Roland Ritchie

The appellant, in operating its open pit mine, purchased peripheral land to maintain the necessary wall slope and angle of repose.

The land did not overlay any ore body and was gradually consumed as the mine deepened.

The Minister assessed the land purchases as capital expenditures.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the expenditures were incurred in the regular day-to-day business operations to avoid a shutdown, were not part of a plan for assembling assets, and should be allocated to the revenue account as deductible expenses.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed a decision according the respondent Workers' Compensation Board the status of a secured creditor.

The Board claimed unpaid assessments from the bankrupt employer, arguing that provincial legislation created a charge on the employer's property.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the federal Bankruptcy Act determines priorities in bankruptcy.

The provincial legislation, while valid, is inoperative in a bankruptcy situation to the extent it conflicts with the federal scheme of distribution.

The appellant teachers filed grievances claiming their university-level teaching experience should be credited.

The respondent employer objected that the grievances were filed late under the collective agreement.

The arbitration tribunal dismissed the objection, finding the grievances related to 'errors of evaluation' and could be filed at any time.

The employer sought a writ of evocation, which was granted by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded their jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an arbitrator's decision on whether a grievance is filed late is not jurisdictional in nature and is not subject to judicial review.

The appellant was given a demand to provide a breath sample and accompanied a police officer to the station without being informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding a breach of section 10 of the Charter, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Therens to hold that a breathalyzer demand constitutes detention, the failure to inform of the right to counsel violates the Charter, and the resulting evidence must be excluded under section 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams after complying with a breathalyzer demand.

He was not informed of his right to counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Therens, held that a breathalyzer demand constitutes detention under section 10 of the Charter.

Consequently, the appellant's right to counsel was violated.

The Court concluded that admitting the breathalyzer evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants challenged the federal cabinet's decision to permit the United States to test cruise missiles in Canada, alleging it violated their right to life, liberty, and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter by increasing the risk of nuclear war.

The respondents moved to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while cabinet decisions are reviewable under the Charter, the statement of claim must be struck out.

The Court found that the causal link between the testing of the cruise missile and an increased risk of nuclear war was entirely speculative and incapable of proof, meaning the facts alleged could not establish a violation of s. 7.

The Crown appealed a decision dismissing an application for mandamus to direct a magistrate to proceed with a hearing under the Lord's Day Act.

The information had been quashed because the fiat granting leave to prosecute was signed by the Acting Deputy Attorney General rather than the Attorney General.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Acting Deputy Attorney General lacked the authority to issue the fiat.

The appellant municipality challenged a Court of Appeal decision annulling a by-law regulating amusement machines and amusement halls.

The Supreme Court held that, apart from severable age-based restrictions, the by-law was a valid regulatory scheme concerning local commerce, zoning, youth protection and local policing, and was neither disguised prohibitory legislation nor impermissibly vague.

The Court further held that the municipality lacked authority to enact discriminatory distinctions based on age absent express or necessarily implied statutory authorization, rendering the provisions excluding persons under eighteen from amusement halls and billiard halls ultra vires.

The constitutional division-of-powers challenge failed because the by-law did not trench on the federal criminal law power.

The appellants, who claimed Convention refugee status, were denied their claims by the Minister of Employment and Immigration and the Immigration Appeal Board without an oral hearing.

They argued that the procedures under the Immigration Act, 1976 violated their rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the term 'everyone' in section 7 includes every person physically present in Canada.

The Court found that the denial of an oral hearing in the refugee determination process violated the principles of fundamental justice and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The appeals were allowed and the cases remanded for hearings on the merits.

The appellants, Roman Catholics, were convicted under s. 172(3) of the Criminal Code for wilfully disturbing the order or solemnity of a religious meeting.

They had knelt to receive communion in defiance of a diocesan directive requiring parishioners to stand.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions.

The Court held that while s. 172(3) is valid federal criminal legislation, the appellants' brief, passive, and peaceful conduct did not constitute a disturbance within the meaning of the section, which requires conduct that is disorderly in itself or productive of disorder.

The respondent suffered severe back injuries in a motor vehicle accident caused by the appellant.

Medical experts recommended surgery with a 70% chance of success, but the respondent refused due to a fear of surgery, demanding a 100% guarantee.

The trial judge found the refusal unreasonable and cut off damages for loss of income at the date the respondent would have recovered had he undergone surgery.

The Court of Appeal adjusted the award by factoring in the 30% chance of failure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the objective test of reasonableness applies unless the plaintiff has a pre-existing psychological condition rendering them incapable of making a rational choice.

The Court affirmed that damages should be assessed by discounting full compensation by the probability of the surgery's success.

The appellant, a Roman Catholic teacher in a Roman Catholic school, was not rehired after marrying a divorced man in a civil ceremony, contrary to Church rules.

She filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on marital status and religion.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the school's requirement of religious conformance was a bona fide occupational qualification under section 8 of the Human Rights Code, given the special nature of the Catholic school.

Furthermore, the school's actions were protected under section 22 of the Code, which permits religious organizations to grant preferences to members of their identifiable group.

The Attorney General of Alberta appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal on a reference concerning the power of police to enter private property to install listening devices under a wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an authorization to intercept private communications under Part IV.1 of the Criminal Code authorizes, by necessary implication, the power to enter private property to install or service a listening device, provided such entry is required to implement the authorization.

The Court also held that a judge has jurisdiction to expressly authorize such entry when granting an authorization.

The appellant, owner of a boarding house where a fatal fire occurred, was charged with causing a fire by violating a municipal fire prevention by-law under s. 392(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the deeming provision in s. 392(2) to establish causation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 392(2), which deems a person to have wilfully caused a fire if they fail to comply with fire-safety laws, applies only to charges of wilfully causing a fire under s. 392(1)(a).

As the appellant was charged under s. 392(1)(b), the deeming provision did not apply, and the acquittal was restored.

The respondent negligently caused a traffic accident on a provincial highway, resulting in debris and a risk of explosion.

The Crown incurred $300 in clean-up costs and sued to recover this amount.

The Court of Appeal characterized the claim as one for pure economic loss and denied recovery.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the highway suffered direct physical damage and the Crown, as the property owner, was entitled to recover the costs of restoring the road to its prior condition.

The British Columbia Development Corporation (B.C.D.C.) and its subsidiary, First Capital, were involved in an urban redevelopment project.

They refused to renew the lease of a restaurant, King Neptune, which then complained to the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman commenced an investigation, but B.C.D.C. challenged his jurisdiction, arguing the refusal to renew a lease was a business decision, not a 'matter of administration'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction, as the phrase 'matter of administration' encompasses everything done by governmental authorities in the implementation of government policy, including commercial activities.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his paramour during an altercation where both were intoxicated.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that excessive force in self-defence should lead to a manslaughter verdict, inadequately charged on provocation, and failed to relate intoxication to self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that excessive force defeats self-defence entirely, the provocation charge was adequate, and intoxication is irrelevant to the objective standard of reasonable apprehension required for self-defence under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Musqueam Indian Band surrendered valuable reserve lands to the Crown for lease to a golf club on specific terms approved by the Band.

The Crown subsequently entered into a lease on significantly less favourable terms without consulting the Band.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown's historical responsibility and the statutory scheme of the Indian Act impose a fiduciary duty on the Crown when dealing with surrendered Indian lands.

The Crown breached this fiduciary duty by ignoring the terms approved by the Band, and the Band was awarded $10 million in damages for the lost opportunity to develop the land.

The appellant, Ken Gordon Excavating Limited, and other lien claimants sought to enforce mechanics' liens against a housing project undertaken by Edstan Construction Limited on land purchased from the Ontario Housing Corporation (OHC) and financed by the Ontario Mortgage Corporation (OMC).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that OHC was an 'owner' and the project was a 'public work' under the Mechanics' Lien Act.

The Court found that the ten lien claimants who failed to give written notice to OHC as required for public works had invalid claims against OHC's interest, but the two who did give notice had valid claims for the full amount owed, not limited to the statutory holdback.

Furthermore, the Court characterized payments made by OMC to OHC as 'advances' under the mortgage, meaning the registered liens of the ten claimants had priority over those advances and could be satisfied from the mortgage sale proceeds.

The appellants appealed from an order setting aside acquittals on charges of importing cannabis and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a drug-smuggling vessel entered Canadian waters allegedly because of mechanical failure and deteriorating weather.

The Court recognized necessity as a common law excuse preserved by s. 7(3) of the Criminal Code, grounded in moral involuntariness and limited to situations of imminent peril, no reasonable legal alternative, and proportionality.

The Court held that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by failing to direct attention to the availability of a legal alternative, which justified a new trial.

It also rejected the botanical defence, holding that the phrase “Cannabis sativa L.” in the Narcotic Control Act was intended to include all marihuana, with the technical term’s meaning fixed at enactment.

The appeals were dismissed.