P.W. Sutherland

The plaintiff sought certification of a class action against the Attorney General of Canada on behalf of veterans who experienced delays in the processing of disability benefits.

The court applied the five-part test under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The court struck the claims for breach of s. 7 of the Charter, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation, finding it plain and obvious they could not succeed.

However, the court found the negligence claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court certified the class action for the negligence claim, conditional on the plaintiff amending the class definition.

The plaintiff brought an action against his brother's former wife, claiming she held his interest in a property in trust.

The property had been sold and the proceeds disbursed pursuant to family law proceedings between the brother and his former wife.

The plaintiff argued for an express, constructive, or resulting trust.

The court dismissed the action, finding insufficient evidence of an express trust, no equitable obligation or unjust enrichment to support a constructive trust, and that the presumption of resulting trust did not apply.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The defendant failed to close the purchase of the plaintiff's home, alleging the plaintiff misrepresented the lot frontage.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the Agreement of Purchase and Sale required the purchaser to verify measurements and there was no evidence the frontage was materially significant to the defendant.

The court awarded the plaintiff damages for the difference in sale price and carrying costs, and ordered the deposit to be credited towards the damages.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the court held a focused trial to determine parenting and child support issues for three children.

The court considered whether to release the two younger children from a court-ordered parenting schedule based on their views and preferences.

The court released the 16-year-old child from the schedule effective August 2022 but declined to release the 14-year-old child.

The applicant mother was granted sole decision-making authority.

The court also calculated child support and section 7 expense arrears, ordering the respondent father to pay outstanding amounts.

Ongoing child support was reduced to $1,850 per month to reflect the shared parenting arrangement and the eldest child attending university.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against his brothers and their jointly owned corporations amidst a family business dispute.

On the return motion, the defendants argued the injunction should be set aside due to the plaintiff's failure to provide full and frank disclosure of material facts, including his involvement in prior litigation and his control over a corporate mortgage.

The court agreed that the plaintiff breached his duty of full and frank disclosure and discharged the Mareva injunction over the defendants' personal assets.

However, the court exercised its discretion to grant an alternate interim injunction securing specific corporate cash accounts and real properties pending trial.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police during the execution of a general warrant and upon his arrest.

The court previously found that the applicant's Charter rights were breached.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found that the police conduct was serious, noting that the lead investigator provided misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) regarding the necessity of a general warrant.

Although the evidence was reliable and essential to the Crown's case, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious state misconduct.

The application was granted, and the evidence was excluded.

The applicant brought an application to quash a general warrant and exclude evidence obtained during a covert entry and search of his residence.

The police had obtained a general warrant that authorized them to enter the applicant's unit once identified, provided they determined there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking was inside.

The Superior Court of Justice found the general warrant invalid on two grounds: it impermissibly delegated the judicial function of determining reasonable and probable grounds to the police, and it violated s. 487.01(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the police could have obtained a standard search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act once the unit was identified.

The applicant's s. 8 Charter rights were breached, and a subsequent hearing was ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for damages arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The defendants admitted to breaching the agreement of purchase and sale but argued the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages when he resold the property for a lower price in a falling market.

The court heard expert appraisal evidence from both parties.

The court found the defendants failed to prove the plaintiff acted unreasonably in mitigating his damages, noting the property was sold on the open market after reasonable exposure.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $111,702.58, representing the difference in sale prices plus carrying costs, less the deposit.

The applicants sought a declaration that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property was null and void after the respondent purchasers failed to waive inspection and financing conditions by the deadline.

The respondents had proposed an amendment to the APS instead of waiving the conditions, which the applicants did not accept.

The respondents subsequently registered a Purchaser's Lien on the property.

The court held that the APS was null and void because the conditions were not explicitly waived or fulfilled in writing as required.

The court ordered the Purchaser's Lien discharged and the deposit returned to the respondents, finding no breach of the duty of good faith by the applicants.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support, seeking to impute an annual income of $1.5 million to the respondent father based on text messages and lifestyle.

The father argued his income was $146,655.50.

The court found the financial disclosure from both parties to be inadequate and applied 'rough justice' to determine income based on the parties' sworn living expenses.

The court imputed an income of $285,000 to the father and zero income to the mother, ordering temporary spousal support of $7,201 per month and child support of $2,271 per month.

The mother's request for an order requiring the father to obtain $4.1 million in life insurance was dismissed due to a lack of evidence.

Following a finding that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter, the court determined the appropriate remedy under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Applying the framework from Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, the court rejected the Crown's request for tailored remedies (reading in, reading down, or severance), finding that such modifications would significantly alter Parliament's legislative scheme.

The court also declined to suspend the declaration of invalidity, concluding the Crown failed to demonstrate a compelling public interest justifying a suspension.

The impugned provisions were declared immediately of no force and effect.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction against his brothers and their jointly owned corporate entities.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were dissipating assets, selling properties without his knowledge or consent, and transferring funds to avoid sharing them equally as previously agreed.

The court found that the motion should proceed ex parte due to the risk of further asset dissipation if notice were given.

Applying the test for a Mareva injunction, the court found the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case, a risk of asset removal, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court granted a temporary Mareva injunction freezing the defendants' assets.

The plaintiffs purchased a cottage and later discovered significant structural issues and Building Code violations during renovations.

They sued the Township for negligent building inspections and failure to enforce the Building Code Act.

The court found that the Township owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs and breached that duty by granting a building permit without proper plans and failing to identify structural deficiencies during inspections.

The Township was held liable for the costs to remedy the Code violations and for the plaintiffs' mental distress, resulting in a total damages award of $361,875.33.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that her home insurance policy was in effect when a fire destroyed her property, and claiming damages of $398,958.94.

The insurer had terminated the policy for non-payment of premiums months before the fire.

The fire was intentionally set by the plaintiff's husband, who was living at the property.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the insurer properly terminated the policy according to its terms.

Furthermore, even if the policy had been in force, the intentional or criminal act exclusion would have barred coverage because the husband was an insured living in the household.

The plaintiff's claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligence were also dismissed.

The motion and action were dismissed.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant at trial using emails exchanged between them regarding their marriage breakdown and separation agreement.

The Crown argued the emails were 'records' under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code, requiring a hearing under section 278.92.

The court found that the emails contained personal information with a reasonable expectation of privacy, thus constituting records.

The court also held that the recent amendments to section 278.1 were procedural in nature and operated retrospectively, applying to the accused's trial despite the charges predating the amendments.

The accused, charged with two counts of sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of prior discussions with the complainant regarding 'rough sex' and a 'rape fantasy', as well as her characterization of the incident as a 'grey area'.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence engaged the twin myths and the application lacked sufficient detail.

The court found the application material sufficient, as the proposed evidence came from the complainant's own statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding its probative value for full answer and defence outweighed prejudicial effects, provided cross-examination is strictly limited to the specific statements and not used to invoke the twin myths.

The applicant, charged with trafficking cocaine, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings until the state agreed to fund his legal counsel.

Although he had been denied legal aid, the court found his financial disclosure deficient.

He failed to provide evidence of his recent employment income, the value of his vehicle, or a logical explanation for transactions in his girlfriend's bank account.

The application was dismissed as the applicant did not prove on a balance of probabilities that he could not afford to retain private counsel.

The plaintiffs and defendant entered into an unconditional agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The defendant failed to close, claiming she could not obtain financing because she was unable to sell her existing home following a provincial government policy announcement that cooled the real estate market.

The defendant argued the contract was frustrated or contained an implied financing condition.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that a market decline is not an unforeseeable supervening event that radically changes the contractual obligation, and the entire agreement clause precluded any implied terms.

The plaintiffs were awarded $623,733.05 in damages for the difference in resale price and carrying costs.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, the third party actions, and all counterclaims and crossclaims arising from a 2007 motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs did not oppose the dismissal of their action.

A third party opposed the dismissal of her counterclaim and crossclaim for contribution and indemnity.

The court held that because the main action was being dismissed, the third party's claims for contribution and indemnity had no basis in law and could not survive.

The motions were granted and all claims were dismissed.

During a jury trial, the plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 52.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the jury to determine if past and future care costs were warranted, despite having called no evidence on these issues.

The plaintiff proposed that if the jury found such costs warranted, the quantum could be determined later by a judge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining the necessary expert evidence before trial.

The court also held that bifurcating the issue would improperly remove the determination of the extent and quantum of future care costs from the jury.