Steven Benmor

The applicant sought child support, retroactive spousal support, and supervised parenting time.

The central issue was determining the respondent's income, which the applicant alleged was hidden in a complex web of international corporations, including one fraudulently transferred to her name.

The court found the respondent was the beneficial owner of the corporations, imputed his income at approximately $7 million annually, and ordered $20,000 per month in both child and spousal support.

The court also ordered supervised parenting time due to the respondent's history of deceit and the risk of child abduction to India or the UAE, which are not signatories to the Hague Convention.

The parties brought cross-motions seeking to impose specific terms for the sale of their matrimonial home, following several prior orders that had failed to result in a sale.

The applicant sought to restrict the respondent, who intended to bid on the property, from seeing other offers.

The respondent argued that real estate regulations required offers to be conveyed promptly.

The court held that the obligation to convey offers is subject to client direction and ordered a blind bid process where neither party would see the offers until a specified time, preventing the respondent from gaining an unfair right of first refusal.

The court imposed detailed terms regarding the listing agreement, showing times, and COVID-19 protocols to ensure the sale proceeded without further dispute.

In the midst of a family law trial, the respondent husband objected to the applicant wife's attempt to cross-examine him on police occurrence reports and title documents that had not been previously disclosed.

The court found that the wife's late production of these documents amounted to trial by ambush and created unfairness for the husband, violating the fundamental principle of early and complete disclosure in family law.

To remedy the unfairness, the court halted the cross-examination on the new documents and ordered a revised trial schedule, requiring the wife to testify first to establish the admissibility of the documents and allowing the husband an opportunity to review them and be properly examined.

The applicant moved for an order determining the sum he must pay the respondent to purchase their jointly owned matrimonial home, effectively seeking to vary a previous order that required the home to be listed for sale.

The parties had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale that failed to close.

The court held that, absent an agreement or a formal motion to vary, it lacked jurisdiction to order a transfer of property to the applicant on new terms.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion but updated the timelines in the previous order to facilitate the sale of the home.

The applicant sought spousal support, claiming the parties lived in a conjugal relationship for six years.

The respondent denied they were spouses, asserting the applicant was an unwelcome guest who refused to leave and became violent.

The court applied the Molodowich criteria and found the parties did not live in a conjugal relationship, dismissing the spousal support claim.

Additionally, the court dismissed a preliminary motion to initialize the parties' names and granted the respondent's request to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant, barring her from instituting further proceedings against him without leave.

The respondent husband brought a motion to change an interim consent support order, arguing his income had substantially decreased and seeking to impute income to the applicant wife.

The court excluded the husband's RRSP withdrawals from his income for support purposes, finding he used them to pay debts and support obligations.

The court imputed a minimum wage income of $30,000 to the wife prospectively, noting she had made no efforts to become self-supporting three years post-separation, but declined to impute income retroactively due to her childcare responsibilities for three children, including one with autism.

Interim spousal support was ordered at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines based on the recalculated incomes.

Following a trial in writing on family law issues, the applicant father sought full indemnity costs of $73,208.59.

The court found the father was largely successful on the main issues and the mother's behaviour was unreasonable, particularly regarding the choice of school and spousal support.

However, the father did not beat his offer to settle on all issues, precluding full indemnity costs.

The court also found the father's bill of costs to be excessive for a trial in writing with no cross-examination.

The court awarded the father partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 all inclusive.

The parties proceeded to a trial in writing to resolve issues regarding parenting, child support, spousal support, and equalization.

The court ordered the child to attend the father's proposed school and daycare, finding it in the child's best interests.

The court imputed an income of $50,000 to the mother based on her earning capacity in the film industry.

Given the shared parenting arrangement and the parties' respective financial circumstances, the court ordered no child support payable by either party.

The mother's claim for spousal support was dismissed as she failed to prove entitlement.

The father was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $5,034.34.

Following a family law trial, both parties sought costs.

The applicant father sought full indemnity costs of $103,581.45 based on an offer to settle, while the respondent mother sought no order as to costs due to mixed success.

The court found that the father was substantially successful on custody and child support, but the mother was substantially successful on access, relocation, spousal support, and equalization.

Given the divided success, the unreasonable conduct of both parties, and the father's lack of financial disclosure, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The applicant, a 76-year-old former lawyer, brought a motion for a provisional order to terminate spousal support and a temporary stay of enforcement pending a confirmation hearing in British Columbia.

The applicant had recently been diagnosed with dementia, forcing him to close his law practice and leaving him with nominal pension income.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the applicant's medical condition and inability to earn income, provisionally terminating spousal support.

The court also granted a temporary stay of enforcement, finding the applicant met the test by acting promptly and establishing a prima facie case for variation.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding the enforcement of consent orders that required them to use a parenting coordinator with secondary arbitration powers.

The applicant argued the court lacked jurisdiction to delegate decision-making to an arbitrator and that the agreement was an unenforceable 'agreement to agree'.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that courts have jurisdiction to incorporate arbitration requirements on consent and that the essential terms of the agreement were binding.

The court applied the principle of good faith contractual performance, ordering the applicant to sign the parenting coordinator agreement and provide her full income tax returns within 30 days, deferring a formal contempt order.

The applicant sought a stay of an interim family arbitration award permitting the respondent to list and sell the matrimonial home prior to trial.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant a stay pending an appeal of the arbitration award and concluded that jurisdiction arose under s. 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court found the appeal raised a serious issue regarding whether the arbitrator failed to address relevant grounds relating to the applicant’s claimed beneficial interest in the property through constructive or resulting trust.

The court determined that an immediate sale could cause irreparable harm by undermining the applicant’s proprietary claims and development potential of the property.

The balance of convenience narrowly favoured preserving the status quo pending the appeal or arbitration trial.

The applicant sought interim orders permitting relocation of the child from Richmond Hill to Guelph, along with custody, schooling, and support orders.

The court applied the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the framework from Gordon v. Goertz.

Finding compelling interim circumstances, including housing instability and financial advantages of the move, the court permitted the relocation and determined the disruption to the child and the respondent’s parenting time would be minimal.

Requests for interim child support and section 7 contributions were adjourned due to incomplete financial disclosure.

The court emphasized that interim mobility orders require compelling circumstances but may be granted where the child’s best interests clearly favour the move.

Following a ten-day trial primarily concerning child custody and a mobility application, the applicant father was largely successful and sought full indemnity costs of over $212,000.

The respondent mother argued for reduced costs based on divided success, her reasonable conduct, and her impecuniosity.

The court found that neither party's offer to settle triggered full indemnity costs and that the mother's conduct was not unreasonable.

The court declined to apportion costs for divided success or reduce them for impecuniosity, ultimately awarding the applicant $106,765.86 on a partial indemnity basis.

Following a successful family law motion, the court addressed costs.

The successful party sought full recovery costs while the unsuccessful party argued for no costs or a nominal award.

Applying Rule 24(11)(b) of the Family Law Rules, the court considered the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct.

The court found that communications from the responding party’s counsel contained inappropriate accusations and unnecessarily escalated the dispute.

As a result, the court awarded full recovery costs with a punitive element to mark its disapproval of the behaviour.

The respondent father brought a motion to stay an Ontario application for child support on the basis that he resided in Florida and that Ontario should decline jurisdiction under forum non conveniens or require the claim to proceed under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and held that the child’s ordinary residence in Ontario constituted a sufficient presumptive connecting factor to ground jurisdiction.

Relying on Court of Appeal authority, the court found that the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act does not displace jurisdiction under the Family Law Act but provides an alternative procedure.

The respondent failed to demonstrate that Florida was a clearly more appropriate forum.

The motion to stay the Ontario proceeding was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's pleadings due to his alleged failure to comply with multiple court orders regarding child and spousal support, financial disclosure, and business valuation.

The court declined to strike the pleadings, noting that such a remedy should only be used in exceptional circumstances, particularly in family law cases where ongoing obligations are determined.

Instead, the court ordered alternative remedies, including allowing the applicant to encumber the matrimonial home for litigation funding, requiring the respondent to provide a collateral mortgage to secure support arrears, and granting the applicant access to the respondent's business records.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a temporary order to move the parties' 12-year-old child from a private school to a public school gifted program for Grade 7.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing the child should remain at the private school and that the issue required a trial.

The court found it had jurisdiction to make a temporary order regarding school choice if it was in the child's best interests.

However, the court dismissed the motion, finding the mother had not met the onus of demonstrating that a change in schools was in the child's best interests at this time, particularly given the child's preference to remain at his current school and the lack of comprehensive expert evidence evaluating both options.

The court ordered an independent assessment under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to determine the issue for trial.