Amanda Jane Jackson

The plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment on two mortgage loans, a line of credit, an overdraft loan, and a credit card.

The defendant, representing himself, raised several defences, including that he had repaid the loan with an EFT requisition, that the contract lacked consideration, and various pseudolegal arguments regarding promissory notes and bills of exchange.

The court found that the EFT requisition was dishonoured and rejected all of the defendant's legal arguments as meritless.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff with substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagee payment under a charge and possession of the charged property.

The appellants argued that being late with payments constituted 'arrears' rather than 'default', and that the mortgagee made unauthorized changes to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no distinction between late payments and default in the mortgage terms, and confirming that a single event of default was sufficient to accelerate the mortgage debt.

In a mortgage enforcement proceeding resolved by summary judgment, the court determined the quantum of costs after prior entitlement to substantial indemnity costs had already been established by contract.

The court applied Rule 57 reasonableness principles, considered proportionality against the judgment amount, and weighed litigation conduct including repeated settlement opportunities and delay-related behaviour.

Although the court accepted that the matter was not unusually sophisticated and reduced the effective hourly allowance, it found most work and disbursements reasonable and necessary.

The court rejected objections that Notice of Sale costs required a separate assessment process under the Mortgage Act and fixed total costs in a reduced but substantial amount payable by the responding party.

Following the granting of summary judgment and a writ of possession in favour of a mortgagee, the court addressed the outstanding issue of costs.

The defendants had resisted the summary judgment motion by raising issues that had previously lapsed or were not pursued, resulting in unnecessary prolongation of the proceeding.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and considering the mortgage covenant, the court determined that costs should be awarded on a substantial indemnity basis due to the defendants’ vexatious and unnecessary conduct.

After reviewing the plaintiff’s revised cost outline and adjusting for certain excessive or premature billing items, the court fixed costs at $13,000 inclusive of disbursements.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment, arguing that the motion judge displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias through his comments during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the transcript and found that while the motion judge used colourful language, his comments did not demonstrate bias or prejudgment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a residential mortgage following the mortgagor’s default and sought payment of the outstanding balance, possession of the property, and dismissal of a counterclaim.

The borrower argued that the lender failed to honour a three‑month payment holdback allegedly promised during refinancing and asserted defences including misrepresentation, non est factum, and equitable set‑off.

The court found that the mortgage commitment permitted changes to the holdback if the borrower’s financial representations were inaccurate and concluded that insufficient funds existed to fund the holdback because of undisclosed arrears and higher debts.

The record demonstrated the borrower knew the holdback was unavailable and had multiple opportunities to cure the default but failed to do so.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring trial under Rule 20 and dismissed the counterclaim.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment after depositing over $400,000 into the defendants’ joint account based on the mistaken belief that a mortgage had been registered to secure the advance.

During submissions, the plaintiff relied on theories including unjust enrichment, equitable subrogation, and estoppel.

The responding party argued these causes of action had not been pleaded and that granting judgment on that basis would be procedurally unfair.

The court held that the pleadings should first be amended to properly reflect the legal basis of the claim and allow the defendant to respond.

The motion was adjourned with directions requiring amended pleadings, completion of undertakings, and supplementary materials before the continuation of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal after failing to comply with a previous order requiring him to bring a motion for an adjournment by a specified date.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment to ensure fairness, as the appellant was in the process of retaining counsel.

The adjournment was granted on strict conditions, including the payment of $8,673.39 in costs by a specified date, failing which the respondent could move to dismiss the appeal.

The respondent landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal from an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The tenants failed to order a transcript or perfect the appeal, and provided no explanation for the delay.

The court quashed the appeal for failure to perfect and also found it devoid of merit, noting that applying the Small Claims Court monetary cap to the payment of outstanding rent arrears to void an eviction order under section 74(11) of the Residential Tenancies Act would result in an absurdity.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the franchisor and the respondent bank had a sufficiently close connection to make the bank responsible for the franchisor's faults.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that no such genuine issue existed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent and a second mortgagee advanced funds to a mortgagor, but their mortgages were registered in the wrong order due to a solicitor's error.

The appellant, a third mortgagee, learned of the error and subsequently purchased an assignment of the mistakenly first-registered mortgage at a discount, claiming priority over the respondent.

The application judge found the appellant had actual notice of the true priority before acquiring the assignment, defeating its claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

The Minister of Transportation appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision awarding the respondent $1,110,348 for the expropriation of a portion of her land.

The Minister argued the Board erred by deducting development and delay costs from the 'after value' of the remaining land, contending the compensation should be lower.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board correctly applied the 'before and after' valuation method and properly interpreted the Expropriations Act regarding market value and injurious affection.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding that the Town of Oakville did not owe her a duty of care to require a builder to warn about noise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the Town lacked the legal authority under the Planning Act to impose such a duty on the builder.

The court found that the Town's inability to discharge the duty without the Region's consent to severance negated any prima facie duty of care.

No costs were awarded as the Town did less than it might have.

The appellants held mortgages on a property that was destroyed by fire after being vacated by the owners.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claims under the standard mortgage clause, arguing that the vacancy was a material change to the risk under Statutory Condition 4 of which it was not notified.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Statutory Condition 4 conflicts with the standard mortgage clause, which explicitly preserves coverage despite any act or neglect of the mortgagor, including vacancy.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurer was precluded from relying on the statutory condition to void the mortgagees' coverage.

The appellant, a mortgagee in possession, sought to terminate a fixed-term residential lease on 60 days' notice pursuant to section 53(4) of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Divisional Court's finding that section 51(2) of the Tenant Protection Act, which requires termination at the end of the fixed term, is paramount due to the primacy clause in section 2(4) of the Tenant Protection Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motions to set aside a 1983 order terminating his tenancy.

He argued the original order was obtained by fraud because the corporate landlord had changed its name but had not registered the name change on title at the time of the application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the lands were owned by the same corporate entity at all relevant times and the failure to register the name change did not constitute a fraud on the court.