Stephen P. Kirby

The appellant, Charles Mark Hilton, appealed the dismissal of his 14B motion by Nicholson J., which sought to set aside previous orders made in divorce proceedings, including those issued after he was noted in default.

The appellant alleged that the respondent, Marlene Dale Hilton, committed fraud through misrepresentations and material omissions during the uncontested trial.

Nicholson J. had dismissed the motion on the basis that the appellant had not appealed the earlier orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, clarifying that while some orders resulting from the appellant's default required an appeal, the allegations of the respondent's misrepresentations and material omissions should have been determined on their merits under r. 25(19)(a) of the Family Law Rules.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a new hearing on these specific allegations.

The applicant mother sought a temporary order for primary care of the two children and permission to relocate with them from London to Oakville.

The respondent father opposed the move and sought primary care if the mother relocated.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test from *Gordon v. Goertz* and interim relocation factors from *Plumley v. Plumley*, found that the mother was the primary caregiver and faced significant financial and professional uncertainty in London, while having a rare fellowship opportunity in Toronto.

Despite a genuine issue for trial, the court found compelling circumstances to allow the interim move, noting a strong probability the mother's position would prevail at trial and that a change in primary parent would be disruptive to the young children.

The motion for relocation was granted on an interim basis.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and specific parenting orders during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the motion for exclusive possession urgent but dismissed it, determining that the mother did not meet the onus to demonstrate that continued co-habitation was impractical or threatened the children's well-being.

The court considered the father's inability to find alternative accommodation and the mother's financial resources.

The court also dismissed the request for exclusive care of the children for 14 days due to a lack of admissible evidence regarding the father's non-compliance with COVID-19 protocols.

The decision emphasized that the pandemic alone is not a reason to suspend parental access and encouraged parents to provide child-focused time-sharing proposals.

This corrigendum addresses mathematical corrections and clarifies child support issues arising from a prior trial judgment (2019 ONSC 5260) in a family law matter.

The court corrected date of marriage property values, adjusted equalization payments, and clarified retroactive spousal support calculations.

Crucially, it determined ongoing and retroactive child support, finding that the respondent had provided effective and formal notice of her claim in her answer.

The court applied the D.B.S. factors, concluding that the applicant's conduct, including misrepresenting income and benefiting from non-payment, justified a retroactive child support order, effective July 1, 2014.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal of a spousal support decision.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order that reduced and then terminated spousal support payments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and modified the support order.

The court then addressed costs for the trial below, determining that the appellant was the more successful party and entitled to costs despite the respondent's arguments regarding divided success and the appellant's disclosure failures.

The court awarded costs of $24,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as support.

This family law appeal concerns the variation and termination of spousal support following a 2008 consent order.

The respondent sought to reduce spousal support from $3,000 to $1,000 per month effective June 2013 and terminate it one year later, claiming material changes in both parties' financial circumstances.

The trial judge found material changes in both parties' circumstances and imputed income to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while there was a material change in the appellant's financial circumstances, there was no material change in the respondent's circumstances as his income remained consistent.

The court also found the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the matrimonial home, determining that the parties' true bargain was reflected in a secret trust agreement rather than the consent order.

The court reduced spousal support but declined to terminate it, consistent with the parties' original agreement.

The appellant appealed from trial decisions determining unresolved issues in a family law matter, including spousal support duration and quantum, child and spousal support arrears, equalization of post-valuation-day increases in corporate shares, disposition of a recreational property, and costs.

The trial judge determined the appellant's income for support purposes by excluding losses from a corporation used to fund his personal lifestyle, assessed the value of corporate shares considering personal benefits provided by the corporation, ordered payment for a recreational property, and awarded substantial costs to the respondent based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct and inadequate disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld all findings.