ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
CHARLES HAMILTON
Before Justice A.M Elias
Heard on August 11, August 12, and October 21, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on December 2, 2025
Robert De Chellis............................................................................... counsel for the Crown
Shaleem Gill.............................................. counsel for the defendant Charles Hamilton
ELIAS J.:
Overview
1A gas-station attendant reported a possibly impaired driver. He told police that someone was parked at a gas pump for over 15 minutes, drifting in and out of consciousness. When police arrived, they detained Mr. Charles Hamilton and asked him to exit his car. He approached them slowly. Police detected an odour of marihuana from his breath. Police arrested the defendant for drug-impaired driving, demanded that he comply with a drug evaluation, and called for medical assessment given their concerns about his level of impairment. Once he was medically cleared, a drug recognition expert concluded that he was impaired by cannabis and demanded a sample of his urine. His urine ultimately tested positive for metabolites of cannabis and Olanzapine. Mr. Hamilton stands charged that he operated a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by drug, contrary to section 320.14 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code.
Charter Analysis
2Mr. Hamilton submits that he was the subject of an unreasonable search and an unlawful arrest contrary to sections 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Crown called two witnesses, namely PC Wickramasinghe, the arresting officer, and PC Batte, a Drug Recognition Expert. I must decide the following issues on the Charter analysis:
(1) Did Constable Wickramasinghe have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Hamilton for drug-impaired driving?
(2) Did Mr. Hamilton have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he was being medically assessed in the back of the police cruiser?
(3) Did the DRE have reasonable grounds to make a demand for Mr. Hamilton to comply with a drug evaluation?
(4) Did the DRE conduct her evaluation in an unreasonable manner?
(5) If there are one or more breaches of the Charter, should the evidence be excluded pursuant to s.24(2)?
Did Constable Wickramasinghe have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Hamilton for drug-impaired driving?
3The defence submits that PC Wickramasinghe did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving, without further investigation. The Crown submits that reasonable and probable grounds had crystalized at the point of arrest and no further investigation was necessary.
4Whether reasonable and probable grounds exist is a fact-based exercise dependent upon all the circumstances of the case. The totality of the circumstances must be considered.1 To establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, a police officer must subjectively believe that a person has committed or is about to commit an offence, and the police officer must be able to justify that belief on an objective basis, meaning that a reasonable person placed in the position of the police must be able to conclude that there were reasonable and probable grounds. The police need not demonstrate anything more than reasonable and probable grounds. Specifically, the police need not establish a prima facie case for conviction.2
5The assessment of reasonable grounds is conducted through the lens of a reasonable person “standing in the shoes of the police officer” with that Constable’s training and experience.3 Exculpatory or neutral information cannot be disregarded, but the obligation to take all factors into account does not require that the police conduct further investigation to rule out alternate explanations. All the circumstances must be considered, not isolated factors shorn of context.4
6I find that Constable Wickramasinghe had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Hamilton for drug-impaired driving. I reach this conclusion upon analyzing (a) the information he received prior to attending at the gas station and (b) the observations he made while on scene prior to arrest. The information received, when combined with his direct observations, grounds a reasonable and probable belief that Mr. Hamilton was operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drug.
7On the morning of March 27, 2024, Constable Wickramasinghe learned the following information from central dispatch, regarding a possible impaired driver, before attending on scene of a gas station:
(1) A gas station attendant at Petro Canada, located at 7761 Woodbine Avenue, had called police to report that a male in his thirties (30s) had been at Pump #1 for 15-20 minutes and was in and out of consciousness: sleeping and waking up. He was driving a Black Ford with a numbered plate.
8Constable Wickramasinghe made his way to the gas station to respond to the impaired call. Enroute, he learned the following information:
(1) The attendant described the driver as “extremely groggy and impaired.” He further advised that, “the driver passed out and he attempted to wake him up a number of times.”
(2) The attendant reported that the driver attempted to pump gas but spilled the gas all over the vehicle. He was unable to place the gas nozzle into the car. No alcohol was visible. The vehicle had been at the gas station since 7 am that morning.
9When he arrived at the gas station, Constable Wickramasinghe observed a Black Ford, bearing a licence plate matching the earlier description, parked at Pump 1, facing southbound. He immediately “pinned” the car with a fellow cruiser, so that it wouldn’t drive away. I note, at this juncture, that Mr. Gill concedes that police had a reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Hamilton and block in his car. Given this concession, I will not assess the validity of the detention.
10At this point, the Constable Wickramasinghe directly observed Mr. Hamilton while he was in the driver’s seat of the car. He was slumped back, sleeping, with his feet hanging out of the driver’s side window. Constable Wickramasinghe approached the Ford and motioned to the driver to exit his car and walk towards him. The defendant complied. The officer observed Mr. Hamilton walk and move slowly. His eyes were droopy. When the defendant asked why police were blocking his car, Constable Wickramasinghe detected a strong odour of marihuana emanating from Mr. Hamilton’s mouth. Constable Wickramasinghe arrested Mr. Hamilton for impaired driving by drug.
11I find that the Crown has proved that the Constable subjectively, and objectively, had grounds to arrest Mr. Hamilton. These grounds existed at the time of a dynamic arrest:
(a) The officer testified that he saw Mr. Hamilton slumped back, sleeping in his car, with his legs hanging out of the driver side window. When Mr. Hamilton exited his car, he was slow and unsteady on his feet. The Constable immediately detected the odour of marihuana.
(b) Prior to make these observations, the Constable had received information that Mr. Hamilton was at the pump for 3 hours; was spilling gas; and was in and out of consciousness. He believed this information.
12The Defence submits that the arresting officer embarked on no further investigation after detecting an odour of marihuana emanating from Mr. Hamilton. Namely, no field sobriety test, nor ASD demand was issued. It is Mr. Gill’s submission that Mr. Hamilton was arrested on a “mere hunch: no questions were asked of Mr. Hamilton.
13There is no minimum time period nor mandatory questioning that must occur before an officer can objectively have reasonable and probable grounds. There is no requirement that a roadside sample be taken. The ASD provides evidence of the blood alcohol concentration in the suspect's blood, not evidence of impairment. Once the officer had subjectively and objectively reasonable and probable grounds, he was not required to delay the arrest to conduct more tests.5 The issue is not whether the officer could have conducted a more thorough investigation. The issue is whether, when the officer arrested Mr. Hamilton, he subjectively and objectively had reasonable and probable grounds to do so. That the belief was formed in less than one minute is not determinative. That an opinion of impairment of his ability to operate a motor vehicle can be made in under a minute is neither surprising nor unusual.6
Did Mr. Hamilton have a reasonable expectation of privacy during medical assessment in police custody?
14After Constable Wickramasinghe arrested Mr. Hamilton, he placed him in the back of his cruiser. Mr. Hamilton continued to go in and out of sleep while the Constable advised of his reason for arrest, cautioned him, and demanded that he submit to a drug recognition evaluation. The officer testified that he was concerned for Mr. Hamilton’s medical wellbeing given his ‘high level of impairment.’ Acting on that concern, Constable Wickramasinghe called for ambulatory assistance. When a firetruck arrived on scene, an initial medical examination took place while the defendant remained in the back of the police cruiser. When ambulatory staff removed him from the police cruiser, PC Wickramasinghe stood next to Mr. Hamilton and held his arm.
15The Defence submits that the officer’s attendance during this medical assessment violated Mr. Hamilton’s right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter. The Crown submits that Mr. Hamilton did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, the Crown submits that no information from this medical examination is used for investigative, or prosecutorial purposes.
16I find that Mr. Hamilton did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he shared with medical personnel while in police custody, in the back of a police car, and while accompanied by a police officer. A search or seizure will not occur within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter unless investigative state conduct intrudes upon a Charter claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.7 The determination of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists requires a case-specific, contextual analysis.8
17The accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy extends only to certain communications made for the purpose of giving and receiving medical care. There is no blanket expectation of privacy in respect of all activities that occur in a hospital emergency room, or all communications that pass between medical personnel and a patient.9
18An “information privacy” claim is made where an individual asserts the right “to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.10 When an informational right of privacy is being claimed, the appropriate question is whether the information is the sort that society accepts should remain out of the state’s hands because of what it reveals about the person involved, the reasons why it was collected, and the circumstances in which it was intended to be used.”11 Taking these three factors into account, I find Mr. Hamilton did not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy while speaking to medical personnel within the police cruiser.
Nature of Information
19During the medical examination, Mr. Hamilton advised personnel that he had consumed marihuana. He also provided his finger so that his pulse could be taken. While the information about drug usage would otherwise be self-incriminatory, as it was in the case of SS, there are meaningful distinctions in this case. First, unlike the young person in SS, Mr. Hamilton knew that a police officer was present. Second, unlike the young person in SS, Mr. Hamilton was in police custody, handcuffed in the back of a cruiser. Third, unlike the young person in SS, Mr. Hamilton was cautioned and advised of his right to counsel prior to medical examination. Mr. Hamilton did not lack the knowledge required to choose whether to exercise the right to silence that would have operated.
20The information that Mr. Hamilton disclosed, that he had used marihuana earlier that day, reveals little about him in the context of this specific arrest and investigation. Police had already formed reasonable and probable grounds to believe that he was drug-impaired while operating a vehicle based on his conduct in the gas station. Police detected an odour of marihuana emanating from his mouth prior to his arrest. Furthermore, the arresting officer had already made a demand that Mr. Hamilton submit to a drug impairment evaluation, where he would be directly asked about his drug usage. Constable Wickramasinghe did not relay any of this information to the Drug Recognition Officer, nor did she rely on it to form her grounds to demand an evaluation.
Reasons Information was Collected & Circumstances of Collection
21In this case, police overheard the exchange of medical information to ensure Mr. Hamilton’s well-being, not to further investigate him for an impaired driving offence. PC Wickramasinghe testified that the defendant was, “going in and out of consciousness.” He believed that “he had a high level of impairment and was “concerned for his medical wellbeing.” He was so concerned for Mr. Hamilton’s well-being that he hesitated to drive to an ambulance bay—as he was instructed—while Mr. Hamilton remained without medical attention in the backseat of the police cruiser. He worried that Mr. Hamilton might go into medical distress. He testified that he called ambulance to potentially “save Mr. Hamilton’s life.”
22The in-car camera continued to record the interaction. When asked why the in-car camera remained on during this assessment, PC Wickramasinghe indicated it was contrary to police policy to turn it off. Indeed, if the camera was stopped and Mr. Hamilton’s well-being was compromised or threatened, the absence of evidence would raise other constitutional flags, perhaps spurring a lost evidence application.
23When medical personnel asked Mr. Hamilton to step out of the cruiser, Constable Wickramasinghe passively accompanied him. I note here, that Mr. Hamilton was having trouble standing up and was falling asleep. The officer stood by as he remained in police custody. He testified that police “don’t have the ability to lose sight of a prisoner, even for medical treatment.” This case is distinguishable from SS, where the young person had no reason to believe that the answers shared with the paramedic for health purposes were being captured by a police officer as part of a criminal investigation. On the contrary, the medical transaction was recorded for safety, and not investigatory purposes. While Mr. Hamilton may have incriminated himself during the medical assessment, this information did not inform the investigation or the prosecution; he was already placed under arrest, and subject to the drug impairment evaluation.
24Having regard to the way the information was acquired by the police, the nature of the information, and the reason why it was collected, Mr. Hamilton had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Like LaChappelle, the seriousness of the offence under investigation, Mr. Hamilton’s lack of a territorial privacy interest in police cruiser, the absence of any interference with his medical care, and the nature of the information heard by the officer all support this conclusion.
Was the DRE Constable entitled to rely on grounds beyond those of arrest to make her demand?
25The defence submits that PC Wickramasinghe was not entitled to provide the Drug Recognition Expert with information that he learned after Mr. Hamilton’s arrest. The defence did not provide a legal authority for this proposition.
26Constable Wickramasinghe issued a demand to Mr. Hamilton at 11: 24 hours. Prior to 12:59 hours that afternoon, PC Rachel Batte renewed the demand that he submit to a drug recognition evaluation. At page 2 of Exhibit #3, entitled “York Regional Police Drug Influence Evaluation Narrative”, PC Batte sets out the sources of her information, under the heading “Sources.” First, she details what happened prior to Mr. Hamilton’s arrest: that a gas station called to report an impaired driver parked at a pump. While the attendant attempted to rouse the driver, he would not wake up. The driver then exited the car and attempted to fill gas on the wrong side of his vehicle causing it to spill on the ground. Next, she details the arresting Constable’s observations of Mr. Hamilton—slumped in the driver’s seat. When he exited, the arresting Constable could smell marihuana from his breath. She then summarizes what happens after Mr. Hamilton’s arrest:
“Once placed into the patrol car, the subject had difficulty remaining upright and slumped forward. PC Wickramasinghe contacted paramedics as a precaution. He was cleared medically. The residue of dried cannabis was found in the vehicle inside a plastic Ziploc bag and the odour of burnt cannabis was detected by PC Wickramasinghe. No evidence of alcohol consumption and there were no grounds for breath test.”
27All that section 320.28(2) of the Criminal Code requires is that a valid demand is made by a peace officer with reasonable grounds to do so and that the demand is made as soon as practicable. There is nothing in the Criminal Code or in the jurisprudence that supports the proposition that the Crown must prove the 'who, what, where and when' of the demand."[^^12] As applied to the present case, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation in R v. Guenter, 2016 ONCA 572 permits me to find that a demand by the drug evaluation expert, PC Batte, would satisfy the requirements of s. 320.28(2) provided she had formed reasonable grounds and made a demand "as soon as practicable" thereafter.
28First, I find that even if she relied only on the circumstances that proceeded Mr. Hamilton’s arrest, she would have reasonable and probable grounds to demand that he comply with a drug evaluation. Second, I find that she was entitled to rely on information that arose after his arrest in forming her grounds to believe that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by drug—which I find reasonable and probable in these circumstances.
Did Constable Batte carry out the Drug Recognition Evaluation in an unreasonable manner?
29The Defence submits that Constable Batte conducted her drug evaluation in manner that was unreasonable. Mr. Gill further submits that the DRE excluded medical reasons for Mr. Hamilton’s behaviour because she was advised that he was medically cleared. He further submits that Constable Batte did not consider that Mr. Hamilton was asleep, in the cells, prior to her evaluation. Together, he submits, this results in an unreasonable search.
30There is no evidence that the evaluation was conducted in an unreasonable manner.
31Based on the questions Constable Batte asked Mr. Hamilton at the outset of her examination, she was entitled to exclude fatigue and medical reasons as justifications for his irregular behaviour. Exhibit #3 contains a one-page Drug Impairment Evaluation Report using a prescribed form, and qualitative, 9 page “Drug Evaluation Narrative.” Constable Batte notes the location of the examination, the witnesses, her sources of information prior to the exam, and her first observations of Mr. Hamilton. Under her first observations, she asks, “When did you sleep and for how long?” and Mr. Hamilton answers, “yesterday, at 9 pm, for 5 hours.” She then asks, “Are you sick or injured?” and he responds, “No.” She then asks whether he was sick or injured, diabetic, epileptic, whether he had physical disabilities, or was under the care of a doctor. He responded to all these questions in the negative.13 These questions all correspond to the prescribed fields on the standard, Drug Impairment Evaluation. In asking these questions, Constable Batte learned about Mr. Hamilton’s quantity of sleep and his medical condition. Her assessment was not skewed by the information she received from PC Wickramasinghe nor was it misguided by her lack of knowledge about his sleeping inside the cells. I find her search was conducted in a reasonable manner, as prescribed by the Drug Impairment Evaluation standard intake form.
24(2) Analysis
32I have found no section 9 or section 8 breaches under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. DC Wickramasinghe did not rely on any information provided during his medical assessment when forming his grounds to arrest Mr. Hamilton, who was already in police custody. Nor did the Drug Recognition Expert rely on any information exchanged during the medical examination to form her grounds to demand compliance with the evaluation. I note, parenthetically, that the DRE would have learned that Mr. Hamilton was “medically cleared” even if PC Wickramasinghe did not passively attend the assessment. The Crown did not seek to tender any information captured during the medical assessment and asked to excise that portion of the in-car camera from evidence on the trial proper.
33In the further alternative, if Mr. Hamilton did enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy to this information, and police conduct breached his section 8 rights, and the demand for a drug evaluation and collection of his urine was contextually related to this breach, this still would not mandate an exclusion of the urine analysis or DRE report under 24(2). Police conduct was not serious and was technical in nature: it was the evidence of the officer that he summoned ambulatory care to ensure Mr. Hamilton’s well-being given his high level of impairment. He did not turn off the in-car camera because he was responsible for Mr. Hamilton’s safety while in police custody. It was contrary to York Regional Police policy to suspend the recording of the in-car camera. Likewise, the impact of the breach on Mr. Hamilton’s constitutionally protected rights is minimal, given that he was already the subject of DRE evaluation where he would reveal his drug consumption and participate in clinical testing. Society’s interest would favour adjudication on the merits. Balancing all these factors, excluding the DRE evaluation and urine analysis would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Mr. Hamilton’s Charter application is dismissed.
Trial Proper
34The Crown bears the onus to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hamilton operated a conveyance while his ability to operate was impaired, to any degree, by drug on March 27, 2024. Defence conceded Mr. Hamilton’s identity, date of the offence, and jurisdiction. The following issues arise on the trial evidence:
(1) Was Mr. Hamilton “operating” a motor vehicle?
(2) Was Mr. Hamilton’s ability to operate a motor vehicle impaired to any degree?
(3) If was impaired to any degree, was he impaired by drug?
Was Mr. Hamilton operating a motor vehicle?
35The Defence submits that the Crown has not established that Mr. Hamilton was in “care or control’ of his motor vehicle. Namely, no evidence as to how the key to the car was found on the dash after Mr. Hamilton was found asleep in the driver’ seat.
36Section 320.11 of the Criminal Code defines ‘operate’ for the purposes of offences relating to conveyances. In respect of a motor vehicle, “operate” means to drive it or have care or control of it. Pursuant to s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code, the Crown may prove operation via “care or control” by proving that the accused occupied the driver’s seat of the vehicle:
In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 320.14 or 320.15, if it is proved that the accused occupied the seat or position ordinarily occupied by a person who operates a conveyance, the accused is presumed to have been operating the conveyance unless they establish that they did not occupy that seat or position for the purpose of setting the conveyance in motion.
37The presumption is engaged when the accused first occupies the driver’s seat, not when the police arrive later. The mens rea and actus reus of the offence are complete at that time. The purpose of the legislation is to discourage intoxicated persons from even occupying the driver’s seat.14 The presumption may be rebutted by showing on the balance of probabilities that the accused had no intention of setting the vehicle in motion.15
38In this case, Mr. Hamilton’s position in the driver’s seat engages the presumption.16 There is no evidence that rebuts the presumption on a balance of probabilities. On the contrary, Mr. Hamilton was found passed out seated behind the driver’s wheel, slumped backward with his feet hanging out of the driver-side window on the premises of a public, commercial business, namely a gas station. He did not have permission to remain there indefinitely. I conclude that the Crown has established occupancy and thereby proven that Mr. Hamilton operated the vehicle.
Was Mr. Hamilton’s ability to operate a motor vehicle impaired?
39The Crown bears the onus of proving impairment—to any degree, including slight impairment—beyond a reasonable doubt, on all the evidence. The impairment of one’s ability to drive is generally understood as meaning the alteration of one’s judgment and the decrease in one’s physical abilities. If the evidence establishes any degree of impairment ranging from slight to great, the offence has been made out. Slight impairment to drive relates to a reduced ability in some measure to perform a complex motor function whether the impairment impacts on perception or field of vision reaction or response time, judgment, and regard for the rules of the road.17
40In considering the observations of the arresting officer, the conduct of Mr. Hamilton on the in-car camera, in conjunction with the clinical observations of the Drug Recognition Expert, I find that Mr. Hamilton’s impairment is the only reasonable conclusion available on this constellation of facts:
41Pre-Arrest Evidence: Constable Wickramasinghe testified that he observed Mr. Hamilton passed out, with his feet hanging out of the driver side window, while his car was parked in a busy gas station at 11 am in the morning on a weekday. When Mr. Hamilton exited the vehicle, he observed that Mr. Hamilton was moving and speaking slowly.
42In-Car Camera Evidence: The in-car camera video, entered as Exhibit 2 on the trial, demonstrates Mr. Hamilton’s impairment based on the following observations:
(a) Mr. Hamilton is placed in the back of a police cruiser. After Mr. Hamilton is told the reason for his arrest and cautioned between 11:20 and 11:24 am, he lies down and proceeds to sleep in the police car. The arresting Constable then reads the demand that he submit to drug evaluation. Mr. Hamilton remains in a lethargic condition—where he interacts briefly then proceeds to shut his eyes—in the back of the police car. Throughout his time in the police cruiser prior to EMS attending, the defendant appears to drift in and out of sleep.
(b) A firetruck arrives at the side of the cruiser to assess Mr. Hamilton between 11:42 and 11:47 am. Mr. Hamilton is placed back into the police cruiser at 11:47 am. He proceeds to lie back down against the chair and, once again, falls asleep. As the cruiser moves towards the police station, I note that Mr. Hamilton remains asleep in the car, with his eyes closed until the cruiser reaches the police station, at 12:04 pm.
43These observations cannot be divorced from their context. Mr. Hamilton is slumped against the seat of the police car, fading in and out of sleep, while he is under arrest for a criminal charge. He remains lethargic and in a generalized state of grogginess while he is advised of his right to counsel, his obligation to submit to a drug evaluation demand, and transported to a police station. This level of lethargy prompted PC Wickramasinghe to seek out medical attention. This level of lethargy impairs one’s ability to drive with due attention, concentration and co-ordination.
44Observations made by Drug Recognition Expert: While Mr. Hamilton’s conduct on the in-car camera, discussed above, demonstrates his impairment, this conclusion is corroborated by the drug recognition evaluation. I consider the DRE’s opinion, that, “the subject’s ability to operate a conveyance is impaired by Cannabis” as one fact that forms the constellation of evidence before the court. Constable Batte observed that Mr. Hamilton’s eyes appeared watery and droopy. She described his attitude as groggy and his co-ordination, movement and speech as slow.
45Mr. Hamilton’s pre-arrest and post-arrest behaviour demonstrate his impairment beyond a reasonable doubt. The in-car camera footage is capable of establishing this impairment and is further supplemented by Constable Batte’s observations during the Drug Evaluation. I find that a person who is falling asleep, slumped over, and unable to keep his eyes open while under arrest and caution, could not drive with due concentration and co-ordination. The evidence is overwhelming that Mr. Hamilton’s ability to drive was impaired.
Was Mr. Hamilton impaired by drug?
46Constable Batte identified cannabis as impairing Mr. Hamilton’s ability to drive. She demanded that he provide a sample of his urine. The toxicology report, filed as Exhibit 5 on the trial, identified “carboxytetrahydrocannabinol” in his urine. This is described at paragraph 2 of that report as a metabolite of THC and its detection in urine indicates prior use of, exposure to, cannabis products:
“THC can impair the individual’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. The effects of THC can include altered time perception, incoordination, and decreased ability to concentrate. THC is unlikely to be detected in urine; therefore, no inference regarding the recency of cannabis use can be made based on the absence of THC in urine.”
47The toxicology report further detected olanzapine in Mr. Hamilton’s urine. Paragraph 3 of that report indicates that “Olanzapine can impair an individual’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. The effects of olanzapine can include dizziness and drowsiness.”
48Section 320.31(6) of the Criminal Code allows two presumptions when three pre-conditions are met:
(a) A presumption that the drug was present in the body at the time of operation and;
(b) A presumption that the drug caused the impairment
49The preconditions for the presumption that cannabis was present in Mr. Hamilton’s body at the time he operated the vehicle, and that cannabis caused the impairment are met in this case, namely: the analysis of the urine sample demonstrates that Mr. Hamilton had a drug—a cannabis metabolite and olanzapine—in his body; Cannabis was identified by the evaluating Constable, PC Batte.
50Mr. Hamilton’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was proved to be impaired by drug beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
51The Crown has established, beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hamilton was operating a motor-vehicle and his ability to do so was impaired by drug on March 27, 2024. I find him guilty of this charge.
Released: December 2, 2025
Signed: Justice Ann Marina Elias
Footnotes
- R v Bush, 2010 ONCA 554 at para 54
- R v Wu, 2015 ONCA 667 at para 49, R v Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1990] SCJ No 12.
- R v Wu, 2015 ONCA 667 at para 50
- R v Leppanen, 2015 ONSC 2973 at para 38
- R v Bush, 2010 ONCA 554 at para 54
- R v Bush, 2010 ONCA 554 at para 70
- R. v. S.S., 2023 ONCA 130, at para 29
- R. v. S.S., 2023 ONCA 130 at para 36
- R. v. Singh, 2024 ONCA 66 at para 55
- R. v. S.S., 2023 ONCA 130, at para 40
- R. v. Jones, 2025 ONSC 6158 at para 67 citing R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55 at para. 34
- Exhibit 3, Drug Influence Evaluation Narrative, page 2.
- R. v. Szymanski, 2009 CanLII 45328 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 3623 (S.C.J.) at paras. 35-42.
- R. v. O’Neill, 2016 ONCA 307
- R. v. Green, 2007 ABPC 286
- R. v. Grant, 2014 ONSC 1479
- R v Guenter, 2016 ONCA 572 at para 89