Tyler H. McLean

The defendants (Smith Defendants) brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel (McLean) due to an alleged conflict of interest and to prevent the use of allegedly privileged documents.

The plaintiffs (Milicevic/Mazzone) brought cross-motions to remove the defendants' counsel (Rapley), to amend their pleadings, and for orders regarding document production and privilege.

The court dismissed both motions to remove counsel, finding no compelling reason to interfere with the parties' choice of counsel and noting the tactical nature of the motions.

The court also ruled on the privilege of various documents, finding that joint retainer documents were not privileged as between the joint clients, and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their cross-claim in the Toronto action while denying the withdrawal of their indemnity claim in the Brampton action.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to recover funds allegedly loaned or invested in the defendant corporation and evidenced by promissory notes.

The defendant opposed the motion and sought summary judgment dismissing the claim on the basis that it was statute‑barred.

The court held that the limitation period under the Limitations Act expired in February 2008 following a demand for payment in 2006 and that no valid acknowledgment occurred before the expiry of the limitation period.

A purported later promissory note relied upon by the plaintiff was found to be a forgery and therefore could not revive the claim or constitute an acknowledgment of debt.

The plaintiff’s claim, whether framed as enforcement of the promissory notes or as a loan, was statute‑barred and equitable relief was unavailable due to the plaintiff’s lack of clean hands.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order and a corresponding costs order arising from complex litigation involving the sale of business assets.

The court applied the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the motion judge's decision did not reflect significant legal error and that the case was fact-driven, lacking matters of general or public importance that would warrant appellate review.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The court heard competing motions arising from a business sale dispute involving an agreement of purchase and sale entered into before the purchaser's corporation was incorporated and later followed by that corporation's bankruptcy.

The defendants sought to strike the individual plaintiff for lack of capacity and, alternatively, summary judgment dismissing his personal claim on the basis of an assignment under s. 21 of the Business Corporations Act; the plaintiffs sought declarations that the assignment transferred all rights and obligations to the corporation.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court held the record was inadequate to fairly and justly determine the assignment and liability issues, particularly given conflicting positions, the absence of evidence from the trustee in bankruptcy, and factual disputes about payments and asset transfers.

The court interpreted s. 21 of the Business Corporations Act as not permitting rights and obligations under the pre-incorporation contract to be severed in the manner urged by the defendants.

All motions were dismissed, though the plaintiffs were directed to amend their pleading to clarify alternative claims.

Following the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of claim to add an oppression claim under s.248 of the Business Corporations Act, the successful defendant sought costs of the motion.

The defendant requested partial indemnity costs based on 50.4 hours of counsel time.

The court found the claimed hours excessive for a routine motion that took less than half a day and concluded that 20 hours would have been reasonable at the claimed hourly rate under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, considering the broader circumstances of the dispute, including that the defendant retained $500,000 advanced by the plaintiff while denying liability, the court exercised its discretion to decline awarding costs.

No costs were ordered.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his Statement of Claim to add personal defendants and an alternative claim for an oppression remedy.

The original claim was based on a promissory note, which the defendant alleged was a forgery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the original pleading contained no facts to support an oppression remedy, and the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action for which the limitation period had expired.

The applicants sought to set aside corporate Change Notices filed with the Ministry of Government Services that purported to remove existing directors of a non-profit amateur football corporation and replace them with the respondent and her supporters.

The dispute arose from competing groups seeking control of the organization and its assets.

The court found that the respondent lacked authority to unilaterally file the Change Notices and that the removals were not supported by proper corporate procedures, written resignations, or valid resolutions.

Evidence showed several directors had not resigned and continued to assert their positions.

The court set aside the Change Notices and directed that a properly constituted meeting be held to address the corporation’s governance issues.