Toronto

ORDER OF THE COURT

Claim No. SC-22-00000161-0000

BETWEEN

WARREN HAYWOOD

and

HORLICK LEVITT DI LELLA LLP and BRIAN HORLICK

Plaintiff(s)

Defendants(s)

BEFORE: Mirilyn Sharp

HELD BY: ☐ In person ☐ Videoconference ☐ Teleconference ☒ In writing ☐ Hybrid

DATE: January 29, 2026

EVENT TYPE: Written Submissions on Costs

APPEARING:

Plaintiff(s): WARREN WINSTON HAYWOOD Present ☐

Representative: SELF-REPRESENTED Present ☐

Defendant 1: HORLICK LEVITT DI LELLA LLP (NOW LEVITT DI LELLA DUGGAN & CHAPLICK LLP)

Present ☐

Representatives: BHARAT KAPOOR and GEORGE MARDIROSSIAN Present ☐

Defendant 2: BRIAN HORLICK Present ☐

Representatives:

BHARAT KAPOOR and GEORGE MARDIROSSIAN

Present ☒

ORDER OF THE COURT - COSTS

The Plaintiff’s action against his former employer, Horlick Levitt Di Lella LLP (now Levitt Di Lella Duggan & Chaplick LLP) and one of its now former partners, Brian Horlick was dismissed in its entirety following a trial heard by me on January 12, 2026, for the reasons given in my Decision dated January 13, 2026. The Defendants were jointly represented at trial by Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian (a lawyer and a paralegal working at Mr. Horlick’s current law firm, Horlick Condominium Law).
The parties were advised that if they were unable to agree on costs, the Defendants were to provide written costs submissions within 7 days following the release of the Decision, and the Plaintiff was to deliver responding costs submissions 7 days after receipt of the Defendants’ costs submissions.
Mr. Kapoor provided costs submissions on January 20, 2026, with an amended version served later that day. The Plaintiff did not provide costs submissions despite being given the opportunity to do so.
Mr. Kapoor seeks on behalf of the Defendants “reimbursement for all legal costs and disbursements in the amount of $10,500.00 incurred for defending this frivolous Action, and addressing the Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated and defamatory statements made within the Plaintiff’s Claim”.
The costs submissions included a Bill of Costs setting out the time spent by Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian on this matter, as well as their hourly rates, broken down into five separate items:

(a) Preparation for Trial ($6,678);

(b) Further trial preparation and attendance at trial ($2,952);

(d) Preparation for and attendance at the Motion brought July 17, 2024 ($840); and

(e) Preparation of Costs Submissions ($823.50).

The fee for the five items is $16,435.50. With HST of 13% ($2,136.62) and disbursements of $710.85, the total fees, HST and disbursements according to the Bill of Costs is $19,282.96.
In seeking an all-inclusive costs award of $10,500.00 (which includes the $710.85 in disbursements) Mr. Kapoor has applied a discount of approximately 47% on the fees.
One issue not addressed in the costs submissions is which of Rule 19.04 or Rule 19.05 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court (the “Rules”) applies to the present case. Rule 19.04 provides that “if a successful party is represented by a lawyer, student-at-law or paralegal, the court may award the party a reasonable representation fee at trial...”. Rule 19.05 provides that the Court may order an unsuccessful party to pay to a successful party who is self-represented an amount not exceeding

$500 as compensation for inconvenience and expense.

The question in this case is whether either of the Defendants were represented by a lawyer and/or paralegal such that Rule 19.04 would allow this Court to award a reasonable representation fee to that Defendant, or whether either of the Defendants were self-represented, such that Rule 19.05 would limit the costs award to $500 for that Defendant. This issue is addressed below.

Principles Applicable on Costs Awards in Small Claims Court

In making a costs decision, I am bound by the provisions of s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides, in part, that an award of costs in Small Claims Court, other than disbursements, shall not exceed 15 per cent of the amount claimed unless the court considers it necessary in the interests of justice to penalize a party for unreasonable behaviour in the proceeding.
The Plaintiff claimed $35,000 in his Plaintiff’s Claim. As such, by virtue of s. 29, the costs award is not to exceed $5,250 (15% of $35,000) plus disbursements unless the court considers it necessary in the interests of justice to penalize Mr. Haywood for unreasonable behaviour in the proceeding.
Mr. Horlick seeks an elevated costs award on the basis of the exception in s. 29, alleging that the

Plaintiff’s unreasonable behaviour in the proceeding justifies such an award.

Unreasonable behaviour can include failing to accept an offer to settle made pursuant to Rule 14.07 of the Rules provided all conditions of the offer as set out in Rule 14.07 are satisfied.
Unreasonable behaviour can also include behaviour that increases the costs incurred by the successful party.
In West End Tree Service Inc. v. Danuta Stabryla 2010 ONSC 68 (“West End”), Justice Swinton held that even if there is a basis to find unreasonable behaviour on the part of the unsuccessful party, the costs awarded should logically bear some relationship to the costs incurred by the successful party as a result of the unreasonable behaviour of the party ordered to pay costs.
West End was considered by Justice Charney in 10.1 Inc. v. 2248951 Ontario Inc., 2018 ONSC 381, a case in which a costs decision of the Small Claims Court was overturned. Justice Charney held that “where the court exercises its discretion to increase costs above the 15% maximum set by s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act, it must provide sufficient reasons for the party ordered to pay costs to understand what unreasonable behaviour is being penalized, and to understand the correlation between the additional costs ordered and the unreasonable behaviour. The correlation does not require the recitation of a mathematical formula, but does require at least some explanation” [Emphasis added].
In the event it is determined that one or both of the Defendants were self-represented, Rule 14.07(3) allows the Court to award a self-represented defendant an amount not exceeding $1,500 as compensation for inconvenience and expense despite Rule 19.05, provided the self-represented defendant has served an offer to settle that satisfies all of the criteria in Rule 14.07(2).
In the present case, Mr. Kapoor seeks on behalf of the Defendants, an elevated costs award against the Plaintiff on the basis of (a) the Defendants’ offer to settle made on January 7, 2026, (b) allegations contained in the Plaintiffs’ Claim that Mr. Kapoor describes as unsubstantiated and defamatory, and

describes as “racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and sexually charged aggressive emails.”

(a) The Offer to Settle

In seeking elevated costs of $10,500.00, Mr. Kapoor relies, in part, on the Defendants’ offer to settle dated January 7, 2026 in which the Defendants offered to pay $1,000.00 to the Plaintiff to settle the action (the “Offer to Settle”). Specifically, Mr. Kapoor seeks, on behalf of the Defendants, double costs pursuant to Rule 14.07(2) of the Rules which provides:

14.07 (2) When a Defendant makes an offer to settle that is not accepted by the plaintiff, the court may award the defendant an amount not exceeding twice the costs awardable to a successful party, from the date the offer was served, if the following conditions are met:

The plaintiff obtains a judgment as favourable as or less favourable than the terms of the offer.
The offer was made at least seven days before the trial.
The offer was not withdrawn and did not expire before the trial. [emphasis added]
The Offer to Settle was served by the Defendants on January 7, 2026, and the trial was held on January 12, 2026. As such, the Offer to Settle was not served at least seven days before trial and thus does not meet the criteria for Rule 14.07 double costs.
Even if the Offer to Settle had been served seven days before trial, it may still not have met the criteria for Rule 14.07 double costs given that the Plaintiff’s action was dismissed. There are cases that hold that where a plaintiff’s claim is “dismissed”, the double costs rule does not apply to a defendant’s offer because to qualify for double costs, the plaintiff must have obtained a “judgment” as favourable or less favourable than the terms of the offer. Those cases hold that a “dismissal” of a plaintiff’s claim does not qualify as a “judgment”. See the thorough analysis of this issue by Regional Sr. Justice Ellies in Bilbija v. Whittington Engineering Ltd. et al., 2024 ONSC 874, https://canlii.ca/t/k2qtv.
Given that Mr. Horlick’s Offer to Settle was not served at least seven days before trial, I need not comment further on this line of cases. I do note, however, that in 575864 Ontario v. Ridley Windows., 2022 ONSC 4329, https://canlii.ca/t/jr1mp Justice Matheson in the Divisional Court held that the Deputy Judge in that case had the discretion under Rule 14.07(2) to award up to double costs where the defendant’s $4000 offer was better than the “dismissal” of the plaintiff’s claim.

(b) Alleged Unsubstantiated and Defamatory Allegations in the Plaintiff’s Claim

In seeking elevated costs of $10,500.00, Mr. Kapoor asserts on behalf of the Defendants that the Defendants incurred costs for defending a frivolous action and addressing the Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated and defamatory statements made within the Plaintiff’s Claim.
I have reviewed the Plaintiff’s Claim and do not consider that any of the allegations made therein rise to the level of “unreasonable behaviour” required to warrant a penalty under s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act. Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian ably and successfully defended the Plaintiff’s Claim on behalf of the Defendants by addressing the various allegations made, but in my view, there is nothing in the Plaintiff’s Claim itself that would justify an elevated costs award.

(c) The Offensive Emails

In seeking an elevated costs award, Mr. Kapoor also relies on a series of emails written by the Plaintiff to the Defendants during the course of the litigation (attached to the costs submissions) which are aptly characterized by Mr. Kapoor as “racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and sexually charged aggressive emails.”
Mr. Kapoor claims the Plaintiff’s conduct “significantly impacted the morale of Mr. Horlick and his employees who are of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, and sexual orientations.”
While the emails written by the Plaintiff are certainly offensive, and no doubt impacted the morale of Mr. Horlick and his employees, there are a number of questions this Court must answer before determining whether it is appropriate to award elevated costs to the Defendants under the exception noted in Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act or impose a penalty on the Plaintiff under Rule 19.06 of the Rules which allows the Court to award a penalty where a party has acted unreasonably.
The first question is whether the emails sent by the Plaintiff to the Defendants during the course of the litigation amount to “unreasonable behaviour in the proceeding” sufficient to bring into play the penalty provisions of Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act or the penalty provisions of Rule 19.06.
The second question is whether Mr. Kapoor, in seeking an award of elevated costs on the basis of “unreasonable behaviour” has demonstrated that the unreasonable behaviour has increased the Defendants’ costs, such that the Defendants would be entitled to more than the 15% maximum prescribed by Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act or, if either Defendants is considered to be a self-represented litigant, whether pursuant to Rule 19.06, the Defendants would be entitled to more than the $500 maximum prescribed by Rule 14.05.
The third question is whether any of the additional costs incurred can be claimed now if those costs were incurred in relation to earlier proceedings or motions where a costs award was already made or where costs were either not sought or not awarded.

The July 9, 2024 Email

Mr. Kapoor has produced a July 9, 2024 email written by the Plaintiff to counsel for Mr. Horlick responding to Mr. Horlick’s request for a consent adjournment of the trial that had been scheduled to take place on October 3, 2024, as the date fell on one of the Jewish High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah. In denying the request, the Plaintiff wrote:

“Request for adjournment is denied. It’s been over two years and I am not allowing his religion to try and ruin me as they are ruining Gaza.”

As a result of the Plaintiff’s refusal to consent to the adjournment request, Mr. Kapoor, on behalf of the Defendants, was forced to bring a motion on July 17, 2024 to adjourn the trial that had been scheduled for October 3, 2024 (the “Adjournment Motion”). The Adjournment Motion was heard on September 20, 2024 and Deputy Judge J. Twohig granted the adjournment by order dated September 20, 2024 (the “September 20, 2024 Adjournment Order”).
The September 20, 2024 Adjournment Order makes no reference to costs, notwithstanding that the July 9, 2024 email was included in the motion materials filed in support of the Adjournment Motion. Whether that is because no costs were sought by the Defendants at the time, or because Justice J. Twohig refused to award any costs is unknown. Either way, this Court is not able to award costs in relation to the Adjournment Motion as costs for that motion have already been determined.

The October 26, 2024 Emails

Mr. Kapoor has also produced two October 26, 2024 emails written by the Plaintiff to Mr. Horlick and his counsel concerning unspecified motion materials. While the emails are clearly racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and sexually charged, without further information, this Court cannot determine the correlation between the unreasonable behaviour and any additional costs incurred as a result.

The October 28, 2025 Emails

Lastly, Mr. Kapoor produced a series of emails written by the Plaintiff to Mr. Horlick and his counsel on October 28, 2025 which again are racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and sexually charged. In order to determine whether additional costs can be awarded based on Mr. Haywood’s unreasonable behaviour, the emails need to be put into context.
By Order dated October 23, 2025, Deputy Judge Vicars struck the Defence because the Defendants did not appear for the trial that had been scheduled to take place on October 23, 2025. As the action was undefended, Deputy Judge Vicars, after hearing from the Plaintiff, granted judgment to the Plaintiff in the amount of $35,000 plus $250 in costs (the “October 23, 2025 Order for Judgment”).
By Order dated November 24, 2025, Deputy Judge McNeely set aside the October 23, 2025 Order for Judgment on the basis that the Notice of Trial for the October 23, 2025 trial date did not reach the Defendants (the “November 24, 2025 Set Aside Order”). The November 24, 2025 Set Aside Order addressed the issue of costs as follows:

[3]….As the lack of notice was due to Court error, no order as to costs is made.

The offensive October 28, 2025 emails post-date the October 23, 2025 Order for Judgment and pre- date the November 24, 2025 Set Aside Order.
Because costs of the motion that led to the November 24, 2025 Set Aside Order have already been determined, this Court is not able to award costs in relation to that motion.
That leaves the costs of preparation for the January 12, 2026 trial and the costs of the January 12, 2026 trial itself. As none of the offensive emails produced by Mr. Kapoor relate to the January 12, 2026 trial or the preparation for that trial, there does not appear to be the necessary correlation between the unreasonable behaviour of the Plaintiff in writing the emails and any additional costs incurred by the Defendants for the trial or preparation for trial.
Given the above, there is no basis upon which to award elevated costs to the Defendants pursuant to the s.29 exception in the Courts of Justice Act or to impose a penalty pursuant to Rule 19.06.

What Costs Award is Appropriate – Were Either or Both Defendants Self-Represented Litigants

Having determined that neither the exception to s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act nor the penalty provisions of Rule 19.06 are applicable, this Court must determine an appropriate award of costs keeping in mind that the maximum allowable costs award in this case is $5,250 plus disbursements (15% of $35,000 claimed) if Rule 19.04 applies, and $500 plus disbursements (with some wiggle room as set out below) if Rule 19.05 applies.
As noted, the legal fees set out in the Bill of Costs are broken down into 5 categories as follows:

(a) Preparation for Trial ($6,678);

(b) Further trial preparation and attendance at trial ($2,952);

(d) Preparation for and attendance at the Motion brought July 17, 2024 ($840); and

(e) Preparation of Costs Submissions ($823.50).

Given that the costs in relation to items (c) and (d) have already been determined, this Court can only consider the costs in relation to items (a) and (b). Once a determination is made on the appropriate costs award, this Court can consider whether any additional amount is owing for item (e).
The total time spent on items (a) and (b) is $9,630 in fees. Using Mr. Kapoor’s proposed discount of

47%, the maximum amount for which fees reimbursement is properly sought would be $5,103.90. Costs Entitlement of Mr. Horlick

At the outset of the trial, Mr. Kapoor advised the Court that he and Mr. Mardirossian were representing both Defendants. As Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian were both working at Mr. Horlick’s current law firm (Horlick Condominium Law) when they represented the Defendants, the question is whether Rule

19.05 applies to Mr. Horlick, such that he would be considered a self-represented litigant entitled to claim costs not exceeding $500 as compensation for inconvenience and expense or whether Rule

19.04 applies, such that Mr. Horlick would be entitled to claim a reasonable representation fee.

This very question was considered in Vardalas v. 1455358 Ontario Inc., 2014 40443 (ON SCSM), [2014] O.J. No. 5263 (“Vardalas”) where the Small Claims Court had to determine whether the successful law firm defendants, who were represented by one of their own lawyers, should be treated as self-represented litigants entitled to a maximum award of $500 as compensation for inconvenience and expense pursuant to Rule 19.05 or whether they would be entitled to a reasonable representation fee pursuant to Rule 19.04.
In Vardalas, the successful defendants (a law firm and its payroll management company) who were sued by a former law clerk for wrongful dismissal, claimed costs of $11,923.69 based on $3000 (being 15% of the amount claimed), a further $3000 for double costs arising from a Rule 14 offer, $780 for HST and $5,143.69 for disbursements.
The unsuccessful plaintiff in Vardalas argued that the defendants were effectively self-represented litigants, since a partner of the law firm represented the defendants.
The plaintiff argued that as self-represented litigants, the defendants should not be awarded costs as if they had retained outside counsel but instead should be limited to a maximum costs award of $500 as compensation for inconvenience and expense pursuant to Rule 19.05.
The Court in Vardalas referred to Fanaken v. Bell, Temple (1985), 49 C.P.C. 212 (OSC Assessment Office) (“Fanaken”) where no counsel fee was allowed to a law firm that was defending the dismissal of its former law clerk, noting that the Assessment Officer in Fanaken had relied on long standing precedents such as Smith v. Graham (1856), 2 U.C.Q.B. 268 and Johnston v. Ryckman (1904), 7

O.L.R. 511, in deciding that a member of a law firm who appears on its behalf is not in court as counsel but as litigant and, as he put it in paragraph 41 “…where…a firm of lawyers defends itself through the use of an employee or a partner, that no counsel fee should be taxed”.

The Court in Vardalas determined that there was merit in these submissions and that the defendants in the circumstances of that case should be considered self-represented litigants.
The Court in Vardalas went on to consider whether the self-represented law firm was entitled to any costs in excess of the $500 stipulated in Rule 19.05. Specifically, the Court considered whether additional costs could be awarded for lost opportunity. The Court concluded that absent proof of lost opportunity by the self-represented lawyer, the most such a lawyer could be awarded for costs in Small Claims Court would be $500 (plus disbursements) pursuant to Rule 19.05. The Deputy Judge in Vardalas indicated that if lost opportunity costs had been proven, the $500 cap could have been overcome.
In a more recent decision, Primeau Professional Law Corporation v 5039454 Ontario Inc., 2024 114332 (ON SCSM), https://canlii.ca/t/k805b (“Primeau”), the successful self-represented lawyer plaintiff relied on Vardalas as well as Fong v. Chan, 1999 2052 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 4600 (“Fong”) to argue that if she could prove a lost opportunity cost, she should be entitled to recover more than the $500 maximum set out in Rule 19.05.
In Fong, an oft cited decision of the Court of Appeal, the issue on appeal was the extent to which self- represented lawyers are entitled to recover costs in litigation to which they are parties.
At paragraph 26 of the Fong decision, the Court of Appeal held that: “All litigants suffer a loss of time through their involvement in the legal process. The self-represented litigant should not recover costs for the time and effort that any litigant would have to devote to the case. Costs should only be awarded to those lay litigants who can demonstrate that they devoted time and effort to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyer retained to conduct the litigation, and that as a result, they incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity”.
Because the Court of Appeal in Fong was not dealing with a Small Claims Court action, the Court did not address whether Rule 19.05 would prevent the Court from awarding an amount in excess of $500 even where the litigants could demonstrate that they incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity.
Notwithstanding that Fong did not involve a Small Claims Court action, the Deputy Judge in Primeau accepted that there was discretion to award more than the $500 maximum set out in Rule 19.05 where there was a self-represented lawyer. Ultimately the Deputy Judge in Primeau did not award costs in excess of the $500 limit as he was concerned that there was no hard evidence that the self- represented lawyer and her student lost income in pursuing the Small Claims Court action. In those circumstances he determined that he was bound by the $500 maximum award for inconvenience and expense as set out in Rule 19.05.
While I am not bound by the decisions in Vardalas or Primeau, I note that both Courts reached the same conclusion regarding the entitlement of a self-represented lawyer to recover costs in excess of the $500 provided for in Rule 19.05. Both Courts were prepared to award an additional amount provided the self-represented lawyer could prove a loss of earnings.
The Bill of Costs discloses that both Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian dedicated significant time to the preparation for and attendance at the trial (10.8 hours of Mr. Kapoor’s time and 27.9 hours of Mr. Mardirossian’s time). While I may have been prepared to find that Messrs. Kapoor and Mardirossian could have spent their time working on billable matters for Mr. Horlick’s current law firm rather than defending this Small Claims Court file, I was not provided with any evidence in that regard.
As I have not been provided with proof that Mr. Horlick incurred an opportunity cost or forewent remunerative activity by having members of his current law firm represent him at trial, I am bound by Rule 19.05 which limits a self-represented litigant to recovery of up to $500 plus disbursements as compensation for inconvenience and expense.

Costs Entitlement of Horlick Levitt Di Lella LLP (now Levitt Di Lella Duggan & Chaplick LLP)

The situation with the Defendant Horlick Levitt Di Lella LLP (now Levitt Di Lella Duggan & Chaplick LLP) is different from that of Mr. Horlick. The Defendant law firm was sued by the Plaintiff for damages allegedly arising out of the Plaintiff’s employment at the Defendant law firm and specifically arising out of an alleged breach of the Employment Agreement marked as Exhibit 2 at the trial. That Employment Agreement names the Plaintiff and the Defendant law firm as parties to the Employment Agreement but does not name Mr. Horlick personally.
The Plaintiff’s action against Mr. Horlick personally was based primarily on allegations of Human Rights Code violations but not based on a breach of the Employment Agreement.
Had I found that Mr. Haywood was entitled to damages arising out of his employment at the Defendant law firm or his dismissal from the Defendant law firm, I would have assessed those damages as against the Defendant law firm, not as against Mr. Horlick personally.
It is my view that the successful representation of the Defendant law firm by members of Mr. Horlick’s current law firm (a lawyer and a paralegal) entitles the Defendant law firm to an award of a reasonable representation fee at trial pursuant to Rule 19.04.

Conclusions

I have concluded that the Defendant, Mr. Horlick was a self-represented party, limited to recovery of

$500 (plus disbursements) as compensation for inconvenience and expense pursuant to Rule 19.05, and that the Defendant law firm, Horlick Levitt Di Lella LLP (now Levitt Di Lella Duggan & Chaplick LLP) was successfully represented by both Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian, thus entitling the Defendant law firm to a reasonable representation fee pursuant to Rule 19.04.

I have decided that the appropriate split for the hours spent, and the fees claimed by Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian ($5,103.90) would be 50/50 as between Mr. Horlick and the Defendant law firm for the purposes of calculating the maximum costs entitlement of each of the Defendants. Thus, subject to the limitation imposed for self-represented litigants by virtue of Rule 19.05, each of the Defendants would be entitled to claim a maximum of $2,551.95.
Most of the disbursements claimed in the Bill of Costs appear to relate to the Motions and thus are not recoverable for the trial. Further, as the costs awarded by me are significantly lower than the amount originally requested, I have not added the fees claimed in item (e) preparation of costs submissions.
As I have determined (a) that Mr. Horlick was self-represented, (b) that his Offer to Settle did not meet all of the criteria of Rule 14.07(2) or 14.07(3), (c) that the unreasonable behaviour of the Plaintiff in sending racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and sexually charged emails did not correlate to additional costs that have not already been dealt with on the prior motions, and (d) that Mr. Horlick did not provide sufficient proof that he suffered an opportunity cost by having Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian represent him, Mr. Horlick is entitled to $500 as compensation for inconvenience and expense.
As I have determined (a) that as a successful party, the Defendant law firm is entitled to a representation fee pursuant to Rule 19.05, (b) that Mr. Kapoor and Mr. Mardirossian devoted significant time to defend the Defendant law firm, (c) that the Offer to Settle did not meet all of the criteria of Rule 14.07 (2), and (d) that the unreasonable behaviour of the Plaintiff in sending racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and sexually charged emails did not correlate to additional costs that have not already been dealt with on the prior motions, the Defendant law firm is entitled to a costs award of $2,551.95.
Mr. Haywood is to pay $500 to Mr. Horlick as compensation for inconvenience and expense and

$2,551.95 to Levitt Di Lella Duggan & Chaplick LLP as a representation fee (for a total of $3,051.95), with both amounts to be paid within 30 days following the Release of these Reasons. Both amounts should be sent by Mr. Haywood to Mr. Kapoor at Horlick Condominium Law to be held in trust on behalf of Mr. Horlick and Levitt Di Lella Duggan & Chaplick LLP and distributed as they direct.

January 29, 2026

Date Signature of Judicial Official

Warren Haywood v. Horlick Levitt Di Lella LLP and Brian Horlick, 2026 ONSC 44277

Case Summary