8 total
The court struck the defendants' pleadings for non-attendance and awarded the plaintiffs over $1.6 million for a fraudulent mortgage churning scheme.
The plaintiffs alleged that Maria Surovova and her company, Maria Mortgage Services Inc., engaged in a mortgage churning scheme, inducing the plaintiffs to take out a series of mortgages and transfer the proceeds to Surovova under the pretense that the funds would be applied to their mortgages.
Instead, Surovova misappropriated the funds for personal use.
The court found Surovova liable for civil fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, awarding the plaintiffs $1,666,059.13 in damages and $215,603.52 in costs.
The court granted a motion to correct misnomers for John and Jane Doe defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim, finding the litigation finger pointed clearly at them.
The plaintiff, Sayed Hoq, brought a motion to correct the names of "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" defendants to Lakhwant Singh and CWH Distribution Services Inc. o/a CW Henderson Distribution, respectively, in a multi-vehicle automobile accident claim.
The motion was brought under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for correction of incorrectly named parties if there is no non-compensable prejudice.
The court applied the "litigation finger" test, finding the original pleading sufficiently particular for the proposed defendants to know they were the intended targets.
Despite a six-year delay, the court found no non-compensable prejudice, dismissing arguments regarding lost records as speculative and not prejudicial to the defendants.
The motion to correct names was granted.
Insurer's late motion to intervene adjourned, delaying plaintiffs' motion for leave to proceed under Securities Act.
The insurer for an insolvent corporate defendant and a missing individual defendant brought a motion on short notice to intervene and appoint a litigation guardian.
The plaintiffs, who had been preparing to argue their motion for leave to proceed with a secondary market cause of action under the Securities Act, sought an adjournment due to the late service of the insurer's motion record.
The court adjourned the insurer's motion to allow the plaintiffs to respond, and consequently adjourned the plaintiffs' leave motion, as the outcome of the insurer's motion could significantly alter the defense.
Default judgment granted against fraudulent advisor; summary judgment against dealer denied due to triable issues.
The plaintiffs brought a motion for default judgment against their former investment advisor and his corporate entities for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and for summary judgment against the mutual fund dealer, FundEx, on the basis of vicarious liability.
The court granted default judgment against the advisor and his companies, finding the elements of civil fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were established based on deemed admissions.
However, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment against FundEx, concluding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding whether the advisor's wrongful acts were sufficiently connected to his authorized conduct to impose vicarious liability, and whether the plaintiffs' claims were discoverable outside the limitation period.
The court dismissed a defendant's motion to compel broad documentary discovery in a defamation action, prohibiting a fishing expedition.
This motion concerned the scope of documentary discovery in a defamation action.
The defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to produce documents related to prior arrests, hospitalizations, a diversion program, communications with Columbia University, and employment/health records, arguing relevance to justification and mitigation of damages.
The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that the requested documents went beyond the narrow scope of documentary discovery permitted in defamation cases, particularly when justification is pleaded.
The court emphasized that a defendant cannot embark on a "fishing expedition" to buttress general allegations or to impugn the plaintiff's character and credibility through unrelated past incidents, especially when such incidents were not known to the defendant at the time of the alleged defamation or properly pleaded for mitigation.
Section 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act imposes no duty on a lessee's insurer to defend a lessor.
The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finding that her insurer was obliged to defend and indemnify the respondent, Hertz Canada Limited, under s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act.
The Court of Appeal held that s. 277(1.1) imposes no duty on the appellant's insurer to defend on behalf of Hertz, as it speaks only to priorities of payment.
The Court also found that the indemnity issue could not be resolved on the current record.
The appeal was allowed in part and the order varied.
Appeal allowed to permit plaintiff to amend statement of claim to particularize knowing assistance allegations.
The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against a defendant law firm.
The respondent conceded the motion judge erred in concluding the claim did not plead a cause of action, as the claim pleaded 'knowing assistance' in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the motion judge's order, and granted the appellant leave to amend the statement of claim to provide sufficient particulars regarding the law firm's actual knowledge of the trust and participation in the breach.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge's discretionary refusal to grant an adjournment in Small Claims Court upheld.
The defendants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the plaintiff $10,000 for unpaid overtime.
The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge unreasonably refused the defendants' request for an adjournment.
The Divisional Court found that the defendants had ample time to prepare and move for a sealing order prior to trial, and failed to provide medical evidence supporting the individual defendant's absence.
The appeal was dismissed, as the defendants failed to establish a basis to overturn the trial judge's discretionary refusal of the adjournment.