Thomas Hawkins

The moving plaintiff sought leave to amend the statement of claim to add a new corporate plaintiff, additional defendants, and new allegations relating to the alleged non‑payment of professional fees for psychological services.

The responding defendants opposed the amendments on the basis that limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002 had expired and that some proposed amendments raised new causes of action.

The court held that where it is unclear whether a limitation period has expired, leave to amend should generally be granted subject to the responding parties retaining the right to raise a limitation defence.

Leave was granted to add certain parties, including a law firm as a defendant, and to make most amendments, while some proposed paragraphs were refused or required revision for failing to plead material facts.

The motion was therefore partially granted with conditions.

The moving defendants sought costs of a motion following reasons previously released awarding them costs of a discontinued action but not addressing the motion itself.

The responding plaintiff argued that the absence of a costs provision meant no costs were payable and that the court was functus officio.

The court rejected both arguments, holding that because no formal order had yet been issued and entered, the court retained jurisdiction to address costs.

Applying the principles of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1.1) and the cost factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the claimed amount and fixed enhanced costs at $8,000 payable by the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their action for delay.

The action had experienced significant delays, largely due to the chronic procrastination of the plaintiffs' counsel.

Despite finding the explanation for the delay inadequate, the court applied a contextual approach based on the Reid criteria.

The court found that the delay was not deliberate or contumacious, and the defendants failed to demonstrate significant prejudice resulting from the delay.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order was set aside, and the plaintiffs were granted an extension to set the action down for trial, but were ordered to pay $15,000 in costs to the responding defendants due to the indulgence granted.

The self‑represented plaintiff in a legal malpractice action brought a motion under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to amend her amended statement of claim.

The proposed amended pleading was 236 pages long and contained extensive allegations including claims involving non‑parties, pleas of evidence rather than material facts, scandalous allegations, constitutionally flawed assertions, and claims that were statute‑barred or otherwise untenable.

The court held that leave to amend should be refused where proposed amendments are clearly impossible of success or constitute an abuse of process.

The court concluded that the proposed pleading was fundamentally flawed and non‑compliant with pleading rules requiring concise statements of material facts.

The motion for leave to amend was dismissed with prejudice in respect of the untenable allegations.

The defendants brought a motion to strike affidavits filed by counsel for the plaintiff after cross-examination on an earlier affidavit.

The court held that the subsequent affidavit constituted an improper attempt to repair or explain earlier evidence following cross-examination, effectively amounting to a belated re‑examination contrary to subrule 34.11(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court emphasized that re‑examination must occur immediately following cross‑examination and declined to dispense with the rule under Rule 2.03 because no justification was provided.

The June affidavit was struck, while a second affidavit from another lawyer was disregarded as unnecessary and duplicative of an existing transcript.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in writing seeking various forms of relief, including an order preventing the registrar from dismissing the action for delay.

Counsel for one defendant delivered notice requiring that the motion be heard orally under Rule 37.12(5)(d).

During a case conference, the court declined to grant an open-ended order preventing administrative dismissal and instead directed the plaintiffs to request a status hearing before the case management judge.

The court further directed that if the plaintiffs wished to proceed with the motion, they should promptly obtain a hearing date in consultation with defence counsel.

The plaintiff moved for leave under Rule 48.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck off.

The court applied the four-factor framework governing restoration motions, including whether delay was intentional, whether there was inordinate and inexcusable delay, whether the plaintiff rebutted any presumption of prejudice, and whether the defendant demonstrated actual prejudice.

The court found the delay was not intentional or contumelious and that the action had originally been set down for trial within a reasonable period after commencement.

The plaintiff provided evidence addressing delay and asserting no prejudice, while the defendant produced no concrete evidence of actual prejudice beyond general assertions.

Balancing the factors and the interests of the parties, the court granted leave to restore the action to the trial list and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs for the indulgence.

The defendants brought motions to strike various portions of a statement of claim in an action alleging wrongful dismissal, defamation, conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The court considered whether numerous allegations offended the pleading requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rules 25.06 and 25.11.

Some paragraphs were struck as irrelevant, speculative, or lacking material facts, including portions relating to unrelated background allegations and speculative assertions.

Other allegations, including those concerning conspiracy and alternative pleadings regarding defamatory communications, were found to sufficiently plead material facts and were allowed to stand.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to provide further particulars for certain allegations and granted leave to amend where appropriate.

The defendant municipality brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s civil action for failure to comply with multiple interlocutory cost orders.

The plaintiff had failed for several years to pay costs awarded in prior proceedings, including $10,000 ordered following dismissal of an appeal and additional costs awarded on subsequent motions and appeals.

The court considered Rule 60.12 and subrule 57.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorize dismissal or other sanctions where a party fails to comply with interlocutory orders, including orders for payment of costs.

Finding that the plaintiff persistently refused to comply with cost orders, repeatedly delayed the action, and demonstrated no intention of satisfying the outstanding obligations, the court concluded that dismissal was the appropriate sanction.

The action was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff moved under subrules 37.14(1)(c) and (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay.

Applying the four‑factor test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., the court found the plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the litigation delay but established that the missed trial‑set‑down deadline resulted from inadvertence, that the motion to set aside was brought within a reasonable time, and that the defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice arising from the delay.

Considering the contextual approach endorsed in appellate authority, the court concluded that the absence of material prejudice justified setting aside the dismissal despite the plaintiff’s shortcomings.

The action was reinstated subject to directions requiring prompt filing of the trial record and completion of mediation, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the responding defendants’ costs.

The moving defendants sought costs after the plaintiff discontinued a defamation action arising from online criticism of a municipal mayor during an election campaign.

The court considered whether the action constituted Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

Based on the timing of the action, the absence of a demand letter, the use of a notice of action without a statement of claim, and the plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence explaining the litigation, the court inferred that the proceeding was intended to silence political critics.

Exercising discretion under Rule 23.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the defendants were successful parties following discontinuance and were entitled to costs.

Enhanced costs were awarded due to the SLAPP nature of the litigation.

The moving plaintiff sought to set aside a registrar's dismissal for delay and obtain leave to file a substantially expanded amended statement of claim in contamination litigation.

Applying a contextual approach under rule 37.14 and related jurisprudence, the court found the delay had adequate explanation in light of counsel changes, document-production disputes, and evolving contamination evidence.

The court also held the proposed amendments did not plead a new cause of action, and alternatively found limitation issues unsuitable for determination on a pleadings motion.

The dismissal order was set aside, leave to amend was granted subject to limitation defences, costs were fixed against one responding party, and costs as between the plaintiff and the railway were reserved to the trial judge.

The moving defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action for failure to pay a previous costs award and failure to comply with an interlocutory order regarding undertakings.

The Master declined to dismiss the action, finding the plaintiff was impecunious.

The defendants also sought production of the plaintiff's accident benefits file from a subsequent motor vehicle accident and orders for two additional independent medical examinations.

The Master ordered the plaintiff to produce relevant documents from the subsequent accident benefits file and to attend the requested independent medical examinations with a neuropsychologist and a psychiatrist to ensure trial fairness.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a medical malpractice action as abandoned under Rule 48.15(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to extend the time for service of the originating process.

The court applied the Reid factors governing relief from registrar dismissal orders, considering the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The delay arose primarily from severe personal tragedies affecting the plaintiff’s former counsel, which rendered him unable to practice and resulted in the plaintiff being unaware that her action had not been prosecuted.

The court found that the plaintiff acted promptly once aware of the issue and that the defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice from the delay.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside and late service of the notice of action and statement of claim was validated.

The moving party sought leave under Rule 60.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to issue a writ of seizure and sale more than six years after judgment relating to a motor vehicle accident claim assigned to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The responding party had filed a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and listed the Fund as an unsecured creditor.

The court held that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act binds the Crown and that s. 69.2(1) imposes a stay of proceedings preventing creditors from enforcing provable claims once a consumer proposal is filed.

The judgment debt was a provable claim in bankruptcy and therefore enforcement remedies, including issuing a writ of seizure and sale, were barred during the proposal process.

Leave to issue the writ was denied.

The moving defendants sought leave under Rule 29.02(1.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to issue a third party claim against an alarm monitoring company in an action alleging failure by insurance brokers to obtain adequate insurance coverage for stock spoilage.

The plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that adding the third party would cause delay and prejudice.

The court held that leave should be granted unless the plaintiff would suffer meaningful prejudice, and found no evidence that witnesses or documents had been lost due to the delay.

The court also held that limitation period concerns were not determinative at the leave stage because the discoverability provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002 might postpone the running of the limitation period.

Leave to issue the third party claim was granted and service by courier on the proposed third party was validated.

The defendants moved for several orders in a wrongful dismissal action, including injunctive relief restricting the plaintiff’s direct contact with them and sanctions for the plaintiff’s failure to pay multiple outstanding costs awards.

The court held that a master lacked jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctive relief under the Courts of Justice Act and adjourned that portion of the motion to be heard by a judge.

The court found the plaintiff had failed to pay four costs orders totalling $6,160 and that no appeals remained pending.

Applying Rules 57.03(2) and 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claimed inability to pay and concluded that sanctions were warranted.

The action was stayed until the outstanding costs are paid, with leave to the defendants to seek dismissal if payment is not made within three months.

The moving defendants sought sanctions after the first plaintiff failed to comply with earlier court orders requiring answers to undertakings and refused questions from discovery and payment of previously ordered motion costs.

The court considered Rules 57.03 and 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing costs enforcement and sanctions for non‑compliance with interlocutory orders.

Although some progress toward compliance occurred and the delay was partly explained by counsel’s involvement in a lengthy trial and administrative issues with payment of photocopying invoices, the court found prolonged non‑compliance with two court orders.

The court held that the defendants were justified in bringing the motion and were more affected by the delay than responsible for it.

Costs of the motion were awarded against the first plaintiff.

The defendant brought a motion under the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to answer certain undertakings and refused questions arising from examinations for discovery.

The court applied the relevance test under Rule 31.06(1) and reviewed multiple refused questions to determine whether they related to matters in issue, particularly the ownership of coins held in a safety deposit box.

Most questions were found to be irrelevant or speculative and did not need to be answered, though one question relating to an alleged event in Israel was ordered answered.

The court also addressed alleged improper interruptions by plaintiff’s counsel during discovery and directed counsel to conduct future examinations consistently with established principles governing discovery conduct.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the defendant.

The moving party sought an order under Rules 15.03(4) and (5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure declaring that his former lawyers had no right to assert a lawyer’s possessory lien over documents belonging to him.

The law firm had represented the moving party in two civil actions and claimed unpaid legal fees exceeding $150,000, asserting a lien over litigation documents after being discharged without cause.

The court held that the law firm was entitled to assert the lien given the material unpaid balance and the circumstances of discharge.

However, the court noted that a substantial portion of the accounts may be statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and reduced the potential exposure accordingly.

The motion was conditionally resolved by permitting release of the documents if the moving party granted a collateral mortgage as security for up to $75,000; otherwise the motion would be dismissed.