Robert Allan Klotz

Plaintiffs commenced an action alleging fraud, deception, and improper conduct arising from a series of mortgage and financial transactions involving real estate properties and business dealings.

The court held the action turned primarily on credibility and preferred the defendant’s evidence over that of the principal plaintiff.

The court found the plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent and unreliable, and concluded many claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and further defeated by the corporate veil where the transactions involved corporate entities rather than the individual plaintiff.

The plaintiffs failed to establish any contractual or legal basis for personal recovery.

The action was dismissed and judgment was granted on the defendant’s counterclaim for the outstanding mortgage balance.

During case management conferences, the court addressed scheduling issues in a civil action where the anticipated trial length had increased from four days to eight to ten days.

The previously scheduled trial date was vacated as it could no longer accommodate the expanded timeframe.

The matter was directed to be placed on the January 2015 blitz trial list.

The court also addressed a submission that the trial had been marked peremptory to the plaintiff but noted no such order appeared on the record and invited counsel to bring any such order forward.

Counsel were directed to deliver an amended timetable reflecting the parties’ agreement.

The plaintiff brought a motion to remove the defendant as the estate trustee of her late husband's estate.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant breached his fiduciary duties, ignored preservation orders, and deliberately prejudiced her family law and trust claims by liquidating estate assets.

Although the court found sufficient facts to justify removal, it declined to exercise its discretion to do so because all estate assets had already been sold, the estate had no money to pay a new trustee, and replacing the trustee would delay the impending trial where the defendant's actions would be scrutinized.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.

The applicant brought a motion to annul the respondent’s assignment into bankruptcy, arguing it was filed to stay ongoing family law proceedings and avoid an equalization payment.

The court examined the respondent’s financial circumstances and the timing of the bankruptcy filing under s. 181(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the principles governing abuse of process.

The respondent had relatively modest debts, significant equity in the matrimonial home, and exempt assets including a pension and RRSPs, indicating he was solvent.

The court concluded that the assignment was motivated by an attempt to derail the family litigation and evade equalization obligations.

The bankruptcy was annulled and property was vested in the applicant to facilitate payment of legitimate creditors and advance the equalization process.

Following dismissal of a motion to annul a bankruptcy, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The bankrupt sought full indemnity costs based on unproven allegations of fraud, while the opposing party argued for minimal costs in the cause.

The court held that the motion to annul lacked any realistic basis due to extreme delay and that costs should be payable within 30 days.

However, because no findings were made on the fraud allegations, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court fixed costs at $10,000 inclusive of HST after considering the factors under Rule 57.01 and the allocation of work between the annulment motion and a separate expungement motion.

The judgment debtors moved under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay enforcement of a judgment and the scheduled sheriff’s auction of a residential property pursuant to a writ of seizure and sale.

They argued equitable considerations, including a potential future claim for overpayments under earlier share purchase agreements that might support a set‑off against the judgment.

The court held that a stay of execution of a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy exercised only in rare circumstances where enforcement would be oppressive, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The proposed claim was speculative, likely statute‑barred, unrelated to the subject matter of the judgment, and raised only as a last‑minute attempt to delay enforcement.

The court concluded that enforcement was not oppressive and that a stay would instead cause injustice to the judgment creditors.

A creditor and former spouse brought a motion under s. 181(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to annul a bankruptcy more than a decade after the alleged fraudulent conduct giving rise to the request was known.

The moving party relied on earlier family court findings that the bankrupt had diverted income and engaged in deceit prior to the bankruptcy.

The court held that applications to annul a bankruptcy must be brought with diligence once the relevant facts are known.

Given a delay of at least twelve years and the absence of any satisfactory explanation, the motion was fatally late.

The court also noted potential prejudice arising from the long passage of time and questioned the practical purpose of the application.

The appellant appealed a Master's order striking his Statement of Defence for failing to fully comply with undertakings and prior court orders.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of review from Housen v. Nikolaisen, finding that the Master's decision was supported by the evidence and involved no error of law or principle.

The appellant had been given multiple warnings and opportunities to comply but failed to do so.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

A trustee in bankruptcy sought directions regarding whether settlement proceeds from a motor vehicle accident should be included in the bankrupt’s income for surplus income calculations under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that damages for pain and suffering are not income for the purposes of s. 68 because they resemble windfalls unrelated to employment income.

However, compensation for future loss of income constituted income, but should be prorated over the period it replaces rather than counted entirely in the year received.

Statutory accident benefits received in a lump sum were included fully as income due to the bankrupt’s improper payment of the funds to a third party.

Welfare payments were also included as income despite being repayable loans.

Conditions of discharge required payment of surplus income and an additional penalty due to the bankrupt’s failure to disclose litigation and settlement proceeds.

The applicant sought a bankruptcy order based on a loan debt that had become due more than two years before the bankruptcy application was commenced.

The respondent argued that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and therefore could not support a bankruptcy application.

The court held that the Limitations Act, 2002 bars a remedy but does not extinguish the underlying debt, meaning the debt may still constitute a debt “owing” for the purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court also found written acknowledgments of the debt within the limitation period that would revive the claim in any event.

The bankruptcy application was granted and a trustee appointed.

The parties separated and consented to an accounting and valuation of their assets under the Manitoba Family Property Act.

Before the valuation, the husband made an assignment in bankruptcy and was subsequently discharged.

The valuation later confirmed the wife was entitled to an equalization payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the equalization claim was a debt provable in bankruptcy and that the husband was released from the claim upon his discharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties arbitrated their family law dispute, resulting in an award requiring the husband to pay an equalization payment out of his share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The husband subsequently made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The motion judge incorporated the arbitration award into a court order and granted the wife priority over the husband's unsecured creditors, finding the award created an equitable trust.

The motion judge also ordered the transfer of the husband's bankruptcy-exempt RRSP to the wife.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitration award did not effect a division of property or impose an equitable trust or assignment that would defeat the bankruptcy scheme.

The Court also set aside the RRSP transfer, as no such relief was claimed in the arbitration and the motion judge erred in using enforcement proceedings to grant a new proprietary remedy.

The appellant debtor appealed an order relating to the sale of a property in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant did not appear before the motion judge and the issue of occupation rent was not raised below.

The court found no error in the motion judge's analysis or conclusion regarding the sale of the property.

The appellant appealed a bankruptcy order, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment, finding she could not meet her debts, and failing to stay a receivership order pending other litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the refusal of the adjournment was a proper exercise of discretion and the finding of insolvency was supported by the record.

The court also noted the appellant had not sought a stay of the receivership order before the motion judge and the pending litigation was speculative.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order finding that their debt to the respondents survived bankruptcy due to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant physician breached his fiduciary duty to the respondent patients by falsely assuring them their investment was safe.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but the costs awarded by the motion judge were reduced to exclude costs from related proceedings.

The added parties appealed an order striking out their pleadings for willful failure to obey court orders.

They sought to adjourn their appeal to be heard with the husband's appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined the adjournment and dismissed the appeal on two grounds.

First, the appeal was moot because the respondent had proceeded to an uncontested trial and obtained a final judgment, and the appellants had not sought a stay of the order striking their pleadings.

Second, the appeal was dismissed due to the appellants' ongoing and deliberate refusal to comply with numerous court orders.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order regarding surplus income payments under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Trustee was entitled to proceed to court after the Official Receiver refused mediation.

The court also held that the hearing below was procedurally fair and declined to allow the appellant to raise a new issue regarding his wife's involvement for the first time on appeal, noting the appellant had been bankrupt for 28 months without making any surplus income payments.

The appellants appealed an order appointing the respondent as receiver of two corporations, alleging a conflict of interest due to the respondent's role as trustee in bankruptcy for related parties.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, finding the appointment order was final rather than interlocutory.

The Court admitted fresh evidence—a statement of defence filed by the respondent in related litigation—which crystallized a pervasive conflict of interest.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order appointing the receiver, and referred the matter back to the Commercial List Court, also setting aside the provision granting priority to the receiver's fees.