SCJ 2026

The applicant association applied under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001 to quash the Township of Wainfleet's Short-Term Rental By-law.

The applicant argued the by-law was illegal, enacted in bad faith, and conflicted with the Municipal Act and Planning Act.

The court found the by-law was enacted after extensive public consultation, did not prohibit short-term rentals, and did not conflict with provincial legislation.

The administrative penalties were deemed coercive rather than punitive, and the by-law was found not to be discriminatory.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the Township on a partial indemnity basis.

Three related Small Claims Court actions involving disputes over real estate commissions between a real estate broker and a businessman.

The businessman claimed a 50% split of commissions based on verbal agreements for three property transactions in 2017 and 2018.

The court held that these verbal agreements were unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, as they concerned an interest in the sale of lands, and the part performance exception did not apply.

A separate dispute arose over a 2021 transaction involving a written Buyer Representation Agreement.

The broker's claim for commission was dismissed because it was barred by a Full and Final Release executed following a prior arbitration settlement.

The businessman's reciprocal claim for a share of that commission was also dismissed because he was not personally a party to the agreement and could not pierce the corporate veil of his own companies to claim entitlement.

All claims and a related defendant's claim for contribution and indemnity were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action, the defendants sought elevated costs of $10,500 based on an offer to settle and the plaintiff's unreasonable behaviour, including sending offensive emails.

The court found the offer to settle did not meet the timing requirements of Rule 14.07 and the offensive emails did not correlate to additional trial costs.

The court held that the individual defendant lawyer, represented by members of his current firm, was a self-represented litigant subject to the $500 costs cap under Rule 19.05, as he failed to prove an opportunity cost.

However, the defendant law firm was entitled to a reasonable representation fee under Rule 19.04.

The court awarded total costs of $3,051.95 to the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiff requested a reconsideration of a costs decision after her motion to reinstate an action dismissed for delay was denied.

She argued she was forced to bring the motion, the defendants contributed to the delay, and opposing counsel owed her a duty to warn her about Rule 48.14.

The court rejected these arguments, finding she chose to bring the motion, the defendants' inaction did not excuse her delay, and opposing counsel owed her no duty to assist her against their clients' interests.

The original costs awards of $50,000 and $35,000 to the defendants were reaffirmed.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion to enforce a guarantee securing a $9 million commercial loan after the borrowers defaulted and the guarantors failed to pay on demand.

The defendants filed no evidence and did not attend the hearing.

Applying the Hryniak summary judgment framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the uncontested record established the guarantors' clear contractual liability for principal, interest, and enforcement costs.

Judgment was granted for $9,126,162.71, prejudgment and post-judgment interest as stipulated, and substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant insurer filed a request under Rule 2.1 to stay or dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal and disability benefits action, arguing it was duplicative of a prior Human Rights Tribunal application.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the existence of multiple proceedings involving similar issues is not automatically an abuse of process.

The court concluded that determining whether the action violated principles of judicial economy or finality was not appropriate for summary disposition under Rule 2.1.

The plaintiff subcontractor sued the defendant contractor for unpaid holdback and overtime costs related to the installation of millwork at a casino project.

The defendant argued that it was entitled to withhold payment due to a 'pay when paid' clause, as the owner had charged back costs for completing the delayed work.

The court found that the delay was primarily caused by the defendant's failure to deliver materials on time.

The court held that the defendant could not rely on the 'pay when paid' clause because its own default caused the owner's non-payment.

The plaintiff was awarded the holdback amount and a portion of the overtime costs that were explicitly authorized in writing.

In CCAA proceedings arising from a major construction project, the monitor sought an order authorizing release of a contractor-specific holdback notwithstanding the continued construction of the project and the resulting technical inability to satisfy the timing requirements of the construction lien regime.

The court held that s. 11 of the CCAA gave it jurisdiction to deem compliance with statutory preconditions where doing so usefully furthered the remedial objectives of the restructuring, caused no demonstrated prejudice, and preserved the substantive rights of affected stakeholders.

The court also held that it could protect the monitor and CRO from potential personal liability under specified tax statutes for implementing the court-authorized payment, but revised the proposed wording to grant a narrower and more direct liability shield.

The holdback release order was approved with modifications, including removal of an unnecessary overlapping protection.

Costs endorsement following a three-day family law trial in which the applicant obtained a Final Order on parenting issues.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $24,577.27 based on her Offer to Settle and the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

The court found the applicant's Offer to Settle met the requirements of Rule 24(12) FLR, entitling her to full recovery of costs.

However, applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness from Beaver v. Hill and Lawrence v. Lawrence, and considering the respondent's unreasonable behaviour including overholding the child and breaching court orders, the court awarded the applicant 80-85% of her costs, totalling $20,000 all-inclusive payable within 30 days.

In this slip and fall action, one defendant sought leave at a case conference to bring a partial summary judgment motion on duty of care and limitation issues.

The plaintiff opposed the request on the basis that the action would continue against other defendants, the moving defendant would still be a trial witness, and credibility and expert issues remained live.

The court held the proposed motion was not appropriate because it would delay trial scheduling, was unlikely to be materially more cost-effective than trial, and risked inconsistent findings on issues intertwined with the main action.

The request to proceed by summary judgment was therefore refused.

Costs decision arising from a motion to compel answers to undertakings in a wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff brought the original motion but by the hearing date the substantive issues had been resolved, leaving only costs.

The court found the motion was not the catalyst for the defendant's compliance, as the defendant had been working to address concerns before the motion was served.

The court also found the plaintiff's rigid and adversarial approach in continuing to press the motion after the issues were largely resolved did not warrant a costs award.

Applying the principle that costs generally should not be awarded where a motion is settled on all issues except costs absent exceptional circumstances, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to validate service of the Statement of Claim on one of the defendants in an assault action arising from a 2015 incident that resulted in the death of the decedent.

The defendant opposed and brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay under r. 24.01.

The court declined to validate service, finding the claim did not come to the defendant's notice within the prescribed time and the defendant was not evading service.

The court also declined to extend time for service under r. 3.02, finding presumed and actual prejudice to the defendant.

Applying the test for dismissal for delay, the court found the over-8-year delay to be inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial, creating a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.

The action was dismissed as against the moving defendant.

In supplemental reasons following an earlier decision, the court addressed the priority of payment and subrogation rights between OPCF 44R insurers and an umbrella policy (PULP) insurer, following the Court of Appeal's decision in Rodriguez-Vergara v. Lamoureux.

The court held that the at-fault drivers' automobile policy is primary, followed by the respective OPCF 44R endorsements, and finally the PULP.

The court also held that the OPCF 44R insurers have no right of subrogation against the umbrella insurer, and their subrogation rights against the at-fault drivers directly are limited to the amount by which their payment exceeds the combined automobile and excess policy limits.

The plaintiff sued two property appraisers he had retained for an improvident sale action, alleging their appraisals undervalued his condominium unit.

One of the defendant appraisers brought a motion to strike the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious the claim could not succeed because the appraiser was protected by absolute witness immunity for reports prepared for litigation.

Furthermore, the claim was entirely speculative as the improvident sale action had not yet been determined, meaning the plaintiff could not establish any damages.

The claim was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion to extend the time permitted for cross-examinations of the defendants' affiants on pending anti-SLAPP motions.

The defendants had filed 14 affidavits across four separate motions.

The court found that limiting the plaintiffs to the statutory seven hours would prevent meaningful cross-examination and that it was in the interests of justice to extend the time to 15 hours.

The applicant, charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant in the context of a Garofoli review.

The applicant sought to question the affiant on the underlying warrantless vehicle search, a witness statement synopsis, and confidential informant information.

The court granted leave to cross-examine solely on the affiant's knowledge regarding the connection between the drugs found in the vehicle and the applicant or his residence.

Leave was denied regarding the constitutionality of the vehicle search, the witness statement, and the confidential informant, as cross-examination on those issues was not reasonably likely to assist the court in determining whether there was a basis for the warrant.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for a writ of possession, the self-represented respondent sought costs of $15,000 for 150 hours of his time, plus disbursements, and $50,000 in damages.

The applicants argued costs should be deferred to a fresh proceeding they had commenced.

The court awarded the respondent $2,700 in costs, finding he was entitled to a moderate allowance for time spent performing work ordinarily done by a lawyer, but reduced his claimed hours to 25.

The claim for damages was dismissed as it was not properly before the court.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The defendant anticipatorily breached the agreement of purchase and sale after the property's value declined due to rising interest rates.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, rejecting the defendant's vague allegations of misrepresentation.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the shortfall in the resale price, with slight reductions to the claimed real estate commission and legal fees.

The parties resolved their family law litigation via a consent order, which included a provision that the applicant would transfer her shares in two private corporations to the respondent, with the respondent bearing any associated costs.

The share transfer was delayed for years due to the need for third-party shareholder approval and disputes over the transfer documentation.

The applicant sought over $22,000 in costs for the transfer, alleging bad faith and unreasonable delay by the respondent.

The respondent sought costs of $5,000, alleging the applicant misrepresented her ability to transfer the shares.

The court found no bad faith but noted unreasonable litigation conduct by both parties.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $12,000 in costs to the applicant.

The offender pleaded guilty to six offences, including conspiracy to commit robbery and discharging a firearm with intent, following a drive-by shooting and vehicle pursuit in Stoney Creek.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission of eight years.

The court expressed serious concern that the joint submission was at the extreme low end of the range for such egregious gun violence, but ultimately accepted it.

Due to the leniency of the joint submission and the offender's repeated institutional misconduct, the court declined to grant enhanced Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and reduced the standard Summers credit to a 1.25:1 ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 69 months.