Stuart W. Konyer

The Crown brought an application under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code seeking forfeiture of a firearm seized from the respondent and a five-year weapons prohibition order.

The respondent had been arrested following an incident in which a vehicle was shot at a remote campsite.

The respondent's statement to police was excluded at his criminal trial, resulting in dismissal of weapons charges.

The court found that reasonable grounds existed to believe the respondent lacked the responsibility and discipline required of gun owners, and ordered forfeiture of the firearm.

However, the court declined to impose a weapons prohibition order, citing the Crown's delay in bringing the application, the respondent's effective prohibition since the seizure, and the absence of evidence of a pattern of troubling behaviour.

The accused was charged with operating a vessel while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood-alcohol limit.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police boarding of his boat, detention, and search.

The accused argued the boat was his dwelling-house and that police required a warrant under the Feeney principles.

The court found that while the accused had a reduced expectation of privacy on his boat at a public dock in the early afternoon, the officer breached the accused's section 8 rights by failing to announce his presence before boarding.

However, the court found no breach of section 9 rights and, applying the section 24(2) test from R. v. Grant, admitted the breath sample evidence as the breach was inadvertent and minor, the impact on the accused's privacy interests was minimal, and there was a strong societal interest in resolving impaired boating cases on their merits.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle collision on November 21, 2015.

The Crown's case relied on breath analysis results and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised Charter challenges regarding the admissibility of pre-arrest statements, the validity of the breath demand, and the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted all evidence.

The accused was convicted on both counts based on breath readings showing a blood alcohol concentration of 88 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and expert evidence establishing impairment.

This is an optional sentence review under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for a young person convicted of second degree murder.

The applicant was sentenced to seven years custody (four years secure custody followed by three years community supervision) in February 2015.

At the time of this review in July 2017, the applicant had been in custody for approximately four years and eight months.

The court considered the applicant's significant progress in rehabilitation while at a youth facility, his subsequent transfer to an adult correctional facility following institutional incidents, and the limited rehabilitative programming available in the adult facility.

The court found grounds for review based on the applicant's progress and the greater rehabilitative opportunities available in the community.

The court ordered the applicant's release from custody and placement on conditional supervision for the remainder of the youth sentence.

The accused, an Unregulated Care Provider at a retirement residence, was charged with theft of 30 oxycodone tablets prescribed to a resident.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, establishing that the tablets and all records of their existence disappeared during a 16-hour period when only two UCPs had access to the locked narcotic box.

While the court found the evidence persuasive that the theft was committed by one of the two UCPs and that the accused was the likely culprit, the incomplete narcotic count sheet created reasonable doubt as to whether the tablets were present at the end of the accused's shift.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample analysis results.

The defence raised Charter violations: (1) a section 8 unreasonable search and seizure claim regarding the Approved Screening Device demand; (2) section 10(b) right to counsel violations, including failure to reinform of rights upon a second arrest and failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice.

The Crown conceded one 10(b) breach.

The court found the section 8 claim failed but upheld the section 10(b) breach regarding counsel of choice.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the breath sample evidence due to the serious and wilful disregard by multiple officers for the accused's right to counsel, despite minimal actual impact on the accused's interests and the reliability of the evidence.

The accused, a 28-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine.

She sold 0.4 grams of cocaine for $40 while under police surveillance.

The Crown sought six months jail followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, recognizing the accused's addiction, her engagement in rehabilitative programming including residential treatment, and her status as a youthful first offender.

The court balanced the serious nature of cocaine trafficking with the principles of rehabilitation and specific deterrence applicable to first offenders.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle, operation with excessive blood-alcohol concentration, and dangerous driving arising from an incident where he grabbed the steering wheel of a vehicle being driven by his former partner, causing it to crash into a ditch.

The Crown's case was not disputed on the facts of impairment and dangerous operation.

The sole issue was whether the defence of necessity applied.

The accused claimed he grabbed the wheel to prevent the driver from deliberately causing an accident after she threatened to harm them both.

The court found an air of reality to the necessity defence and, applying the three-part test from R. v. Perka and R. v. Latimer, determined that the Crown failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act out of necessity.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a co-worker.

The Crown alleged that the accused kissed and groped the complainant without consent during a lunch break in his pickup truck.

The accused testified that the complainant consented to kissing and that no groping occurred.

The trial judge found the accused's testimony to be contradictory, inconsistent, and illogical, and accepted the complainant's testimony that she did not consent to any sexual touching.

The trial judge also found that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood following a random sobriety check.

The defence challenged the arrest on grounds of Charter violations: alleged lack of reasonable grounds for arrest under s. 8, and alleged failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice under s. 10(b).

The Crown sought to admit breath sample analysis results.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest existed but found a breach of s. 10(b) rights when police failed to leave voicemail messages for chosen counsel and misrepresented the availability of those lawyers.

Under s. 24(2), the court admitted the breath sample evidence as the societal interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the seriousness of the Charter breach.

The accused was convicted of the over-limit charge but acquitted of impaired driving due to reasonable doubt regarding functional impairment.

The accused was charged with defrauding her employer, the LCBO, by scanning items through her cash register, accepting cash payments, and then immediately voiding the sales without turning over the cash.

On eight separate occasions between October 10 and 25, 2014, the accused engaged in this pattern of conduct.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video surveillance and electronic journal records.

The court found that the only reasonable inference from the undisputed facts was that the accused deliberately kept the cash while concealing the purchases from the employer's records.

The defence argued that a supervisor could have removed the money, but the court rejected this as speculative.

The accused was found guilty of fraud under $5,000.

The defendant pleaded guilty to sexually touching a 13-year-old victim with his penis in July 2013 when he was 30 years old.

While awaiting sentencing, he committed additional offences: uttering threats to cause bodily harm and breaching a probation order.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 13 months; the defence sought 6 to 9 months.

The court imposed 12 months imprisonment for the sexual touching offence, with concurrent 30-day sentences for the breach and threats, followed by 3 years of probation with extensive conditions.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence must take precedence over rehabilitation in cases involving child sexual abuse.

The accused was charged with two counts of uttering threats to cause death contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from statements made during a telephone conversation on a train, overheard by a fellow passenger.

The accused allegedly threatened to kill ten female members of Parliament and the spouse of the current Prime Minister.

The court found that while the accused spoke the words in question, they did not constitute threats within the meaning of the statute when considered in full context.

The court held that a reasonable person, fully apprised of all circumstances including the accused's apparent belief that he held a legitimate law enforcement role, would be left in reasonable doubt as to whether the words were actual threats or the ramblings of a mentally unstable individual.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed two key issues: (1) whether a discrepancy in dates between the Certificate of a Qualified Technician and the Intoxilyzer Test Record Card undermined the reliability of the Certificate; and (2) whether the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the approved screening device used for the roadside test was in proper working order, thereby justifying the warrantless seizure of breath samples under section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the date discrepancy was a typographical error and did not affect the Certificate's reliability.

The court also found that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was properly calibrated and functioning correctly based on recent accuracy checks, calibration records, and a self-test.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was convicted following trial of intentionally causing damage by fire to a property owned in part by another person, contrary to section 434 of the Criminal Code.

The accused set three fires in her home in Millbrook on June 10, 2014, designed to appear accidental.

The fires resulted in heat exhaustion injuries to three volunteer firefighters and costs of $10,125 to the Township of Cavan Monaghan.

The court imposed a sentence of five months imprisonment followed by two years probation with conditions including community service, counselling, and a restitution order.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a complainant in his home after they met at a bar and shared a taxi.

The complainant testified that she was pinned down and forcibly penetrated while repeatedly telling the accused to stop.

The accused testified that all sexual contact was consensual.

The trial judge found the accused's testimony to be deliberately misleading on material points regarding his interest in the complainant and the circumstances of leaving the bar.

However, the judge also found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable due to significant memory loss inconsistent with her alcohol consumption and numerous prior statements to others describing consensual sexual activity that turned rough.

The judge concluded that while the accused's guilt was possible or even probable, a reasonable doubt existed regarding whether the complainant withdrew consent, and therefore acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He pleaded guilty to simple possession of oxycontin and cocaine, and guilty to simple possession of fentanyl (rejecting the Crown's trafficking charge).

The Crown did not accept the lesser plea and proceeded to trial on the trafficking count.

The case was circumstantial, based primarily on the quantity of fentanyl found (24 patches with a street value of $9,600 to $12,000).

The accused testified he purchased the fentanyl for personal use, claiming he was a severe addict consuming 3-4 patches daily.

The court found the accused's evidence unlikely but not incapable of belief, and determined that possession for personal use remained a reasonably available inference from the circumstantial evidence.

The court acquitted on the trafficking charge but convicted on simple possession of fentanyl and the other drug counts.

The accused was tried on multiple criminal charges arising from a domestic relationship breakdown, including mischief (cell phone destruction), assault, threatening to kill, unlawful confinement, and forcible entry.

The trial turned primarily on credibility assessments of the complainant and the accused.

The court found the accused guilty of unlawful confinement on September 18, 2014, but acquitted him on all other counts due to credibility concerns regarding the complainant's testimony and the absence of corroborating evidence, despite finding some incidents likely occurred.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury to the victim, resulting in bilateral jaw fractures requiring surgical intervention.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment with credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by three years probation with conditions including restitution, no-contact orders, and a weapons prohibition.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing principles, noting the serious nature of the assault, the vulnerability of the victim, and the accused's significant criminal history despite no prior convictions for violence.

The defendant brought an O'Connor application seeking production of medical records from the Peterborough Regional Health Centre and Brampton Civic Hospital relating to the complainant.

The court applied the test from R. v. McNeil, which requires assessment of true relevancy of targeted records.

The court found that the records contained apparent inconsistencies in the complainant's account of assaults and evidence of delusions at the time of the alleged assaults.

The court determined that the defendant's right to make full answer and defence outweighed the complainant's privacy interests and ordered production of relevant portions of the records, subject to a condition that they be used only for the defendant's defence.