Salvatore Caramanna

The Crown sought to exclude cell phone copies of surveillance video in a manslaughter trial, arguing they were unreliable due to unexplained differences from the original and violated the best evidence rule.

The defence contended the cell phone copies offered superior clarity and had been used without objection in a prior mistrial.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the cell phone copies met the threshold for reliability, provided the clearest images, and thus satisfied a common sense application of the best evidence rule, emphasizing that "original" does not always mean "better" in terms of evidence quality.

The Crown brought an application to relitigate two prior evidentiary rulings made during an initial trial that ended in a mistrial.

The rulings concerned the admissibility of a witness's statement and the scope of cross-examination regarding an alleged attempt to influence testimony.

Applying s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code and the "interests of justice" factors from R. v. Victoria, the court found that the prior rulings were not clearly wrong and that no new evidence or arguments were presented to justify relitigation.

The application was dismissed, affirming the binding nature of the previous evidentiary decisions for the re-trial.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of three subsections of the child luring provision in a police sting operation context: the age presumption under s. 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4), and the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a).

The majority held that s. 172.1(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, but that s. 172.1(4) does not infringe s. 7 because it only limits a defence rather than providing an independent pathway to conviction.

Because the trial judge convicted on a legally unsound basis — failure to take reasonable steps — without finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual belief, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum was left to the new trial judge.

Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have also declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional.

Abella J. dissented in part, finding s. 172.1(4) also unconstitutional and that an acquittal should be entered.

The accused was convicted of child luring by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual conversations with a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of three provisions: the presumption of belief in section 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement in section 172.1(4), and the mandatory minimum one-year sentence in section 172.1(2)(a).

The trial judge found section 172.1(3) violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The trial judge upheld section 172.1(4) as constitutional under section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate under section 12 of the Charter and imposed 75 days intermittent incarceration instead.

Both the conviction appeal and Crown's sentence appeal were dismissed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death.

The Crown sought 15-18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10-13 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the stabbing, the offender's lack of remorse, the vulnerability of the victim, and the jury's recommendation of 25 years.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years, along with ancillary orders.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to play the defendant's entire video-recorded police statement to challenge him on prior inconsistent statements and demonstrate his demeanour.

The defence argued that parts of the statement should be edited to prevent infringing the defendant's rights to counsel and silence, as he had answered some questions and not others.

The court ruled that playing the entire statement would not prejudice the defendant or create an unfair trial, noting that the statement had previously been ruled voluntary.

With the exception of one agreed-upon redaction, the court permitted the whole video statement to be played to the jury.

The defence applied for a directed verdict for second degree murder on a first degree murder count, which was previously dismissed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to correct factual errors in the original decision regarding the evidence presented at trial.

Despite excising the incorrect references to the evidence, the court concluded there was still sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the application remained dismissed.

The accused was charged with first degree murder for the stabbing death of his wife.

After the Crown closed its case, the defence applied for a directed verdict of second degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence globally, including the accused's journal entries expressing frustration with his wife, his delay in calling 911 after the stabbing, and his medical knowledge of vital organs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find planning and deliberation, and dismissed the application.

The court issued supplementary reasons to a ruling that dismissed a defence motion to read the defendant's statement into the record.

The court corrected its previous observation that the defence had ambushed the Crown with the motion, noting that the defence had verbally advised the Crown prior to the close of the Crown's case.

The original decision dismissing the motion remained in place, as the re-examination question did not infer that a statement had been provided.

During a trial, the defence brought a motion requiring the Crown to produce the defendant's complete police statement to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown's re-examination of the lead investigator left the jury with the prejudicial understanding that the defendant had provided a statement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown's questions did not infer any statement was given to the police, and noted that the defence had improperly delayed bringing the application until after the Crown closed its case.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of the deceased's OHIP records.

The court found no foundation that the records were likely relevant to the issues at trial, noting that the best evidence of the deceased's mental health was an existing psychologist's report.

The court concluded the application was based on speculation and sought to enlarge collateral issues.

The first stage test was not met, and the application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the accused, whose first language is Pashto, during a murder investigation.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter due to a language barrier.

The court found that the accused understood English sufficiently, was provided with an interpreter and duty counsel, and gave the statement voluntarily without any police oppression or inducements.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused was convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death after his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The accident was not his fault, but he left the scene for 20-25 seconds, during which time the pedestrian was run over by a truck and killed.

The court stayed the manslaughter conviction under the Kienapple principle.

Considering the highly unusual mitigating circumstances and collateral immigration consequences, the court sentenced the accused to six months less a day imprisonment, followed by 18 months of probation.

The accused was charged with luring a child by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment.

The court conducted a Charter challenge to the constitutionality of subsections (3) and (4) of section 172.1, finding subsection (3) unconstitutional but subsection (4) constitutionally valid.

The accused was convicted based on his failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the online interlocutor, who was actually an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The court then addressed the accused's Charter challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, finding it grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the offence and the offender's personal characteristics.

The accused was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment.

The accused posted a personal advertisement on Craigslist seeking a "daddy/daughter" role-play partner and engaged in sexual communications with a person he believed to be a 14-year-old girl named Mia.

The person was actually an adult police officer conducting an undercover investigation.

The accused claimed he believed he was communicating with an adult engaged in consensual role-play.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that while there was a reasonable doubt as to his subjective belief regarding the age of the person, he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person with whom he was communicating.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police obtaining his cell phone subscriber information from a telecommunications provider without a warrant.

The applicant argued that the disclosure of cell phone subscriber information was analogous to internet subscriber information and should require judicial authorization under the principles established in R v. Spencer.

The court rejected this argument, finding that cell phone subscriber information does not attract the same reasonable expectation of privacy as internet subscriber information, and therefore no breach of section 8 Charter rights occurred.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the combined operation of subsections 172.1(3) and 172.1(4).

Subsection (3) creates a presumption that a representation of being underage constitutes proof of the accused's belief in that age, rebuttable only by evidence to the contrary.

Subsection (4) provides that honest belief in legal age is not a defence unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the person's age.

The applicant argued these provisions violated section 7 (fundamental justice) and section 11(d) (presumption of innocence) of the Charter.

The court found the presumption in subsection (3) unconstitutional as applied in concert with subsection (4), as it could compel conviction despite reasonable doubt about the accused's belief.

Thirty‑three accused sought exclusion of wiretap evidence arising from “Project Marvel,” a large police investigation into shootings, robbery, and organized gang activity in Toronto.

The applicants argued the authorizations violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to establish “investigative necessity” under s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and improperly named certain individuals as “known persons” under s. 185(1)(e).

The court applied the deferential Garofoli review standard and held the authorizing judge had a reasonable basis to conclude investigative necessity existed despite alternative investigative techniques such as cell‑phone analysis.

The court further held that the challenged individuals were properly named as targets because interception of their communications could assist the investigation and the statutory threshold is low.

A separate sub‑facial challenge relating to the search of a backyard shed and the curtilage doctrine was also rejected.

Following jury convictions for manslaughter, robbery, unlawful confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a fatal robbery, the court determined a dangerous offender application under the pre-July 2, 2008 regime.

The court found the statutory prerequisites for both dangerous offender and long-term offender status were met but exercised discretion to designate the offender a long-term offender.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, separation, and proportionality in light of extreme aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, the court imposed concurrent custodial terms resulting in a ten-year net sentence after enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, plus a ten-year long-term supervision order.