Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

The court issued supplementary reasons addressing discrepancies in the calculation of interest owing by Vector as of November 4, 2024.

The plaintiff's affiant calculated total interest at $537,329.14, but the court identified potential errors in the calculation, noting that interest payments of $42,333.33 made on three separate dates may not have been properly reflected.

The court requested further clarifying supplementary affidavits to resolve the apparent discrepancies before finalizing the judgment.

The plaintiffs alleged that Maria Surovova and her company, Maria Mortgage Services Inc., engaged in a mortgage churning scheme, inducing the plaintiffs to take out a series of mortgages and transfer the proceeds to Surovova under the pretense that the funds would be applied to their mortgages.

Instead, Surovova misappropriated the funds for personal use.

The court found Surovova liable for civil fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, awarding the plaintiffs $1,666,059.13 in damages and $215,603.52 in costs.

The plaintiff, a senior area supervisor with nearly 30 years of service, brought an action for wrongful dismissal after being terminated for cause.

The employer alleged the plaintiff breached company policies regarding conflicts of interest, markdowns, and ethical conduct, including failing to disclose a relationship with a cleaning contractor and improperly discounting furniture for himself and friends.

The court found the plaintiff engaged in serious misconduct, including fraud and breach of trust, which went to the core of the employment relationship.

Applying the McKinley proportionality test, the court concluded the employer had just cause for summary dismissal and dismissed the action.

The applicant brought a motion to remove counsel representing both the individual respondent and the corporate respondent in an oppression application.

The applicant argued that counsel had a conflict of interest in jointly representing both respondents and that counsel might be called as a witness.

The court found no basis to remove counsel on the grounds of being a potential witness.

However, the court held that a conflict of interest existed because the interests of the individual respondent and the corporate respondent were not aligned in the context of a shareholder dispute.

The motion was allowed in part, and counsel was disqualified from acting for the corporate respondent.

The plaintiffs requested an urgent case conference to schedule a mediation and fix a trial date before the action was administratively dismissed.

One of the plaintiffs objected, citing an upcoming motion regarding the removal of his counsel in a separate action.

The court found it unfair to delay the other plaintiffs and ordered that mediation be held by June 30, 2022, and that the action appear on the trial scheduling court list on April 11, 2022.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for constructive dismissal after being temporarily laid off due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the plaintiff was an employee from the start of his tenure, despite initially being paid through a personal corporation.

The court also held that the employment contract signed mid-employment was void for lack of consideration.

The employer had no contractual right to lay off the plaintiff, resulting in a constructive dismissal.

The court awarded 15 months' reasonable notice and $25,000 in punitive damages due to the employer's failure to pay statutory minimums.

The plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action against the manufacturer of a handgun used in a mass shooting, alleging negligent design, public nuisance, and strict liability for failing to incorporate authorized user ('smart gun') technology.

The defendant moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the negligence claim, finding it fell within the established duty of care categories for goods dangerous per se and products liability.

However, the court struck the claims for public nuisance and strict liability, concluding they were legally untenable in the context of product liability.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application to remove the respondent as estate trustee, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the applicant's conduct throughout the litigation, which included making demonstrably untrue statements and unfounded allegations of fraud, was reprehensible and worthy of sanction.

The court declined to order costs payable out of the estate, applying the 'loser pays' principle.

The respondent was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $48,975.94, payable by the applicant from her share of the estate.

The defendant consented to the dismissal of its third party claim against the engineering firm before a summary judgment motion was heard.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendant argued the third party's costs should be reduced because the lawyers' time was split between two related actions and the summary judgment motion did not proceed.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the third party's methodology of equally dividing costs between the two actions was acceptable and the time spent on factum preparation was reasonable.

The court awarded the third party costs of $33,984.79 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff's motion to add Ken Rubin as a defendant in a defamation action based on his freedom of information requests was previously dismissed.

In this costs decision, the Master applied the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act by analogy.

Finding no reason to deviate from the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7), the Master awarded the successful proposed defendant his requested costs of $15,000.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against the defendant for unpaid tree harvesting charges totaling $80,672.01.

The defendant, who was self-represented, claimed an Aboriginal or Métis right to harvest trees and argued the fees were unconstitutional.

However, the defendant failed to file any affidavit evidence to support his Métis status, his constitutional claims, or to dispute the calculation of the fees.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.

This case management endorsement records the signing of an order dismissing the outstanding litigation against the Chahals, in accordance with a prior endorsement.

The applicant, a former police officer, brought an application under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss an application brought by the respondent Police Services Board before the Human Rights Tribunal for Ontario.

The respondent's tribunal application sought to enforce a confidentiality provision in a resignation agreement.

The Superior Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the tribunal proceeding, as the term 'proceeding' in section 137.1(3) is limited to civil proceedings before a court and does not extend to proceedings before administrative tribunals.

The application was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of a motion for security for costs brought by Peel Condominium Corporation No. 507 (PCC 507) and supported by Larlyn Property Management Ltd. Precision Tree Care Ltd. (Precision), the successful party on the original motion, sought costs.

The court applied Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering factors such as the result, complexity, and the parties' conduct.

The court fixed costs at $10,000.00, payable by PCC 507 to Precision, noting that Precision was successful and the matter was moderately complex.

Larlyn was not awarded costs and was not ordered to pay costs, as it took no position on the original motion.

The court also admonished counsel for not adhering to page limits for submissions and for attempting to re-argue the underlying motion.

The respondent Landlord and Tenant Board requested the court dismiss the appellant's appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The appellant had named the Board as the respondent instead of the tenants, sought damages unavailable on appeal, and raised issues regarding a separate property.

The court found the proceeding was clearly abusive on its face and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff recruitment agency brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant against a former employee and his new employer.

The plaintiff sought to prevent the defendants from contacting any candidates or clients listed in its databases.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the former employee was not a fiduciary and that the restrictive covenant was overly broad, ambiguous, and unenforceable because it was impossible to determine which names were in the databases.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction.

The plaintiff trustee appealed an order of a Master granting a defendant leave to amend his statement of defence and assert a crossclaim against a co‑defendant following amendments to the statement of claim.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal out of time due to counsel’s inadvertence in missing the filing deadline.

The court granted the extension of time but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

Applying Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that amendments to pleadings should be permitted unless non‑compensable prejudice arises, and that alleged prejudice based on the potential success of a defence does not qualify.

The court further held that any limitation issue concerning the crossclaim was a matter for the co‑defendant and not the plaintiff.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment, vacate a writ of execution, and extend time to deliver a statement of defence in a negligence and breach of retainer claim arising from a failed mortgage transaction.

The court held the default judgment was irregular because the claim for professional negligence and breach of contract was not a liquidated demand capable of supporting default judgment without assessment of damages.

Although the court found the defendant had likely been personally served, it accepted that the default was not deliberate and that the defendant moved promptly upon learning of the writ.

The noting in default was set aside and the defendant was permitted to deliver a defence.

The court also vacated the writ of execution, finding that maintaining it would amount to impermissible pre‑judgment execution akin to a Mareva injunction without the required evidentiary basis.

The defendants sought leave to bring a motion for summary judgment after the action had already been set down for trial.

The court considered whether Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure required leave for such a motion and the appropriate test for granting leave.

The court held that summary judgment motions fall within the phrase “any motion” under the rule and therefore require leave once an action has been set down for trial.

However, the court rejected the rigid requirement that the moving party demonstrate a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances.

Leave should be granted where the motion may reduce issues, shorten the trial, or eliminate the need for trial without causing undue delay.

In a proposed securities class action arising from the collapse in value of a publicly traded corporation’s shares following accounting audit issues, the plaintiffs sought an order permitting substituted service of motion materials on foreign-resident defendants in China.

The request was urgent due to a potential limitation period expiry for secondary market misrepresentation claims under Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act.

Although China is a signatory to the Hague Service Convention and ordinarily requires service through its central authority, the court held that substituted service remained available where defendants had attorned to Ontario’s jurisdiction or appointed an agent for service in Canada.

The court found that the defendants’ roles as officers and directors of an Ontario corporation and their submissions to Ontario securities regulatory processes established sufficient connections to Ontario.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs had taken reasonable steps to locate and serve the defendants and that substituted service was reasonably likely to bring the proceeding to their attention.