Salvatore Caramanna

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police obtaining his cell phone subscriber information from a telecommunications provider without a warrant.

The applicant argued that the disclosure of cell phone subscriber information was analogous to internet subscriber information and should require judicial authorization under the principles established in R v. Spencer.

The court rejected this argument, finding that cell phone subscriber information does not attract the same reasonable expectation of privacy as internet subscriber information, and therefore no breach of section 8 Charter rights occurred.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the combined operation of subsections 172.1(3) and 172.1(4).

Subsection (3) creates a presumption that a representation of being underage constitutes proof of the accused's belief in that age, rebuttable only by evidence to the contrary.

Subsection (4) provides that honest belief in legal age is not a defence unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the person's age.

The applicant argued these provisions violated section 7 (fundamental justice) and section 11(d) (presumption of innocence) of the Charter.

The court found the presumption in subsection (3) unconstitutional as applied in concert with subsection (4), as it could compel conviction despite reasonable doubt about the accused's belief.

Thirty‑three accused sought exclusion of wiretap evidence arising from “Project Marvel,” a large police investigation into shootings, robbery, and organized gang activity in Toronto.

The applicants argued the authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to establish “investigative necessity” under s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and improperly named certain individuals as “known persons” under s. 185(1)(e).

The court applied the deferential Garofoli review standard and held the authorizing judge had a reasonable basis to conclude investigative necessity existed despite alternative investigative techniques such as cell‑phone analysis.

The court further held that the challenged individuals were properly named as targets because interception of their communications could assist the investigation and the statutory threshold is low.

A separate sub‑facial challenge relating to the search of a backyard shed and the curtilage doctrine was also rejected.

Following jury convictions for manslaughter, robbery, unlawful confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a fatal robbery, the court determined a dangerous offender application under the pre-July 2, 2008 regime.

The court found the statutory prerequisites for both dangerous offender and long-term offender status were met but exercised discretion to designate the offender a long-term offender.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, separation, and proportionality in light of extreme aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, the court imposed concurrent custodial terms resulting in a ten-year net sentence after enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, plus a ten-year long-term supervision order.