Adriana Doyle

The court awarded the applicant father $20,000 in costs following a 6-day trial where he was largely successful in obtaining sole custody and primary residence.

The respondent mother, who was self-represented, was found to have been unprepared and unreasonable in her litigation conduct, though her financial circumstances were considered in determining the quantum of costs.

The court significantly reduced the father's requested costs due to proportionality concerns, duplication of legal efforts, and lack of itemized disbursements.

The Applicant sought costs after successfully obtaining an order to close an access road on her property, subject to a temporary suspension for the Respondent's use.

The Respondent opposed the costs request, arguing that the Applicant was aware of the access road's long-standing use when she purchased the property and that he had made settlement offers.

The court considered the parties' efforts to settle, the importance and complexity of the issues (easements), and the reasonableness of the Applicant's counsel's fees.

The court awarded the Applicant costs of $7,500 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton brought a motion for summary judgment seeking extended society care for two children, F.M.-C. and L.M., and findings of need of protection.

The mother, supported by the father and maternal grandparents, opposed the motion, arguing that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including her progress in addressing Society concerns and the improper admission of evidence as business records.

The court dismissed the Society's motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial for both children, particularly regarding the mother's progress in addressing homelessness, substance use, and mental health, and the admissibility of the Society's evidentiary record.

The court emphasized the cautious approach required for summary judgment in child protection cases due to the high stakes and Charter rights involved.

The Applicant and Respondent brought cross-motions concerning various issues arising from their cohabitation.

The Respondent sought to strike the Applicant's claim due to his undischarged bankrupt status or, alternatively, security for costs.

The Applicant sought security for costs, disclosure of property documents, recovery of property, a timetable, and orders regarding communication with his son and the Respondent's address.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to strike, finding the Trustee in Bankruptcy had authorized the Applicant to pursue his constructive trust claim.

Both parties' requests for security for costs were dismissed, as the Applicant's claim was not deemed a waste of time or nuisance and the Respondent did not meet the criteria.

The Applicant was granted disclosure of property sale documents, while motions regarding communication with his son and the Respondent's address were dismissed due to lack of evidence.

A timetable for the proceedings was established, and costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The applicant father brought a motion to enforce a final order for summer parenting time in British Columbia, which the respondent mother denied due to alleged safety concerns stemming from an incident the previous summer.

The mother brought a cross-motion for supervised access in Ottawa and anger management for the father.

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) closed its file without taking a position.

The court found the final order remained in effect and the mother could not unilaterally deny access.

The court was not prepared to restrict access based on uncorroborated hearsay and dismissed the mother's motion, ordering the father's parenting time to proceed as per the final order.

The court rendered a costs endorsement following a six-day trial in a family law matter.

The Applicant sought substantial costs, arguing she was largely successful on major issues such as imputed income and support.

The Respondent argued for each party to bear their own costs, claiming neither party's offer to settle was more favourable.

The court found the Applicant to be the more successful party on the major issues, particularly regarding imputed income and retroactive support, and awarded the Applicant $15,000 in costs, considering the complexity of issues, parties' behaviour, and expert fees.

The accused, J.P., was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a five-year-old complainant.

The case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused being found naked in bed with the complainant whose shorts and underwear were down, inculpatory statements by the accused, and DNA evidence.

The court found the mother's evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and emotional state, and the expert DNA evidence inconclusive regarding the source and timing of semen.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to inconsistencies.

However, considering the evidence as a whole, the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt, leading to dismissal of all charges.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an interim order that expanded the applicant father's access to his daughter.

The father sought costs on a full indemnity basis, arguing the mother was unreasonable regarding access and caused delays.

The mother argued for divided success, noting the final order was more aligned with her offer regarding the timing of overnight visits.

The court found divided success but determined the father was more successful overall in obtaining meaningful access.

Applying principles of costs, including partial indemnification, encouraging settlement, and discouraging inappropriate behaviour, the court ordered the mother to pay the father $1000 in costs within nine months, considering the importance of the case, the reasonableness of the parties' behaviour, and the proportionality of the award.

The Appellant, Graham Blair, appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal raised five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's findings on reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand, the onus of proof for a Charter s. 9 breach, the consistency of factual findings regarding police officers, and the sufficiency of evidence for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including the onus on the accused to prove a Charter breach, the objective and subjective test for reasonable and probable grounds, and the standard of "slight impairment" for impaired driving convictions based on the totality of circumstantial evidence.

The accused, Dennis James Edgar, was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking while serving a penitentiary term.

The fentanyl was found concealed in a blanket in a dry cell where he was confined.

The Crown relied on prison procedures and expert testimony regarding drug distribution in institutions.

The defence argued that crucial evidence, including CCTV footage and testimony from officers responsible for dry cell preparation, was missing, creating reasonable doubt about the accused's knowledge of the fentanyl.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of the fentanyl, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The applicant sought to set aside paragraphs 4 and 5 of a final order related to property division and mortgage payments, arguing that she believed the matter had settled and was unaware of the uncontested hearing.

The court applied the factors for setting aside default judgments, finding the applicant's non-attendance plausible due to a perceived settlement and the respondent's lack of candour regarding prior agreements.

The motion was granted in part, setting aside the pension division and mortgage payment reimbursement, but not the special expenses.

The applicant's pleadings were reinstated, and the matter was listed for trial.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (Society) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child, D.G., was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health and substance abuse issues, and for an order granting sole legal custody to the father with discretionary access for the mother.

The father consented to the motion, while the mother, self-represented, opposed it, arguing the father also had issues and requesting an adjournment to complete a treatment program.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court determined that the child was in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, placed the child in the sole legal custody of the father as the least intrusive disposition, and ordered that the mother's access be at the father's discretion, to be supervised, given her ongoing struggles and inconsistent visits.

The court also permitted the father to obtain a passport for the child and travel without the mother's consent, subject to providing an itinerary.

The respondent brought a motion seeking to be declared a "special party" under Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules and to have a litigation guardian appointed due to alleged mental incapacity preventing her participation in trial.

The applicant opposed, arguing the respondent had not met the onus of demonstrating incapacity and that such an appointment would deprive him of a fair trial.

The court found that while the medical evidence indicated significant stress and mental health issues, it did not conclusively establish that the respondent was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decisions or instruct counsel.

The motion was dismissed, but adjourned to allow the respondent to submit further evidence regarding her capacity.

The applicant, charged with possession of child pornography, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The motion raised three specific areas for cross-examination: delayed report to justice, a "Branton error" in the search warrant's language, and an incorrect date in the ITO regarding the initial complaint.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on the "Branton error" and the incorrect date, finding these issues could discredit the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Leave was denied for the delayed report to justice, as it occurred after the warrant's issuance and did not bear on the pre-conditions for authorization.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following motions brought by both parties in a family law matter.

The Court found the applicant, Mrs. Syed, to be the successful party on major issues, including the imputation of the respondent Mr. Syed's income at $600,000 per annum and the determination of child and spousal support.

While there was divided success on some minor issues, and Mr. Syed made some concessions, his unreasonable behaviour regarding financial disclosure significantly impacted the costs incurred by Mrs. Syed.

The Court declined to award full-recovery costs, finding Mr. Syed's conduct did not meet the high threshold for bad faith, but awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant mother sought a retroactive adjustment of child support and s. 7 expenses, and an increase in life insurance as security, following a significant increase in the respondent father's income.

The respondent father requested that his income be capped at $150,000 for child support purposes, arguing that the table amount would constitute a wealth transfer and that the child's needs had not changed.

The court found that the father failed to rebut the presumption that the table amounts were appropriate, given his increased income and the mother's strained financial situation.

The court ordered the father to pay increased child support retroactively and share s. 7 expenses proportionally, but dismissed the mother's request to increase life insurance and her claim for soccer expenses incurred without agreement.

The respondent father moved to set aside a default final order obtained by the applicant mother, which granted her sole custody, supervised access to the father, and ordered child and spousal support.

The father argued he was unable to attend the hearing due to language barriers, delays in obtaining inter-provincial legal aid, and his assigned lawyer's non-attendance.

The court applied Rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules, finding the father's reasons satisfactory.

The final order was set aside, and the issues of jurisdiction, custody, and access were adjourned for a full hearing.

This is a costs endorsement following an eight-day family law trial.

Both the applicant (father) and respondent (mother) sought costs, but the court found there was "divided success" on the main issues of custody and parenting arrangements.

Neither party obtained an order more favourable than their Rule 18(14) offers to settle.

The court also noted issues with vague offers and the failure to deal with costs at each step of the litigation as per Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules.

Ultimately, the court ordered no costs, with each party bearing their own costs for the trial, case conference, and settlement conference.

The applicant father sought to retroactively adjust child support and rescind arrears, arguing his income had changed.

The respondent mother disputed the changes and opposed the rescission of arrears, seeking the table amount of child support.

The court found the father was intentionally underemployed in 2014 and 2015, imputing income based on his prior agreement, and therefore denied retroactive adjustment for those years.

For 2016, the court found the father was underemployed due to pursuing education and training, allowing a downward adjustment for that period.

Ongoing child support was set based on his current income.

The father was ordered to pay accumulated arrears for 2014 and 2015, as well as outstanding Section 7 arrears.

The applicant sought to vary a prior order by terminating child support, adjusting child and spousal support retroactively, and increasing ongoing spousal support.

The respondent sought to impute income to the applicant and opposed increased spousal support.

The court found no material change of circumstances to justify a variation beyond the agreed-upon annual review.

It denied the imputation of income to the applicant, adjusted child and spousal support retroactively for 2015, and set ongoing spousal support at $702 per month.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for health care premium payments and maintained the existing life insurance security for spousal support.