Suzan Fraser

The applicant, West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. (WWLG), brought an application seeking the court to decide a dispute with Elexicon Energy Inc. regarding the classification and funding of a municipal electrical substation.

This followed an opinion from the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) siding with Elexicon and the Divisional Court's dismissal of WWLG's judicial review application.

The respondents, Elexicon and the OEB, brought a motion to dismiss WWLG's application.

The court dismissed WWLG's application, finding it constituted an abuse of process as it attempted to relitigate a matter already determined by the OEB, and further, that the OEB had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter concerning compliance with the Distribution System Code.

This motion in a construction action concerned Koler Construction Inc.'s request for Falcon Forming Inc. to provide further particulars and supporting documentation for alleged additional costs and delays, specifically related to items in Falcon's Scott Schedule.

Koler argued that Falcon's position on the contract (labour vs. scope of work) had shifted and that previous disclosures were insufficient.

Falcon contended that its Scott Schedule adequately particularized the claim and that discoveries were complete.

The court found that Falcon's Scott Schedule did not provide full answers to the questions asked, especially given the shifting positions and the fact that the Scott Schedule was particularized after discoveries.

The court ordered Falcon to provide the requested particulars and supporting documents for the delay claims.

The defendant, Himelfarb Proszanski, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Aynoush Biniaz-Sarabi, was self-represented and opposed the motion.

The court found that the statement of claim lacked a basis for liability against the defendant, constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a prior License Appeal Tribunal decision regarding accident benefits, and was virtually identical to another action commenced by the plaintiff the day prior.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action without costs.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagors for default on a second mortgage.

The plaintiff claimed the mortgage was renewed at a higher interest rate and sought various fees.

The defendants disputed the renewal and the propriety of many charges.

The court found the mortgage was not renewed and disallowed most of the plaintiff's claimed charges, including the renewal fee, various administration fees, and a three-month prepayment penalty, citing s. 8(1) of the Interest Act.

The court determined the correct amount to discharge the mortgage based on the original interest rate and allowed only a proper discharge fee.

The Third Party Defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, brought a Rule 21.01 motion to strike a third-party claim by 1458875 Ontario Corporation O/A Yorktown Motors.

Yorktown alleged negligence against Ontario for issuing fraudulent vehicle permits and Used Vehicle Information Packages (UVIPs) for a non-existent vehicle, which Yorktown relied upon in a financing transaction.

The court found that the claim was barred by section 11(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, as the issuance of a vehicle permit constitutes a regulatory decision.

Alternatively, the court found it plain and obvious that no private law duty of care existed between Ontario and Yorktown, as the relevant legislation did not create such a duty, and there was no sufficient proximity or policy reason to establish a new duty.

The motion to strike was granted.

The Plaintiffs' motion for a Mareva injunction and Norwich order against Defendant Jain was adjourned sine die due to significant procedural missteps by Plaintiffs' counsel.

These missteps included scheduling a long motion on a short motion date, failing to serve all parties as required by Rule 37.07(1), and providing inadequate notice and unhyperlinked materials.

The court found the alleged urgency was self-created and declined an interim order.

Costs were awarded against the Plaintiffs in favour of the appearing Defendants.

The parties were directed to attend Triage Court to schedule a long motion and consider civil case management.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion for a forfeiture order under s. 3 of the Civil Remedies Act for $79,220 in Canadian currency.

The funds were seized from the residence of an individual associated with drug trafficking and other criminal activity.

The court found, on a balance of probabilities, that the money constituted proceeds of illegal activity, citing various indicia such as the manner of bundling, the individual's criminal record, and his identification as a drug dealer.

No one came forward to claim the funds, and the court determined that forfeiture was in the interest of justice.

The motion for forfeiture was granted.

The defendant, Mordecai Gal, was charged with sexual exploitation under s. 153 of the Criminal Code involving a 16-year-old complainant from a Muslim youth group.

The central issue was whether the defendant, as an older and respected member of the group, stood in a position of trust towards the complainant.

The court found a 12-year age difference, the defendant's role as a mentor and confidant, and the complainant's vulnerability due to an isolated home life.

The defendant exploited this vulnerability by encouraging a "temporary marriage" with promises of financial and housing independence, despite parental disapproval.

The court concluded that the defendant occupied a position of trust and exploited the complainant, finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, a psychiatrist, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the respondent capable of consenting to treatment (antipsychotic medication).

The appellant argued the Board made a legal error by applying the wrong test for capacity and palpable and overriding errors of mixed law and fact by misapprehending crucial medical evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Board's application of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, and no palpable and overriding error in its factual findings, including its assessment of the connection between the respondent's behavior and medication.

The applicant, Dawn McKenzie, acting as Power of Attorney for Property for Raymond Morgan, sought court approval to sell the Springdale property.

This property was subject to a life leasehold interest in favour of the respondent, Wendy Morgan, as per Mr. Morgan's will.

The applicant argued the sale was necessary to cover Mr. Morgan's caregiving fees and debts.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's financial assessments were unreliable and that other options for liquidity had not been adequately explored.

The court also expressed concerns about the applicant's management of Mr. Morgan's care and his isolation from other family members.