Shanti Eva Barclay

In a slip-and-fall action arising from an icy residential driveway at the plaintiff's workplace, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the tenant as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff knew or ought to have known from the outset that the premises were rented and that the occupier-tenant should have been sued.

The court also dismissed the landlord's third party claim for contribution and indemnity against the actual occupiers and the real estate parties as barred by s. 18, holding that s. 18 creates an absolute two-year limitation period not subject to discoverability.

On the merits, the absentee landlord was held not to be an occupier under s. 1 of the Occupiers’ Liability Act and not liable under s. 8 because the lease placed snow and ice removal on the tenant and no actionable landlord default was established.

The main action and third party proceeding were both dismissed.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, sought leave to proceed with an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence action arising from a fire investigation and also sought rescission of the vexatious litigant orders.

The court reviewed the extensive litigation history and repeated unsuccessful attempts by the applicant to obtain similar relief before multiple judges.

The court held that leave could not be granted because the appeal had already been dismissed for delay and the materials disclosed no reasonable grounds to proceed.

The court further found no basis to rescind the vexatious litigant orders, noting the applicant’s continued pattern of relitigating decided matters and failing to comply with costs orders.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order fixing the trustee's remuneration and declining to appoint a substitute trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 39(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act provided the motion judge with the authority to fix the remuneration.

The court also agreed that there was no basis to appoint a substitute trustee, as the appellant was permitted and capable of carrying a claim against the bankrupt.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.