Marek Tufman

The self-represented plaintiff brought motions seeking to enforce a prior production order against a non-party, Sciex, and for leave to examine three former Sciex employees and the defendant's wife for discovery.

The court dismissed the motion for production, finding that Sciex had complied with the order and could not produce documents that did not exist.

The court also dismissed the motions for leave to examine the non-parties, concluding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly as she had already obtained the relevant information from other sources and it would not be unfair to require her to proceed to trial without the examinations.

The plaintiff brought a motion for further documentary production from the defendant and from a non-party, her former employer AB Sciex Ltd. The plaintiff sought the defendant's unredacted bank statement to corroborate a past romantic relationship, which the defendant agreed to produce.

The plaintiff also sought HR records and video footage from the non-party employer relating to harassment complaints made by the defendant and the termination of her employment.

The court ordered the non-party to produce records of the harassment investigations and correspondence regarding the plaintiff's termination, finding them relevant to her claims of malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of mental distress, but dismissed the requests for other HR records and video footage.

The plaintiff successfully defended summary judgment motions brought by multiple defendants across several actions.

While costs were resolved with most defendants, the plaintiff sought costs against the defendants Helden and 131 Ontario for their involvement in the dismissed motions in the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action.

The court declined to award costs for the Copyright Action due to the defendants' limited involvement.

For the s. 38 BIA Action, the court found the defendants were passive participants who 'tagged along' with the primary moving parties.

The court apportioned 25% of the plaintiff's costs for that motion to these defendants, fixing the amount at $9,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff commenced four separate actions arising out of the bankruptcy and subsequent death of a lawyer.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the actions, primarily arguing they were barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the Bankruptcy Trustee Action and the Client Assigned Claims Action (with one minor exception), finding they were commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period and there was no genuine issue for trial regarding discoverability.

However, the court denied summary judgment for the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the injuries and whether the copyrighted materials were used during the relevant period.

The applicant sought an adjournment of a combined Settlement Conference/Trial Management Conference because a business valuation was not completed.

The court noted that the applicant had ample time to retain a valuator but failed to do so until shortly before the conference.

The adjournment was granted, but the court awarded costs of $470 to the respondent due to the applicant's failure to be ready to proceed.

The plaintiff and defendant by counterclaim brought a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him on a counterclaim.

The original defendant had passed away before the default judgment was granted, and his widow was later appointed estate trustee nunc pro tunc.

The court found that Rule 11 did not bar the enforcement of the default judgment due to the retroactive appointment.

However, applying the test under Rule 19.08, the court set aside the default judgment and the noting in default, finding the moving party moved promptly upon realizing the judgment's consequences, provided a satisfactory explanation for the default, and had an arguable defence based on a prior release.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding the enforcement of consent orders that required them to use a parenting coordinator with secondary arbitration powers.

The applicant argued the court lacked jurisdiction to delegate decision-making to an arbitrator and that the agreement was an unenforceable 'agreement to agree'.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that courts have jurisdiction to incorporate arbitration requirements on consent and that the essential terms of the agreement were binding.

The court applied the principle of good faith contractual performance, ordering the applicant to sign the parenting coordinator agreement and provide her full income tax returns within 30 days, deferring a formal contempt order.

The plaintiffs brought an action claiming ownership of a strip of the defendants' land through adverse possession.

The dispute arose after the defendants demanded the plaintiffs move their fence, asserting it was on the defendants' property.

The court found that a chain link fence had existed on the defendants' property for over ten years prior to the property's conversion to Land Titles, and that previous owners of both properties operated under a mutual mistake that the fence marked the boundary.

The court concluded the plaintiffs established open, notorious, and continuous adverse possession for the requisite ten-year period and granted a declaration of ownership, along with nominal damages.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike an action commenced by a corporate religious entity seeking declarations regarding the removal of a bishop and a church council member from ecclesiastical positions.

The court considered whether the corporate plaintiff had private law standing to seek declaratory relief concerning religious appointments and governance within the church.

It held that the corporation’s objects did not give it a legal interest in determining who held ecclesiastical offices or church administrative roles.

Because the dispute concerned the personal rights of individuals within a religious organization rather than the corporation’s legal rights or property interests, the corporation lacked standing.

The statement of claim was struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.