Robert D. Ryan

The City of Mississauga brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's property tax appeal, arguing it was invalidly filed under s. 357(8) of the Municipal Act.

The City contended that the statutory deadline for the municipality to render a decision had been extended by Ontario Regulation 73/20, which suspended limitation periods due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Assessment Review Board denied the motion, finding that the appellant had filed the appeal in a good faith attempt to meet the statutory deadline and that the City failed to demonstrate any prejudice that would result from allowing the appeal to proceed.

The moving party brought a motion to file a late appeal of a property assessment for the 2020 taxation year.

The Board found that while a request for reconsideration was not a prerequisite for this property class, the moving party failed to meet the requirements of Rule 26(b) for a late appeal.

Specifically, the moving party acknowledged filing the motion more than 30 days after becoming aware of the assessment notice.

The motion for a late appeal was denied.

The moving party brought a motion to file a late appeal of its property assessment for the 2020 taxation year.

The Assessment Review Board determined that while a request for reconsideration was not a prerequisite for this appeal, the moving party failed to meet the requirements for a late appeal under Rule 26(b).

Specifically, the moving party did not file the appeal within 30 days of becoming aware of the assessment notice.

The motion was denied.

The appellant fell off his bicycle and sued the municipality for damages more than four years later.

The municipality successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired.

On appeal, the appellant argued that he did not discover the full extent of his injuries until years later and that he lacked the capacity to commence litigation due to a disability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that knowledge of the material facts, not the extent of damages, triggers the limitation period, and that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of capacity under section 7 of the Limitations Act.

The appellant appealed the City of Mississauga's decision to deny a commercial vacancy rebate for the 2018 taxation year.

The City had requested specific evidentiary documents to support the application, but the appellant failed to provide complete information within the prescribed 30-day statutory deadline.

The Assessment Review Board held that the appellant did not comply with the evidentiary requirements under section 364 of the Municipal Act and section 27 of O. Reg. 325/01.

The Board further held that it lacked the discretion to extend the statutory timeline or waive the evidentiary requirements.

The appeal was dismissed, and the vacancy rebate was determined to be zero.

The applicant requested a review of an Assessment Review Board decision that dismissed her application to the City of Mississauga for a reduction or cancellation of her 2016 property taxes due to sickness or extreme poverty.

The applicant alleged several errors, including failure to suspend timelines during the COVID-19 emergency, failure to consider a loan, and misapplication of the legal test.

The Board found no significant errors of law or fact, nor any violation of natural justice, and denied the request for review.

The City of Mississauga appealed the property tax classification of the subject property, seeking to change it from Commercial to Industrial for the 2016 through 2020 taxation years.

The parties agreed on the current value of the property but disputed the classification.

The Assessment Review Board found that manufacturing and processing activities occurred on the property, satisfying the definition of the Industrial property class under O. Reg. 282/98.

The assessed person argued that the appeal process was unduly delayed, causing financial prejudice, but the Board found no evidence of undue delay and noted that the assessed person had not requested an expedited hearing.

The appeal was allowed, and the property was reclassified as Industrial.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her appeal from a conviction for contravening a municipal zoning by-law regarding accessory structures.

The appeal judge had dismissed her appeal after she failed to file an abandonment of various grounds of appeal as ordered.

The moving party argued the appeal judge was biased and that the justice of the peace erred regarding the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no evidence of bias or denial of natural justice, and noting the limitation period issue was a factual finding rather than a question of law.

The appellant appealed the City's cancellation of a vacancy tax rebate for the 2014 taxation year.

The City had cancelled the rebate after discovering the supporting affidavit was sworn before a person whose appointment as a Commissioner had expired.

The appellant failed to appear at the peremptory hearing and did not comply with the Board's Schedule of Events.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the appeal, finding that the lack of communication and non-compliance indicated the appeal had been abandoned.

The appellants appealed a decision of the City of Mississauga denying their application for property tax relief under s. 357(1)(d.1) of the Municipal Act.

The appellants sought an exemption on the basis that the subject property was a philanthropic organization or charitable institution.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the appeal, finding that neither the City nor the Board has jurisdiction under s. 357(1)(d.1) to grant such an exemption, and that the appellants must apply to the Superior Court of Justice under s. 46 of the Assessment Act.

The appellant appealed the city's decision denying a vacancy rebate application for the 2013 taxation year.

The appellant failed to comply with the Board's Schedule of Events and did not attend the scheduled telephone conference hearing.

The city sought a dismissal on multiple grounds, noting it had received no direct communication from the appellant in five years.

The Board found the appeal to be abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant moved for an extension of time to perfect his motion for leave to appeal a 2014 by-law infraction conviction.

The applicant had previously appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice, which dismissed the appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the extension request on the basis that the grounds of appeal raised only a question of fact (whether the driveway was too wide), which does not constitute a question of law or matter of general public importance required for leave to appeal.

Hydro One appealed an application judge's decision declining to grant a general declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must produce accident reports containing driver and owner information to parties who suffer property loss in motor vehicle accidents.

Hydro One argued that while section 200(1) of the Highway Traffic Act requires drivers to provide such information on request, this provision is unavailable when only property loss occurs and no representative is present at the scene.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that although it may have had jurisdiction, it was not appropriate to take jurisdiction due to the absence of an active lis, lack of necessary factual record, and absence of interested parties including the Privacy Commissioner and Attorney General.

Hydro One appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice seeking a declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must provide accident reports containing personal information of drivers and vehicle owners when Hydro One's property is damaged in traffic accidents.

The OPP refused to provide such reports without a court order, citing the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal to receive written submissions on two jurisdictional issues: whether the court could make a declaration interpreting a statute under the Rules of Civil Procedure when there is no actual lis between the parties, and whether the court could make a declaration interpreting FIPPA provisions outside the context of a judicial review of a privacy commissioner's decision.

The court assessed costs following successful summary judgment motions by Hydro One Network and Sarah McMillan and Andrew Cauty against the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs for each of the two combined actions.

The court found the claims not excessive in principle but reduced the total amount to account for duplication of services across the two actions, which were treated as one.

Costs were assessed at $9,000 for Hydro One and $9,000 for McMillan and Cauty, to be split equally between the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The court noted that a complete indemnity award might have been considered had the plaintiffs' motives been argued, given the claims were entirely devoid of merit.

The defendants, Hydro One and two neighbours, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' actions.

The plaintiffs had erected a fence on city property, which the city later ordered removed.

The plaintiffs sued Hydro One for negligence regarding the location of underground services and the neighbours for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of mental distress based on complaints made to the city.

The court granted the motions, finding the claim against Hydro One was statute-barred and lacked merit, and the claim against the neighbours was devoid of merit as there was no evidence of intent to cause harm or damages.

Hydro One Networks Inc. sought unredacted accident reports from the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) for nine specific motor vehicle accidents and a broad-based order for all future accident reports involving Hydro One.

The OPP consented to provide the specific reports but opposed the broad order, citing obligations under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The court dismissed the broad-based application, finding that the Highway Traffic Act does not obligate the OPP to provide such information without a court order, given FIPPA responsibilities, and that judicial oversight is necessary for requests for personal information from non-parties.

The application for the nine specific reports was granted on consent.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which dismissed his complaints for delay.

The applicant had filed complaints regarding his termination and a subsequent settlement agreement 18 months and over two years after the events, respectively.

The Divisional Court found that both tribunals reasonably exercised their discretion in determining that the applicant failed to provide a good faith explanation for the delay.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application for mandamus requiring Hydro One to deliver his hydro bills by courier.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the decision was made under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act and therefore required leave to appeal under s. 6(4).

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that because the appellant had not obtained leave, the appeal was not properly before the court and must be quashed.

The applicant sought a writ of mandamus compelling an electricity distributor to deliver electricity usage bills by courier and to refrain from alleged intimidation and criminal conduct.

The court considered the statutory framework governing electricity distribution, including the Distribution System Code issued under the Ontario Energy Board Act, which provides that bills may be issued by mail or electronically with customer consent.

The court held that the term “mail” in the Code refers to the ordinary postal system and does not include courier delivery.

The applicant’s personal dispute with Canada Post did not alter the distributor’s statutory obligations.

The court further found no evidentiary basis to order the respondent to refrain from alleged intimidation or threats.