Robert De Chellis

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance after a damaged vehicle was abandoned in a parking lot.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver and was impaired by alcohol.

The court dismissed Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 11(b).

Although the court found a minor breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel due to an 8-minute delay, it declined to exclude evidence under section 24(2).

A finding of guilt was entered.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat at a gas pump after an attendant reported that he had been drifting in and out of consciousness and spilling gas.

The court dismissed Charter claims challenging the arrest, medical-attendance circumstances, drug recognition demand, and evaluation, holding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds, no reasonable expectation of privacy arose during the in-custody medical assessment, and the evaluation was conducted reasonably.

On the trial proper, the court held that operation was established through the care or control presumption and that the accused's lethargy, slow movements, cannabis odour, DRE observations, and urine toxicology proved impairment by drug beyond a reasonable doubt.

A conviction was entered under s. 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Muhammed Ali Malik Sher, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance, failure/refusal to comply with a breath demand, and breach of a probation order (operating a vehicle with any alcohol in blood).

The accused testified that his symptoms (swerving, unsteadiness, vomiting) were due to illness (COVID-19) and not alcohol.

The court rejected the accused's explanation, finding it illogical and contradicted by evidence, particularly the strong odour of alcohol.

The court found that alcohol was at least a contributing factor to the impairment.

Regarding the refusal to provide a breath sample, the court found an unequivocal refusal based on words and actions, despite the accused's claim of disorientation.

The court also found that the impaired operation by alcohol logically inferred a blood alcohol concentration above zero, breaching the probation order.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The defendant, charged with 80 plus operation of a conveyance, brought a Charter application to exclude breath test evidence, arguing a violation of her s. 10(b) right to counsel due to a language barrier.

The court found that special circumstances existed, requiring the police to provide the informational component of the right to counsel in the defendant's native Tamil, which was not done, thus constituting a s. 10(b) violation.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the seriousness of the breach to be low, the impact on the defendant's Charter rights to be low (as she received legal advice via an interpreter later), and society's interest in adjudication on the merits to be high.

Consequently, the breath evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant's vehicle crashed into a ditch.

A civilian found him exiting the driver's side and called police.

The defendant demonstrated signs of alcohol consumption and language difficulties.

The court found two violations of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel: the officer failed to translate the right to counsel despite clear language barriers, and failed to properly implement the right by steering the defendant to duty counsel without inquiry.

The breath samples were excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control based on circumstantial evidence including the unexplained accident, strong odour of alcohol, physical presentation, and vomiting.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol.

She challenged the breath test results, arguing that the tests were not taken as soon as practicable due to delays at the police station, and that the presence of gum in her mouth may have affected the accuracy of the readings.

The court found that the delays were reasonably explained by booking procedures and the need to test another subject.

The court also held that there was insufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt regarding the effect of the gum on the test results.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE program and asked to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device.

After failing to provide a suitable sample and claiming he was scared, he was charged with failing to comply with a demand.

At trial, the accused argued he had a reasonable excuse due to an anxiety disorder.

The court rejected his evidence as not credible, finding he was physically able to provide a sample but chose not to out of fear of failing the test.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE investigation, the defendant failed an approved screening test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test readings, alleging violations of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The defendant argued that police violated his right to counsel of choice by presenting a binary option between identified counsel and duty counsel, failing to provide tools to search for counsel, and inappropriately steering him to duty counsel.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a roadside stop for speeding.

The Crown relied on breath test evidence obtained through an Approved Screening Device test and approved instrument tests.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found a serious breach of section 10(b) Charter rights, specifically regarding the accused's right to counsel in a language he understood.

Despite the Crown's arguments that the officer made reasonable efforts, the court found the police failed to take adequate steps to facilitate access to legal advice in Persian, the accused's first language.

The court excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle "over 80" contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The applicant brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of observations, statements, and breath test results.

The court found no breaches of the applicant's Charter rights.

The court held that the officer was authorized to conduct sobriety screening measures prior to making an approved screening device demand, that the right to counsel was limited during these screening measures in accordance with s. 1 of the Charter, that the applicant's right to counsel of choice was not violated by directing him to duty counsel when he did not identify a specific lawyer, that the officer had reasonable grounds to make both the ASD and breath demands, and that the detention was not arbitrary.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with threatening to cause bodily harm contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused made threatening statements to a Children's Aid Society caseworker when she attended his home to remove his children.

The accused denied making the threats.

The trial judge found the caseworker to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable.

The court found that the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a conviction.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of approved instrument breath test readings pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple breaches of his Charter rights.

The primary focus at trial was whether the officer had reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand given the possibility of mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no Charter breach.

The officer's observation of the accused drinking while driving, the presence of an open beer can in the vehicle console, the accused's admission of prior drinking, and the odour of beer on the accused's breath provided reasonable suspicion for the approved screening device test.

The court rejected the defence argument that the officer should have suspected further drinking during a two-minute interval when the accused was briefly unattended, finding the accused's testimony unreliable and the officer's belief that no further drinking occurred to be logical and reasonable.

The officer properly waited more than 15 minutes after the accused's last observed drink before administering the approved instrument test, ensuring test reliability.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion for a mistrial based on concerns raised by the Crown during trial that the accused may have been drinking alcohol and impaired.

The Crown's concern was based on observations by an officer in the hallway.

Defence counsel confirmed with the accused that he had not been drinking and was fit to proceed.

The defence argued that the mention of the issue could prevent a fair trial given that the charge related to alcohol and driving.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that trial courts routinely hear prejudicial evidence later found inadmissible and must disregard such evidence.

The court noted that no prejudicial result occurred from the Crown's concern, which was appropriately raised and addressed.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 for allegedly cashing cheques that should have been paid to a subcontractor's company for a commercial paving job.

The Crown alleged the accused registered a sole proprietorship with a similar name to divert the funds.

The court found the evidence of both the accused and the key Crown witnesses to be unreliable and inconsistent, particularly regarding the nature of their business partnership and the payment of materials.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference, child luring, and making child pornography involving a 15‑year‑old complainant, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate detention.

Extensive psychiatric and psychological evidence established that the offender suffered from antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits, severe substance dependence, and a high actuarial risk of violent and sexual recidivism.

The court found the offence of sexual interference constituted a serious personal injury offence and that the offender demonstrated a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing failure to restrain conduct and a likelihood of causing injury or severe psychological harm in the future.

Although one statutory pathway for dangerous offender status based on persistent aggressive behaviour was not proven, the criteria under s. 753(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code were satisfied.

The court concluded that neither a determinate sentence nor a long‑term supervision order would adequately protect the public and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

During a murder jury trial, the Crown applied to admit a witness’s videotaped police statement and prior preliminary inquiry testimony as substantive evidence under the K.G.B. framework after the witness recanted portions of his earlier account and repeatedly claimed memory loss while testifying before the jury.

The court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness adopted an obstructive stance and attempted to shield the true events despite earlier detailed accounts of the shooting.

Reliability was established through procedural safeguards including a videotaped interview, oath, warnings regarding penal consequences for false statements, and the witness’s availability for cross‑examination.

Additional corroborative circumstances, including forensic evidence and the witness’s belief that surveillance cameras captured the event, further supported reliability.

The court admitted both the videotaped statement and the preliminary hearing evidence as substantive evidence before the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased concerning his belief that the accused had orchestrated a prior theft of his money.

The defence objected on the basis that the statements would introduce prejudicial and untestable allegations of bad character.

The court held that the deceased’s statements were admissible as evidence of the declarant’s state of mind and were relevant to establishing potential motive and context for confrontation between the deceased and the accused.

However, the court limited the scope of admissibility to the deceased’s belief itself and excluded statements recounting the accused’s alleged response about the stolen money.

The jury would receive a limiting instruction restricting the use of the evidence to motive rather than proof of bad character.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a mistrial application after concerns were raised that some jurors appeared to have difficulty staying awake during lengthy testimony related to a successful K.G.B. application involving a recanting eyewitness.

Following an inquiry of the jury, one juror acknowledged momentarily nodding off while others reported occasional difficulty maintaining focus.

The court held that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort requiring proof of concrete prejudice to the trial process.

The evidence did not establish that jurors missed significant evidence or that the integrity of the proceedings had been fatally compromised.

The application for a mistrial was therefore dismissed.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s.745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought an 18‑year period while the defence argued for the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The court considered the offender’s criminal record, involvement in drug trafficking, illegal firearm possession, and conduct surrounding the offence, including returning to deliver a final fatal shot after the victim had fallen.

Although the victim had been the initial aggressor and armed with knives, the offender’s criminal lifestyle and aggravating conduct warranted a significant increase above the minimum.

A period of 16 years of parole ineligibility was imposed.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a lengthy videotaped police interrogation of the accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics and further alleged a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter based on a police comment suggesting consulting counsel would be a mistake.

Applying the confessions rule and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court found that statements made during the first portion of the interview were voluntary but that later portions raised concerns about potential oppression after repeated assertions of the right to silence and fatigue.

The court also found no Charter breach arising from the officer’s comment.

Only the portion of the statement up to 1:05 a.m. was ruled admissible.