W. Glen Orr

The applicant, Tyler Wirag, brought Charter applications under sections 8 and 9 to exclude evidence (a handgun seized from a crashed vehicle and DNA evidence) and challenge his detention and arrest.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the warrantless seizure of the handgun was justified by exigent circumstances and common law police powers to protect public safety.

The court also found that police had reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was the driver of the vehicle, making his detention and subsequent arrest lawful and Charter-compliant.

This is a ruling on a Crown application to admit investigative notes and records of a police officer (DC Soucy) as a principled exception to the hearsay rule in a criminal trial.

DC Soucy, who was involved in forensic evidence collection and handling, is on medical leave and unable to testify.

The defence conceded necessity but disputed threshold reliability.

The court found that DC Soucy's limited, routine role, contemporaneous note-taking, photographic corroboration, and lack of motive to lie established sufficient substantive reliability.

The application was allowed, making the evidence admissible.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with excessive blood alcohol content.

On appeal, he raised several Charter arguments (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) concerning the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the roadside screening demand, the reliability of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) results, and the delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all arguments, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's rulings, including factual findings based on credibility and the proper application of legal principles regarding police authority and Charter rights.

The accused, charged with being an accessory after the fact to murder and aggravated assault, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) rights during multiple arrests and detentions, seeking the exclusion of a seized firearm, cellphones, and statements.

The Crown brought a blended application seeking a finding that five statements made by the accused to police were voluntary.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a high-risk vehicle takedown and reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused after observing a firearm in plain view.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no breaches.

Furthermore, the court found that all five statements were made voluntarily, rejecting the accused's claim that her final statement was induced by an 'under the table' deal brokered by her former counsel.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon following an unprovoked stabbing in a shopping mall.

The court determined the appropriate sentence was five and a half years in prison, noting the seriousness of the offence and the offender's intoxication.

However, after applying credit for over three years of pre-trial custody, including enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions, the sentence was reduced to time-served with no probation order.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon, sought to have the defence of extreme intoxication put to the jury for the general intent offences (aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon).

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on extreme intoxication, emphasizing the high evidentiary burden, including the requirement for expert evidence to establish a state akin to automatism or insanity.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the defence's toxicologist did not opine that the accused's state reached the level of extreme intoxication required by the Supreme Court.

The court ruled that the accused failed to meet the evidentiary burden, and therefore, the defence of extreme intoxication would not be put to the jury for the general intent offences.

The accused brought a pretrial motion alleging infringements of his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) or a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided about the charges, as the accused was sufficiently informed of his jeopardy.

Regarding section 10(b), the court found no breach despite a delay in facilitating access to duty counsel at the hospital and police station, citing reasonable security concerns at the hospital and the police's diligent efforts at the station.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court stated it would not have excluded the evidence (eyewitness statements, video) under section 24(2) as it was not 'obtained in a manner' that infringed Charter rights, nor would it have granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The accused was discharged on all counts following reconsideration of a committal for trial order.

The original committal was based on evidence that the accused was found alone in an apartment where drugs and a firearm were discovered.

The Court of Appeal quashed the original committal order because the judge had misapprehended key evidence—specifically, a baseball hat that was thought to link the accused to the firearm was not, in fact, the same hat the accused had been seen wearing previously.

On reconsideration, the judge found that without this evidence, the Crown's case rested on impermissible speculation and inferential leaps.

The evidence was insufficient to establish the accused's knowledge and control of the contraband, as multiple other individuals had access to the apartment and forensic evidence linked others to the drugs.

Yolanda Meecham sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, arguing a violation of her s. 8 Charter rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court applied the R. v. Garofoli "step six" procedure for redacted ITOs and the R. v. Debot "three Cs" criteria (credibility, compelling, corroboration) for confidential informant information.

Despite acknowledging the ITO's poor drafting and inaccuracies, including a withdrawn charge, the court found that, after excisions and amplification, the ITO met the low threshold for reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood-alcohol level exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved that the accused collided with another vehicle on Highway 409, fled the scene at high speed, and was subsequently found with a damaged vehicle.

Breath tests revealed readings of 216 and 199 milligrams.

The defence raised Charter challenges regarding the right to counsel, search and seizure, and lost evidence, all of which were dismissed.

The court found the Crown proved impairment through the accused's dangerous driving, glassy eyes, odour of alcohol, and expert toxicology evidence.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the impaired driving count stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was convicted by a jury of fraud over $5000 for his role in a scheme involving fake loans and unreturned due diligence fees totaling over $500,000 USD.

The court found the accused played a lesser role than his co-conspirator but still lied to victims, causing significant financial and personal harm.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds, the court determined a fit sentence was 3 years' imprisonment, which was reduced to time served due to pre-sentence custody credit.

A restitution order for 50% of the loss ($341,263.04 CAD) was also imposed.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel due to a conflict of interest after the same lawyer had represented both an accused and a key Crown witness who later provided incriminating statements.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of the witness’s evidence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, arguing police inducements and delayed disclosure compromised their fair trial rights.

The court found that while police comments undermining the witness’s confidence in her lawyer were inappropriate, the accused could not rely on alleged Charter breaches affecting the witness, and no actual prejudice to their ability to make full answer and defence was established.

The court declined to grant a stay or exclude the witness’s evidence but held the conflict required removal of counsel.

The accused would need to obtain new counsel and a new trial date.

The accused sought judicial interim release under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a justice of the peace’s order detaining him on secondary and tertiary grounds in connection with multiple charges arising from an alleged staged motor vehicle accident and insurance fraud scheme.

The proposed plan of release included two sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring.

The court held that the justice of the peace erred in detaining the accused on secondary grounds and found that strict conditions including electronic monitoring could address concerns relating to secondary and tertiary grounds.

However, the court concluded that the proposed sureties were unsuitable due to credibility concerns and prior criminal justice involvement.

Because the sureties were not satisfactory, the proposed bail plan failed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry on charges of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction because there was no evidence that he knew the shipment he handled contained heroin or any controlled substance.

The court reviewed the governing test under s. 548 of the Criminal Code and the jurisprudence in Shephard, Arcuri, and related authorities, emphasizing the highly deferential standard applicable on certiorari review of committal decisions.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence, including phone intercepts, coordinated activity with a co‑accused, and handling of the shipment, was capable of supporting an inference of knowledge if believed.

As some evidence existed on the essential element of knowledge, the preliminary inquiry judge acted within jurisdiction and the committal could not be disturbed.