Stephen E. J. Paull

The applicant father sought to prohibit the respondent mother from relocating with their two young children from Woodstock to Port Stanley, or alternatively sought custody.

The respondent mother sought permission to relocate and sought sole custody with access to the father.

The court considered the principles established in Plumley v. Plumley and Gordon v. Goertz regarding temporary relocation of children.

The court found that the mother had compelling reasons for the move, including a significant reduction in her commute to work and reduced childcare needs.

The court determined that the proposed relocation would not materially interfere with the father's access arrangements as outlined in the parties' separation agreement, and that the benefits to the children outweighed any risks.

The court granted the mother permission to relocate on an interim basis while maintaining the father's parenting time.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the father sought to return to a joint custody and shared residential arrangement that had been in place since November 2017 pursuant to a separation agreement.

The mother suspended this arrangement in May 2020, citing concerns about the father's alcohol addiction, relationship instability with his partner, and the impact on the children.

The court found urgency was established and determined that a graduated return to the shared custody arrangement was in the children's best interests, with conditions requiring the father to continue working with addiction services and counselling, and prohibiting excessive alcohol consumption while caregiving or in the presence of the children.

Both parents brought urgent motions during the COVID-19 pandemic seeking sole custody of their two children.

The respondent father withheld the children from the applicant mother following his access time on May 4, 2020, contrary to an interim order dated December 23, 2019.

The father alleged various concerns including the mother's alleged drug use, housing instability, poor school attendance, and the presence of a potentially dangerous individual in the mother's sister's home.

The court found that urgency was established based on the father's breach of the court order and the need for a structured arrangement to prevent further upheaval.

However, the court determined that the father failed to establish sufficient evidence of immediate risk to the children's safety to justify the change in custody.

The court ordered the children returned to the mother's primary care with an expanded and structured access schedule for the father.

A mother sought a motion for the return of her infant son to her care or to the paternal grandparents' care following the Children's Aid Society's temporary suspension of all supervised access and parenting support programs due to COVID-19.

The court dismissed the motion seeking return to parental care and the alternative claim for residence with paternal grandparents, finding insufficient evidence and lack of cooperation with court directions.

The court upheld the Society's temporary suspension of face-to-face access as justified by public health concerns, while acknowledging the importance of physical contact between mother and child under normal circumstances.

Both parents brought urgent motions seeking temporary custody of their young daughter.

The mother sought sole or shared custody with an alcohol prohibition on the father.

The father sought sole custody with limited access for the mother and restrictions on her new partner and father.

The court found that the father had not established urgency based on his allegations regarding the mother's stability and her new partner's safety concerns.

The court determined that the father's evidence was insufficient, inconsistent, and contradicted by his own text messages, which revealed his true motivations were financial and related to anger over the mother's new relationship.

The court found that the father had engaged in self-help by unilaterally terminating a previously agreed-upon shared parenting arrangement in March 2020 without justification.

The court awarded interim sole custody to the mother with regular and liberal access to the father, finding that the father's conduct demonstrated he would not facilitate the mother's relationship with the child if given custody.

The applicant (mother) and respondent (father) brought competing urgent motions regarding custody and access to their two young children during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondent sought interim custody and primary residence, while the applicant sought to maintain the interim custody order granted in her favour on January 6, 2020.

The court found that while the respondent had been the primary caregiver prior to December 23, 2019, his physically aggressive and threatening behaviour on that date—including threatening to cut the applicant's car tires with a kitchen knife—provided compelling grounds to maintain the children in the applicant's temporary care.

The court granted interim sole custody to the applicant with liberal and unsupervised access to the respondent, subject to specific terms governing parental conduct, alcohol consumption, and communication.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that COVID-19 concerns created urgency, finding that both parents had demonstrated appropriate safety precautions.

The paternal grandparents sought an urgent motion to temporarily suspend face-to-face access between their grandchild and his mother during the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The grandparents cited concerns about the child's asthma diagnosis, the mother's alleged failure to adhere to social distancing protocols, and the mother's other child's recent illness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that prima facie urgency had not been established.

The court held that COVID-19 concerns alone do not automatically warrant suspension of parenting time and that the party seeking to restrict access must provide specific evidence of the other party's failure to adhere to safety protocols.

The court emphasized the importance of children maintaining contact with both parents during the pandemic and encouraged the parties to communicate and cooperate on safety measures.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion during the COVID-19 pandemic seeking return of her child to her care or alternatively to her care while residing with the paternal grandparents, following suspension of the Children's Aid Society's supervised access programs.

The child had been in Society care since September 2019 pursuant to an interim order made in November 2019.

The court found that while the mother's affidavit provided insufficient evidence, prima facie urgency was established by the complete suspension of face-to-face access with a very young child.

The court dismissed the motion for return to joint parental care but directed the mother to provide detailed evidence of an alternative plan, including specific COVID-19 safety measures, by April 30, 2020, with the Society to respond by May 15, 2020.

The applicant mother sought an order terminating the respondent father's access to their two-year-old child, citing his past drug use, abusive behavior, and inconsistent attendance at supervised visits.

The father sought to continue supervised access.

The court found that while the father's inconsistent attendance was concerning, the mother had unilaterally terminated access contrary to an interim order.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the court held that the circumstances did not meet the high threshold required to terminate the parent-child relationship and ordered continued supervised access.

A motion to change custody and access arrangements where the respondent sought to establish contact with his son after seven years of no contact.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought no access, child support, and a restraining order.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the child's age, strong preferences against contact, and the respondent's ongoing pattern of harassing and threatening behaviour.

The court ordered no access, imputed income for child support purposes, and issued a restraining order prohibiting direct and indirect contact.

The applicant mother sought an order for no access between the respondent father and their young child, citing the father's prior abusive and drug-using behaviour during their relationship, his inconsistent attendance at supervised access visits, and safety concerns with the father's family.

The respondent sought to continue supervised access with a progression to unsupervised access.

The court found that while the father's prior conduct and inconsistent attendance were concerning, they did not meet the high threshold for terminating access entirely.

The court noted that the mother had unilaterally suspended access in violation of court orders, preventing a fair assessment of whether supervised access could succeed.

The court ordered continued supervised access at Merrymount, with progression to alternate weekends after three consecutive attended visits.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to vary a temporary care order placing a newborn child with his parents under supervision.

The child had been apprehended at birth due to concerns regarding the father's significant criminal history, domestic violence, substance abuse, and the mother's history of trauma and addiction.

Following an interim order placing the child with the mother and paternal grandparents, the parents were allowed to return home together under strict terms of supervision.

The Society sought to place the child in its care after the parents tested positive for methamphetamine, failed to comply with court-ordered programming, and the father refused to engage with services or attend supervised access.

The court found a material change in circumstances and granted the motion, placing the child in the Society's temporary care with access to the parents at the Society's discretion.

This is a costs decision following a two-day family law trial concerning custody and child support of a child born in 2012.

The parents separated in November 2017.

The applicant sought joint custody with shared residential arrangements and opposed child support, while the respondent sought primary residence and child support retroactive to separation.

The court found the respondent largely successful, ordering primary residence with the respondent, joint custody with final decision-making authority to the respondent, one additional overnight per week for the applicant, and child support on an imputed income of $35,000 retroactive to separation.

The respondent sought full recovery of costs in the amount of $14,252.13 inclusive.

The court awarded partial costs of $7,500.00 inclusive to the respondent, considering her success at trial, her reasonable offer to settle, the applicant's unreasonable behaviour regarding financial disclosure and his position on child support, and the applicant's limited financial means.

A child protection trial involving three children where the Children's Aid Society sought findings that the children were in need of protection due to physical harm and risk of physical harm.

The respondent father (M.A.R.) and his partner (T.E.) were alleged to have exposed the children to excessive alcohol use, domestic violence, and inappropriate physical discipline.

The mother (E.M.T.) was aware of the abuse but failed to disclose it in prior custody proceedings.

The court found the children had suffered actual physical harm and were at risk of further physical harm, but dismissed the claim for risk of emotional harm.

The children were placed in the mother's care subject to supervision with discretionary access to the father through the Society.

Trial decision concerning custody, access, and child support for one child born in 2012.

The applicant sought joint custody with shared residential arrangement (two overnights per week plus alternate weekends) and opposed child support arrears.

The respondent sought sole custody with primary residence and child support retroactive to separation.

The court found that the residential arrangements since separation did not constitute shared parenting under the 40% threshold.

The court ordered joint custody with primary residence to the respondent, one overnight per week access to the applicant, and imputed income of $35,000 to the applicant for child support purposes, resulting in monthly support of $304 commencing from the date of separation with arrears payable at $200 per month.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a protection application regarding two children and subsequently sought leave to withdraw the application without costs.

The respondent father opposed the withdrawal on a without-costs basis, seeking costs of $31,870.41 inclusive, arguing the Society had failed to properly investigate and acted incompetently.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding the Society had conducted an adequate investigation, acted reasonably and with due diligence throughout the proceedings, and appropriately reassessed its position as circumstances evolved.

The court held that the Society's conduct did not meet the threshold for a costs award against a child protection agency.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and seeking a disposition order placing them in kin care with supervision.

The respondent parents opposed the motion, arguing genuine issues required a trial.

The court found that the children were at risk of physical and emotional harm due to exposure to domestic violence, the father's unaddressed drug use and mental health issues, and the parents' failure to adequately address these concerns.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial, and ordered the children to remain in their current kin placements with supervised access at the Society's discretion.

A motion for recusal brought by respondent M.A.R. during a child protection trial.

M.A.R. alleged that the judge's examination of a Children's Aid Society worker regarding her training during a voir dire on the admissibility of children's statements, and the incorporation of two answers into the ruling, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that the judge's questions were appropriate, routine, and consistent with the expanded role judges have in child protection proceedings where the best interests of children are at stake.

This is a costs decision following a two-day trial in a motion to change child support.

The applicant sought to terminate child support for one child and suspend it for another, claiming a change in circumstances due to health issues preventing continued employment.

The respondent opposed the motion and sought recovery of section 7 expenses.

The court found a change in circumstances for 2016 but imputed income on the applicant from 2017 onward based on intentional underemployment.

The respondent was substantially more successful at trial.

The court awarded costs of $8,500 (inclusive) to the respondent, accounting for divided success on less dominant issues and the applicant's unreasonable conduct regarding disclosure and failure to provide an offer to settle.

A paternal aunt sought to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding to pursue permanent custody of the youngest child, who had been placed in her care pursuant to an interim order.

The motion was opposed by all parties, including the child's father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the aunt had provided appropriate care and had a viable plan, adding her as a party was premature, unnecessary to determine the issues, would unduly delay proceedings, and was not in the child's best interests at that stage of the protection application.

The court emphasized that the paramount purpose of the legislation is family reunification and that the aunt's change in position and manner of bringing the motion had created unnecessary conflict.