Stephen F. Gleave

The defendant Daniel Sherk brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs (Verge Insurance Brokers Limited et al.) to produce remaining backup tapes and a revised affidavit of documents, and to indemnify him for costs incurred in reviewing previously produced tapes.

The court found that the plaintiffs had a positive duty to review and produce relevant documents from their backup tapes, as per a prior order by Quinn J. and the Sedona Principles.

The plaintiffs had failed to do so, despite earlier sworn statements by Mark Sherk.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to indemnify Daniel Sherk for the costs of Deloitte's prior work and to forthwith restore and review the remaining 66 backup tapes, producing an amended affidavit of documents.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments regarding leave to bring the motion and proportionality of costs, noting the high stakes of the litigation.

The plaintiff former employee brought a motion to compel the defendant employer to answer questions refused on discovery and produce documents over which the defendants claimed solicitor-client privilege.

The defendants had produced certain emails between their lawyer and a senior employee in their affidavit of documents and answered questions about them on discovery, later claiming the disclosure was inadvertent.

The court found the disclosure was not inadvertent and that the defendants could not selectively waive privilege to support their defence of acting in good faith while withholding other communications on the same issue.

The motion was granted, and the defendants were ordered to produce all related communications.

The appellants, a terminated insurance agent and his company, appealed the dismissal of their claim against Sun Life for post-termination commissions under the Commissions on Release (CORe) program.

The CORe agreements stipulated that payments would cease if the agent induced clients to replace their policies.

The appellant transferred over 600 clients to a new business, prompting Sun Life to terminate the payments.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination clause was an enforceable forfeiture provision, not a penalty, and that the appellants were not entitled to equitable relief from forfeiture given their flagrant breach of the agreement.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion where the applicants sought an advance payment for shares in a family business.

The applicants were largely successful in obtaining a substantial advance payment, significantly more than the respondents' offers to settle.

Despite some divided success on ancillary requests, the court found the applicants to have achieved substantial success on the primary issue.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis, awarding the applicants $60,000 for fees and $5,948.49 for disbursements, payable within 30 days, declining to defer the costs decision to the trial judge.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to stay the defendant's counterclaim pending the payment of approximately $138,000 in costs from previous unsuccessful motions, or alternatively, for an order requiring payment by a specific date.

The defendant sought an extension of 45 days to pay the costs, citing financial difficulties and an upcoming commercial closing that would provide funds.

The court balanced the need to enforce its orders with the context of the complex litigation and granted the defendant's request for an extension.

The court ordered that if the costs were not paid by the extended deadline, the counterclaim would be stayed.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a prior decision dismissing his motion to vary the terms of an interim injunction issued on consent.

The court considered rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal.

It concluded that the moving party failed to meet the required onus under either branch of the rule.

The issues raised, while important to the parties, were not of sufficient importance to justify appellate review.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The plaintiffs, former insurance advisors affiliated with a large financial services company, sought payment of monthly “CORe” commissions following termination of their advisory agreements.

The agreements provided that post‑termination commissions would cease if the advisor advised, counselled, or induced clients to replace or cancel policies serviced through the company.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs breached those conditions by soliciting and transitioning hundreds of clients and significant assets to a competing business after termination.

The court held that CORe payments were conditional incentives rather than vested compensation and found that the plaintiffs had engaged in systematic replacement activities contrary to the agreements.

Relief from forfeiture and equitable claims such as quantum meruit were rejected, and the action was dismissed.

The defendant, Daniel Sherk, brought a motion to vary a consent interlocutory injunction that prohibited him from soliciting or servicing clients of his former employer, Verge Insurance Brokers Limited.

He sought to suspend and amend the injunction under Rules 59.06(2)(b) and (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the restrictive covenants had expired and the court had inherent jurisdiction to vary the order.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that a consent order can only be varied on the same grounds as a contract can be rectified, and that the court's inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the express provisions of the Rules or to upset a fairly negotiated bargain.

Wrongful dismissal action by a senior investment professional terminated for alleged cause after disclosing a private placement memorandum to an outside contact.

The court held the employer failed to prove the document was confidential or that its disclosure breached the employer’s code of conduct, and in any event the conduct would not have justified dismissal for cause.

Applying reasonable notice principles, the court fixed notice at 15 months in light of the employee’s senior role, compensation structure, and impaired re-employment prospects arising from the manner of dismissal.

The court also held proposed 2010 amendments to incentive plans were not binding because they were not accepted by the employee, and awarded salary, AIP, LTIP, pension, and prorated AIP damages less mitigation income.

The plaintiffs brought motions for an interlocutory injunction and for production of documents against the defendants, who were former employees and a competing insurance brokerage.

The injunction motion was settled and the production motion was stayed.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of over $390,000, arguing the defendants unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings and engaged in wrongdoing.

The court found the injunction component of the action was effectively spent, justifying fixing costs payable forthwith rather than in the cause.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $255,237, apportioned equally among the three responding defendants, after making deductions for services not directly related to the motions.

The defendant appealed an interlocutory order that dismissed his motion to strike the plaintiffs' civil contempt motion for lack of particulars, but ordered the plaintiffs to provide clear and concise particulars.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the motions judge erred in applying the test for adequate particulars by failing to recognize the strictissimi juris nature of civil contempt proceedings.

The court also held that the motions judge erred in principle by granting the plaintiffs an unsolicited right to amend their defective motion without balancing the relevant factors.

The employer sought an interlocutory injunction restricting picketing during a lawful strike at one of its warehouse facilities.

The union’s picketing activities caused substantial delays for vehicles entering and exiting several warehouse locations, effectively disrupting operations despite remaining largely peaceful.

The court applied the interlocutory injunction framework from RJR‑MacDonald and considered the special context of labour disputes and the balance between property access rights and constitutionally protected expressive activity in picketing.

The court held that while employers are entitled to access their property, labour picketing may justify some degree of inconvenience and delay as part of the economic dynamics of a strike.

An injunction was granted permitting continued picketing but limiting the extent of delays in accessing the employer’s facilities.

Following an appeal where one appellant was successful and the other unsuccessful, the appellants brought a motion to readdress costs.

Counsel for the appellants had previously agreed to a costs arrangement but later realized he made an error regarding the successful appellant's costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the correction in fairness to the successful appellant and apportioned the trial and appeal costs accordingly.

Following an application proceeding, the court considered written submissions regarding costs.

The applicant argued that because the respondents had not objected to proceeding by way of application, the issue of costs should be determined by the trial judge.

The court agreed that the trial judge would be better positioned to assess any costs thrown away as a result of the application and noted that the record lacked sufficient evidence regarding the parties’ positions on the procedural choice.

The court therefore declined to determine costs at this stage.

Following an unsuccessful motion by the defendant to dismiss a contempt motion, the court addressed costs.

Although the defendant did not succeed on the motion, the court found merit in the defendant’s complaints regarding the organization and drafting of the plaintiffs’ materials, which were described as poorly organized and “reader hostile.” Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the parties’ conduct and its impact on the duration and efficiency of the proceeding.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ conduct justified a costs award against them despite their success on the motion.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the moving party.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss or stay a civil contempt motion arising from an alleged breach of a prior injunction restricting dealings with former firm clients.

The defendant argued the contempt motion lacked sufficient particulars, served no purpose because the underlying order had expired, and constituted an abuse of process.

The court held that although the materials were poorly organized and lacked clarity, the defendant had not demonstrated a complete absence of fair notice of the allegations.

The court also found that the expiry of the order did not eliminate the public interest in enforcing respect for court orders and that the high threshold for abuse of process had not been met.

The motion to dismiss the contempt proceeding was refused, but the plaintiffs were ordered to serve clear and concise particulars of the alleged contempt.

A former bank employee brought an application seeking payment of allegedly outstanding bonuses under a Restricted Share Unit plan following his resignation.

The employer denied liability on the basis that the plan provided for forfeiture of unvested units upon resignation.

The applicant argued that the forfeiture provision operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade and was unconscionable.

The court held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the provision constituted an enforceable restraint of trade and concluded that the issues raised involved material factual disputes.

The court determined that the matter was not properly brought by way of application and directed that submissions be made regarding continuation of the proceeding as a trial.

Two insurance salespeople left a brokerage, taking their books of business with them.

The brokerage sued for breach of contract and unlawful conduct conspiracy.

The trial judge found one salesperson breached an oral agreement to purchase his book of business upon departure, and found the other liable for conspiracy.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the breach of contract finding but overturned the conspiracy finding, noting the trial judge failed to apply the requirement that a conspirator must engage in unlawful conduct or intend to harm the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breaching a non-competition clause in his employment contract and ordering him to repay a $20,000 non-compete payment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in interpreting the contract.

The appellant had met the conditions for the payment by remaining employed for one year and not competing during that time.

Although the non-competition clause was enforceable and breached later, the respondent proved no damages, so the action was dismissed.

The appellants, former commercial insurance salespeople for the respondent, resigned and joined a competitor, subsequently soliciting clients from the respondent.

The respondent successfully sued for breach of a restrictive covenant at trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the clause was an unenforceable non-competition clause rather than a non-solicitation clause, as it contained no geographical limit and broadly prohibited conducting business.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment was set aside.