Stephanie Timerman

This appeal addressed the autonomy of adults with disabilities under parental charge, specifically concerning parenting orders under the Divorce Act for adults presumed capable.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by making a temporary parenting order for a 26-year-old son with Down Syndrome without a specific determination of his capacity to make decisions about his residence and without affording him the opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

The court emphasized the common law presumption of capacity and the audi alteram partem principle, holding that an adult presumed capable must be served and given the right to be heard on matters affecting their fundamental rights.

The appeal was allowed, and the parenting order was set aside.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary orders in a high-net-worth family law proceeding.

The parties separated after a traditional marriage where the applicant was the primary caregiver and the respondent was an entrepreneur with complex, international business interests.

The respondent failed to provide meaningful financial disclosure, claiming his finances were complex and he had lost everything, despite evidence of lavish spending.

The court ordered the respondent to provide comprehensive financial disclosure and serve expert valuation reports within 20 days.

The court also appointed an independent supervising solicitor to review quarantined documents found in the matrimonial home for relevance and privilege.

Given the respondent's lack of disclosure and unilateral financial actions, the court granted a preservation order restraining him from depleting his assets, subject to ordinary business exceptions.

The court granted the applicant primary residence and decision-making responsibility for the children, noting the respondent's frequent travel and lack of day-to-day involvement.

Finally, the court imputed an income of $1,200,000 to the respondent and ordered him to pay a lump sum of $1,700,000 for interim child and spousal support, citing the real risk of non-payment of periodic support.

Following a successful motion by the applicant to have the parties' children attend school in-person in Etobicoke, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The applicant sought $22,404 on a full recovery basis from the date of his offer to settle.

The respondent argued costs should be reserved or limited to $9,000.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs and had met the terms of his offer to settle.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court awarded the applicant $15,000 in costs, payable in installments.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the parties' two children, both of whom have special needs, attend in-person schooling at their current schools in Etobicoke.

The respondent mother opposed, seeking to enroll the children in schools in Meaford where she had temporarily relocated, or alternatively, that they continue virtual learning.

The court found that the mother's proposed change of schools amounted to a relocation under the Divorce Act, which she had not properly initiated.

The court held that the mother failed to demonstrate that the proposed new schools would better meet the children's special needs than their current schools, and ordered that the children attend their Etobicoke schools in person.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary a temporary parenting schedule for the parties' child, following the release of a Section 30 assessment report.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion to maintain the current schedule or implement Phase 1 of the assessor's recommendations.

The court found compelling reasons to change the temporary order, noting the high conflict between the parties and the stress caused by transitions.

Applying the maximum contact principle, the court ordered a 2-2-3 equal parenting schedule and set out detailed terms for transitions, communication, and holidays.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court refusing to grant a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order refusing the stay was interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable as of right.

The court distinguished the case from Hopkins v. Kay, where the refusal of a stay had the effect of finally determining the court's jurisdiction.

The appeal was quashed with costs fixed at $10,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.