother would not meet the test for leave to proceed under subsection 65.1(5) of the Act.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion on a status review application seeking to place a child in the care of her grandparents pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent mother challenged the court's jurisdiction to make such an order, arguing that because a section 57.1 order is deemed to be made under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of that Act, including that the child be habitually resident in Ontario.

The court rejected this argument and found it had jurisdiction to make the order, holding that the deeming provision does not restrict the court's authority to make the initial custody order and that the Legislature would have explicitly stated such a restriction if intended.

A child protection society sought a summary judgment motion to determine whether it could order parents to pay support pursuant to section 60 of the Child and Family Services Act for a child made a Crown Ward.

The parents argued that section 60 only applies to temporary care and custody or society wardship, not Crown wardship, and that Crown wardship terminates parental rights.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that Crown wardship does not terminate the parent-child relationship and that section 60 applies to children placed in the care of a society, including Crown Wards.

The court granted the motion and ordered the parents to pay $3,000 per month for the child's care.

In a high-conflict family dispute, both parents brought competing motions seeking sole custody of two children and changes to an interim parenting arrangement.

The father sought sole custody or expanded decision-making authority and restoration of mid‑week overnight parenting time that the mother had unilaterally terminated.

The mother sought sole custody and elimination of weekday overnights, arguing the arrangement caused stress and behavioural regression for one child.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of maintaining the status quo on interim custody and access motions absent compelling evidence affecting the children’s best interests.

Finding the evidence contradictory and largely untested, and noting the longstanding de facto arrangement of weekday overnights with the father, the court declined to change custody and restored the previous access schedule.

The mother appealed an order granting summary judgment in a child protection proceeding that made the child a Crown ward without access.

The motion judge had concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, given the child’s prolonged time in care, consistent refusal to return to the mother, and the statutory limits on continued Society wardship under the Child and Family Services Act.

On appeal, the mother argued the wrong legal test was applied and that the judge relied excessively on hearsay statements attributed to the child.

The court held that the correct summary judgment test was applied and that even if the expanded fact‑finding powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure had been considered, the outcome would have been the same.

The evidence established no triable issue, and the motion judge properly relied on professional reports reflecting the child’s consistent views and therapeutic assessments.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a 15-year-old child was in need of protection and an order making her a Crown ward.

The child had been in the society's care since February 2013 following a crisis involving self-harm and suicidal ideation.

The child consistently refused to return to her adoptive parents' care or permit them involvement in her treatment.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues requiring trial and that the child should be returned to their care.

The court granted the society's motion, finding the child was in need of protection under multiple grounds and that Crown wardship was the appropriate disposition.

The court rejected the parents' arguments regarding procedural fairness and the admissibility of evidence, and found that the child's wishes and best interests clearly supported the society's position.

A child protection agency sought an order dispensing with service of child protection documents on the respondent father, arguing that service would place the child and mother at grave risk of harm.

The father had a history of serious violence, including aggravated assault of a child resulting in brain and abdominal injuries, and had been incarcerated.

The court rejected the application to dispense with service, finding that the Family Law Rules do not permit dispensing with service based on best interests of the child alone.

However, the court ordered that service proceed with protective safeguards, including redaction of identifying information about the mother and child, restriction of the father's access to the court file, and a separate hearing date without the mother and child present.

This is a dispositional phase decision in a child protection matter involving two children, J.C. (age 6½) and N.Y. (age 11), who were apprehended from their grandmother's care.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for J.C., arguing he was adoptable.

The grandmother sought return of J.C. to her care or, alternatively, access if Crown wardship was ordered.

The court found that J.C. had serious behavioral and mental health issues requiring long-term residential treatment and was not adoptable in the foreseeable future.

The court made J.C. a Crown ward but granted access to his grandmother and sister, finding that such access would not impair future adoption opportunities and that the familial relationships were meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order making a child a Crown ward.

The child had been apprehended in December 2009, placed with the mother in February 2011 under supervision, and re-apprehended in April 2011 after the mother violated multiple court-ordered conditions.

The mother sought to resume care; the father sought a custody order for the paternal grandmother in England.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the motion, making the child a Crown ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The court found the mother's plan to resume care had no air of reality given her pattern of emotional instability, poor judgment, inability to comply with court orders, and failure to engage in meaningful counselling or supportive services.