Thomas J. Donnelly

The appellant appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurer had no duty to defend under a comprehensive general liability policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the claims by unidentified victims of abuse at a residential school were not 'first made against the insured during the policy period'.

The court held that a general understanding of a problem without sufficient detail does not constitute a claim, and therefore the insurer owed no duty to defend the subsequent actions.

The respondents settled a personal injury claim arising from a bar fight and subsequently brought an action against the appellant for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act.

The trial judge found the appellant 80% liable and ordered him to pay $380,000.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of liability but held that the trial judge erred in apportioning fault without regard to the findings in the first trial.

The Court reduced the appellant's contribution to $162,555.50 to ensure the respondents did not obtain a better result in the second action than they could have in the first.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that the respondent insureds were entitled to full coverage of over $20 million for a property loss.

At the time of the loss, the insureds had entered into a conditional Agreement of Purchase and Sale for the property but had not yet obtained court approval.

The Court of Appeal found that the insureds had bargained away their beneficial ownership interest under the agreement and were therefore not entitled to full coverage.

However, the Court held that the insureds were entitled to limited coverage of $2.5 million under the policy's 'Acquired Locations' clause, as the term 'purchased' was sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the contra proferentem doctrine in their favour.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant, Lafarge Canada Inc., sought a Bullock order regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to make the order, noting that the appellant should have known the inclusion of the successful insurers as respondents on the appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by the appellant abandoning the appeal against most of them at the end of oral argument.

The Court requested further submissions on whether the successful insurers should receive partial or substantial indemnity costs and whether costs should be fixed or assessed.

The plaintiffs, homeowners, sued Bertrand and Lafarge for damages resulting from defective concrete foundations caused by fly ash supplied by Lafarge.

The trial judge found Lafarge 80% liable and Bertrand 20% liable for approximately $20,000,000 in damages.

This appeal concerns the insurance coverage disputes between Bertrand, Lafarge, and their numerous primary and excess insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the defective foundations constituted property damage under the CGL policies, that the continuous trigger theory applied to trigger all policies from 1986 to 1992, and that certain excess insurers had a duty to contribute to defence and third-party costs.

The appeal by Guardian Insurance was allowed regarding its duty to defend, but all other appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed.

Following the release of reasons for judgment on May 17, 2002, the Court of Appeal received the respondents' Bill of Costs and written submissions from the parties.

Having regard to the success on appeal, the legal issues raised, and the submissions, the court awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,500 inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.

The respondents, who operated a horse farm, were sued by a horse trainer who sustained injuries after falling from a horse.

The trainer initially pleaded she was an employee, but later amended her claim to remove references to employment, as the respondents' farm liability insurance policy excluded coverage for employees.

The insurer refused to defend the action, arguing the pleadings were manipulated and seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the trainer was an employee.

The applications judge declared the insurer had a duty to defend and declined to consider the extrinsic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the duty to defend is determined by the pleadings and the policy, and that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to make premature findings of fact on matters at issue in the underlying tort litigation.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that it had a duty to defend the respondent insured, a contractor, in actions arising from an oil spill.

The insured was retained to remediate the spill but was sued for allegedly failing to clean it up in a timely and proper manner.

The insurer argued that the claims did not fall within the insuring agreement and were excluded by a pollution exclusion clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claims fell within the insuring agreement and that the pollution exclusion clause did not apply because the insured's alleged negligence constituted an independent cause of the loss occurring after the original discharge.

The appellant's claim was dismissed at trial.

She appealed but failed to pay the deposit for trial transcripts.

After multiple extensions of time to perfect the appeal and obtain legal aid, her appeal was dismissed for delay by Laskin J.A. The appellant moved for an extension of time to review Laskin J.A.'s order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting there was still no evidence she could pay for transcripts or proceed with the appeal, and almost a year had passed since the initial extension.