Q.C.

The appellant appealed a threshold ruling and costs order made by the trial judge in a motor vehicle accident action.

The appellant abandoned the appeal of the threshold ruling but argued the trial judge erred in departing from the usual costs consequences after the plaintiff obtained a judgment less favourable than the appellant's offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the trial judge's departure from the rule.

The Court set aside the order of no costs post-offer and awarded the appellant $70,000 in costs, to be set off against the $135,000 awarded to the respondent for pre-offer costs.

The applicants brought a motion to reconsider a previous decision denying production of CSIS source documents and sought leave to cross-examine the CSIS affiant on a Garofoli voir dire.

The court found that newly disclosed information revealed an apparent contradiction in the CSIS affidavit regarding whether a target was actively seeking a gun.

This contradiction met the threshold to show the affiant may have failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court ordered the CSIS source documents to be produced for judicial review to determine their relevance to the Garofoli application.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the pickup truck he was a passenger in went through a red light and was struck by a transport truck going through a green light.

The jury found the driver of the pickup 95% liable and the driver of the transport truck 5% liable.

The appellants (the transport truck driver and owners) appealed, arguing the jury verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, and there was improper cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's conclusion that a reasonably prudent driver should have been aware of the hazard, the jury charge was not in error when read as a whole, and the improper cross-examination was not serious enough to undermine trial fairness.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of post-divorce enforcement and contempt motions concerning unpaid s. 7 child-related expenses and a life insurance obligation intended to secure support.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the motion judge to conclude that the respondent had reasonably complied with the s. 7 expense provisions and that substantial indemnity costs were not mandated despite wording in the divorce order, because costs remained discretionary.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the contempt motion, applying the civil contempt test and finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's acceptance of evidence that the respondent's medical condition prevented him from obtaining traditional life insurance.

Although the court stated that the motion judge erred in saying there was no legal basis for a dependent to insure the payor's life under the Insurance Act, the appellant's proposed alternate insurance remedy required a change order and the fresh evidence tendered on appeal was inadmissible.

In a business dispute arising from a hotel development venture, the appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing all personal claims against an individual corporate principal while related claims against the corporation continued.

The Court of Appeal held that, under the post-Hryniak summary judgment framework, it was in the interest of justice to finally determine the individual's personal liability and that appellate deference was owed absent material error.

The court found that any factual errors by the motion judge were immaterial, upheld the conclusion that there was no evidence of a personal fiduciary duty, and agreed that the letter of intent was not shown to be a trust asset.

On the findings, the individual acted in good faith and in the corporation's best interests, so the personal tort claims failed and the fresh evidence motion was also dismissed.

The plaintiff sued his nephew and sister for an unpaid loan of $142,307.21, alleging the nephew borrowed the money and the sister guaranteed it as executrix of their mother's estate.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions, arguing the claim was barred by a mutual release executed to settle a decade of prior estate litigation.

The court granted the sister's motion, finding the broad release extinguished the claim against her.

However, the court dismissed the nephew's motion, concluding there was a genuine issue for trial because he was not a party to the release and the parties did not intend to extinguish his personal debt.

The applicant sought to relocate the parties’ children from Bracebridge to Stittsville following the loss of her employment and the acceptance of new employment in Ottawa.

The court applied the relocation framework from Gordon v. Goertz and found that the change in employment and residence constituted a material change in circumstances.

In assessing the best interests of the children, the court considered the existing parenting arrangement, the children’s greater attachment to the primary caregiver, the views of the children, and the disruption associated with either permitting or denying the move.

The respondent raised allegations of parental alienation and improper motive, but the court rejected those claims and accepted that the relocation was driven primarily by employment circumstances.

The court concluded that the children’s best interests favoured relocation with the applicant while preserving meaningful parenting time with the respondent.

The court addressed three issues regarding the distribution of proceeds from the sale of properties by a court-appointed Sales Officer.

The court approved the Sales Officer's recommendation to reduce the general reserve and distribute funds following the closing of two properties.

The court also directed that future costs of the Sales Officer be allocated to the sole remaining property.

Finally, the court declined to eliminate or reduce a $7.5 million Settlement Liquidity Holdback, maintaining it to ensure liquidity for accounting adjustments and to incentivize the parties to advance the long-standing family litigation.

The plaintiff, assignee of a debt owed by the defendants under minutes of settlement, sued for the outstanding principal and accumulated interest.

The defendants acknowledged the principal debt but sought equitable relief from the accumulated interest under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing they withheld payment because the plaintiff failed to provide proper notice of the assignment.

The court found that the defendants' conduct in withholding payment was not reasonable and that the contractual interest rate did not constitute a penalty or forfeiture.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the principal and accumulated interest.

The plaintiff suffered a severe acquired brain injury after losing control of her vehicle on a snow-covered portion of a county road.

She sued the municipality for failing to maintain the road.

The court found that the municipality breached its statutory duty under the Municipal Act by failing to plow and salt the road, which had accumulated a large snow drift.

The court rejected the municipality's statutory defences and its argument that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for driving too fast.

The plaintiff was awarded significant damages for non-pecuniary loss, past and future income loss, future care costs, and Family Law Act claims for her parents.

The respondents' property was damaged by an oil spill after a tenant bypassed the furnace thermostat, causing it to overheat and overflow.

The appellant insurer denied coverage, relying on pollution and mechanical breakdown exclusions, and later argued the respondents failed to file a proof of loss.

The trial judge found for the respondents, concluding the insurer waived the proof of loss requirement and that neither exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, upholding the findings that the adjuster's letter constituted a waiver, the mechanical breakdown was caused by external interference rather than an internal defect, and the pollution exclusion required another operative exclusion to apply.

The respondent farmer was injured when his uninsured all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was struck from behind by a truck on a public road.

He sued the truck driver, the truck owner, and his own insurer for damages and statutory accident benefits.

The motion judge found the ATV was a 'self-propelled implement of husbandry' exempt from compulsory insurance.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the ATV was an off-road vehicle that required insurance when operated on a public road.

Consequently, the respondent's action was statute-barred and his claim for statutory accident benefits was foreclosed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle by drug under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a toxicology report detecting only a cannabis metabolite (CO‑THC) and not the psychoactive component THC established that he could not have been impaired at the relevant time.

The court held that urine analysis was not determinative and did not necessarily exclude impairment, particularly where other evidence—including erratic driving, police observations, admissions of marijuana use, and a drug recognition expert’s evaluation—supported impairment.

The trial judge had properly weighed the toxicology evidence and was entitled to rely on the drug recognition evaluation and other observations.

No reversible error was found in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The appellants, selling shareholders in a family business, appealed the dismissal of their action for breach of fiduciary duty and oppression against the non-selling shareholders and the corporation's professional advisors.

The trial judge had utilized a 'hybrid' trial model following a failed summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were precluded from challenging the hybrid trial model as they had not appealed the initial trial management order.

Furthermore, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding that no fiduciary duty was owed during the share redemption negotiations, as the relationship between the parties was highly adversarial and marked by distrust.

The substantial indemnity costs award of nearly $2.5 million was also upheld.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondents were not entitled to treat the retirement of his transition support loan as a taxable benefit and issue a T4.

The applicant argued that the loan documents, specifically a Q&A document, implied the loan would be retired without financial consequence to him.

The court found no ambiguity in the loan documents and held that they did not restrict the manner in which the respondents could retire the loan.

The application was dismissed, as the court could not rewrite the contract to impose an obligation to retire the loan tax-free.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition for arson, fraud, and firearm offences.

At the committal hearing, the appellant sought to introduce evidence challenging the credibility of two accomplices whose anticipated evidence was summarized in the record of the case.

The extradition judge refused to admit the evidence and committed the appellant for surrender.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender.

The appellant appealed the committal order and applied for judicial review of the surrender order, arguing that the potential sentence in the United States was grossly disproportionate to a comparable Canadian sentence, violating s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the application, finding that the proffered evidence would not have rendered the record of the case manifestly unreliable, and that the potential sentence disparity would not shock the conscience.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a $4 million mortgage scheme and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and $250,000 in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by conducting his own handwriting analysis, failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following unlawful arrest and search, and imposing an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, reasonably assessed the handwriting, and correctly held that conditional sentences are inappropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the conclusion that the offence occurred in 1999 as alleged in the information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the date of the offence is not an essential element unless it is critical and the accused is misled or prejudiced.

The court found the appellant knew the case he had to meet and the date played no part in his defence.

The appellant insurer appealed a Superior Court judgment ordering it to indemnify the respondent for costs incurred in defending a slip and fall lawsuit.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding that issue estoppel did not bar the claim and that the underlying lawsuit triggered a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The plaintiffs sued the quarry owner (Miller Group) and the blasting operator (Sernoskies) for damages caused by a fly rock incident.

The plaintiffs and the operator entered into a Pierringer settlement agreement, releasing the operator and restricting claims against the owner to several liability.

The owner cross-claimed against the operator, alleging an implied indemnity agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the owner's cross-claim and its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the owner's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to address the threshold issue of whether an implied indemnity agreement existed, which could eliminate the owner's liability entirely.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination.