Robert J. De Toni

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding him $21,000 for breach of contract and $32,000 in costs, seeking increased damages, punitive damages, and damages for assault.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of damages or refusal to award damages for a technical assault and alleged fraud.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents and set off against the costs previously awarded to the appellant.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff bankruptcy trustee's claims for the recovery of usurious interest and unlawful commissions paid as part of a Ponzi scheme.

The defendants argued the claims were statute-barred and failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to amend the statements of claim to explicitly plead unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the trustee discovered the fraudulent nature of the scheme, and that unjust enrichment was a valid cause of action.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion to amend the pleadings, as the amendments would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff bankruptcy trustee's claims for the return of usurious interest and unlawful commissions paid as part of a Ponzi scheme.

The defendants argued the claims were statute-barred and that breach of statute is not a valid civil cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the trustee completed its investigation into the complex fraud.

The court also granted the plaintiff's cross-motion to amend the pleadings to explicitly frame the claims in unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, Doyle Salewski Inc. (DSI), as Trustee in Bankruptcy for Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc. and Joseph Gilles Jean Claude Lacasse, brought claims against various defendants, including Victor Laschewski, for recovery of usurious interest and unlawful commissions arising from an alleged Ponzi scheme.

The defendant Laschewski brought a motion to strike DSI's claims, arguing they were statute-barred due to expired limitation periods and failed to disclose a cause of action.

DSI brought a cross-motion for leave to amend its statements of claim to explicitly plead unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion to strike, finding that the claims were not statute-barred due to the discoverability rule in bankruptcy/fraudulent schemes and that unjust enrichment was a valid cause of action.

The court granted DSI leave to amend its statements of claim.

In this amended preliminary costs decision arising from a property title and access dispute, the plaintiffs sought a substantial costs award after being largely successful at trial and defeating most of the defendant's counterclaim.

The court held that the successful litigant principle, proportionality, the complexity and importance of the issues, and the limited impact of withdrawn alternative arguments supported an award of costs.

The court rejected the responding party's position that no costs should be awarded and fixed the appropriate scale as partial indemnity.

The quantum was deferred to an assessment after production of dockets and proof of disputed disbursements.

The plaintiffs sought declarations of ownership by adverse possession and an easement by necessity over portions of land surrounding their waterfront property, which they claimed were necessary for access and the location of their septic system.

The defendant, who owned the surrounding lands, counterclaimed for the removal of the plaintiffs' structures.

The court found that the plaintiffs had established adverse possession over the land containing their septic system due to a mutual mistake about the property boundaries.

The court also granted the plaintiffs an easement by necessity over the access road, finding that the original subdivision plan intended for the lots to have access, and the property would otherwise be landlocked.

The defendant's counterclaim was largely dismissed, except for an order to remove a small portion of the septic field encroaching on another part of the defendant's land.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondents ownership of a portion of a road allowance by adverse possession and finding an easement of necessity over a gravel road on the appellant's property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the adverse possession finding, concluding the trial judge reasonably interpreted a 1998 agreement as not interrupting the ten-year possession period.

However, the Court set aside the finding of an easement of necessity, holding that necessity must be assessed at the time of the original grant, at which point the road allowance provided legal access.

The gravel road was instead declared an access road under the Road Access Act.

The plaintiff, a former tenant of a public housing corporation, sued the corporation and its lawyer after being evicted due to mould and water infiltration that rendered her unit uninhabitable.

The defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim.

The court struck the claim against the lawyer, finding no cause of action exists against opposing counsel for actions taken in their client's interest.

The court also struck the claim against the corporation, finding the eviction issues were already decided by the Landlord and Tenant Board and any claim for rent abatement was statute-barred under the one-year limitation period in the Residential Tenancies Act.

The action was dismissed without leave to amend.

In a contaminated land action arising from a real estate purchase, certain real estate defendants settled with the plaintiffs under a Pierringer Agreement and sought to be removed from the proceeding.

The remaining vendor defendant refused to abandon a cross-claim against the listing agent and brokerage that pleaded both negligence and breach of contract under the listing agreement.

The court held that Pierringer principles applicable to contributory negligence claims did not plainly foreclose a distinct contractual indemnity claim by a non-settling defendant who was not party to the settlement agreement.

The motion to strike that cross-claim was dismissed, although a separate contributory-negligence-only cross-claim was struck on consent.

The plaintiff lien claimants brought a motion for judgment following the defendants' default on a settlement agreement in a construction lien reference.

The first mortgagee, Pillar, sought the return of funds it had advanced that were held in trust by plaintiff's counsel.

The Master granted judgment to the lien claimants, finding they were entitled to enforce the settlement agreement upon default.

The Master dismissed Pillar's claim to the trust funds, holding that the funds were advanced to support the settlement without any escrow agreement in Pillar's favour and were therefore available to satisfy the judgment.

The Tribunal determined the appropriate sanction for a licensee found to have committed multiple breaches of the Liquor Licence Act, including permitting immoderate consumption, allowing violent conduct, and obstructing an AGCO investigation.

The Registrar sought a 14-day suspension and a video surveillance condition, while the licensee proposed a fine.

The Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction to impose a fine and ordered a 10-day suspension along with the requested video surveillance condition to serve as specific and general deterrence.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that a 40‑foot road allowance adjacent to their property constituted a public highway and alternatively claimed ownership of portions of neighbouring land through adverse possession or similar equitable remedies.

The Township and the neighbouring landowner brought motions for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs brought a cross‑motion to amend their statement of claim.

The court granted leave to amend under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the proposed amendments legally tenable and not causing irremediable prejudice.

Summary judgment was granted to the Township because the evidence established the road allowance was a private roadway never dedicated to or accepted by the municipality as a public highway.

However, summary judgment was refused with respect to the neighbouring landowner because significant factual disputes, including inconsistent permission agreements and issues surrounding encroachments and use rights, required a full trial.

The Applicant appealed a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar of Alcohol and Gaming to suspend its liquor licence.

The proposal alleged that the establishment over-served a group of patrons, permitted drunkenness, allowed a violent altercation resulting in serious injury, and subsequently obstructed an AGCO investigation by refusing to provide video surveillance.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the Licensee breached multiple provisions of the Liquor Licence Act and its regulations, including permitting immoderate consumption, serving intoxicated persons, permitting violent conduct, and obstructing an inspection.

The Tribunal requested submissions on the appropriate sanction.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions in a civil action while the plaintiffs brought a motion to amend the statement of claim.

During the hearing, the parties did not address whether the defendants intended their summary judgment motions to apply to the relief sought in any amended pleading should the amendment be granted.

The court directed counsel to arrange a brief appearance or provide written submissions addressing this procedural issue.

The endorsement addresses scheduling and clarification of the scope of the summary judgment motions.

The appellants failed to appear for their appeal, providing only a vague allusion to emergency dental surgery.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appeal appeared to be moot and that continuing the matter would unnecessarily increase costs.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned without costs.

The respondents obtained summary judgment and leave to continue their action against the appellant, who had made an assignment in bankruptcy in New Brunswick.

The motion judge provided no reasons for his decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, holding that the serious jurisdictional issues and the appellant's self-represented status required the motion judge to provide an explanation for his decision.