Ryan O'Neill

The appellants purchased land near Sturgeon Lake and commissioned a survey indicating their property abutted land owned by the Long Beach Residents' Association.

They claimed that a portion of Long Beach's land between their property and the lake shore was originally part of their parcel and should be conveyed to them.

The application judge dismissed their claim, finding that Long Beach's property was originally a water lot conveyed to the federal government and that fill was deposited to construct a wharf, moving the shoreline eastward.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding the factual findings well-grounded in evidence and that survey monuments supported the boundary determination.

The court also dismissed the appellants' riparian rights claim, finding any such rights would have been extinguished under the Real Property Limitations Act.

This decision addresses costs of the proceedings below following a partial appeal success.

The appellants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing they were substantially successful on the issues that drove the proceedings.

The respondents sought no costs or costs on a partial indemnity basis, arguing the success was divided.

The court found that while the appeal was allowed only in part, the appellants enjoyed greater success on the key issues and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, reflecting the divided success.

The appellants and respondents owned adjoining properties in Ontario.

A water pipeline was buried beneath the appellants' land in the 1960s to supply water from Sturgeon Lake to the respondents' property.

Three agreements were executed regarding the pipeline: in 1966 (a licence), in 1968 (a licence), and in 1979 (an easement registered as Instrument No. R147470).

In 2014, when the pipeline leaked, the respondent entered the appellants' land without permission and installed an above-ground waterline.

The appellants sought a declaration that the respondents had no interest in their property and that the easement was invalid.

The respondents sought a declaration that the easement was valid and that they had the right to repair and replace the pipeline.

The application judge found both the 1968 and 1979 agreements granted easements and that the respondents could repair and replace the pipeline.

The appellants appealed, arguing the 1968 agreement was a licence, not an easement, and that the 1979 easement did not permit repairs or replacement without their consent.

The applicants sought a declaration that an easement for a water pipe across their property, benefiting the respondents' adjacent property, was invalid.

The respondents counter-applied for a declaration that the easement was valid.

The court found that historical documents from 1968 and 1979 were intended to create an easement, not a mere license.

Although the 1979 document initially violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act, the court held that subsequent conveyances containing prescribed solicitor statements triggered the curative provision in s. 50(22) of the Planning Act, validating the easement.

The applicants' argument under the Registry Act was also dismissed because the properties had been converted to the Land Titles system.

The application was dismissed and the counter-application granted.

A 16-year-old youth sought a review of a bail order denying release with an unsuitable surety.

The youth faced charges including theft and two counts of arson involving serious property damage.

The Crown argued detention was necessary under the secondary grounds to protect the public from a substantial likelihood of serious re-offending.

The court found that the youth's detention was not necessary to reduce risk to an acceptable level through conditions of release, considering her lack of significant criminal history, obvious need for social supports, and triable issues regarding her involvement in the arson charges.

The court also found the tertiary grounds (public confidence in administration of justice) were not satisfied.

The youth was released on her own recognizance with conditions.

A 16-year-old youth sought a review of a bail order denying release with a proposed surety.

The youth faced charges including theft and two counts of arson involving serious property damage.

The Crown argued detention was necessary under the secondary grounds to protect the public from a substantial likelihood of serious reoffending.

The court found that detention was not necessary, considering the youth's minimal criminal record, underlying mental health and social issues requiring community support, and the triable issues regarding her level of involvement in the arson charges.

The court released the youth on her own recognizance with conditions.