Philip Brent Cornish

During a jury trial arising from a shooting into an occupied dwelling, the accused applied to quash two counts on the indictment on the basis of issue estoppel or res judicata following a discharge at a preliminary inquiry on a conspiracy to murder charge.

The accused also sought directed verdicts of acquittal on multiple counts at the close of the Crown’s case.

The court held that the earlier discharge did not determine issues necessary to the remaining counts and therefore did not bar the prosecution.

Applying the test for directed verdicts, the court found that the Crown had adduced some evidence on each essential element of the offences, including evidence supporting liability as a party under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

The applications were dismissed and the case was left for determination by the jury.

During a jury trial on firearms-related offences and aggravated assault arising from a shooting incident, the court conducted a voir dire regarding the admissibility of three police statements made by the accused following arrest.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to intoxication, fatigue, oppressive interrogation, inducements, and breaches relating to the provision of rights.

Applying the voluntariness doctrine and the principles articulated in leading Supreme Court authority, the court assessed whether the accused had an operating mind and whether police conduct overbore the accused’s will.

The court found the accused understood he was speaking to police and that his statements could be used against him, and rejected allegations of inducement, oppression, or lack of an operating mind.

The Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statements were admitted at trial.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for a declaration that they had obtained an easement or covenant entitling them to domestic water from a well on the respondents' property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the obligation to supply water was a positive covenant requiring the expenditure of money and the doing of acts, which does not run with the land.

The court also rejected the argument that a binding perpetual contract existed between the parties.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding sole custody of a child to the respondent with generous access to the appellant.

The appellant argued that the reasons of the trial judge and the Superior Court appeal judge were purely conclusory and tautological.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately assessed the parenting skills and plans of the parties, and correctly concluded that joint custody was not workable due to the parties' lack of cooperation.

The court also upheld the Superior Court judge's costs award.

The appellant appealed a final order for an equalization payment of approximately $4,560 and child support totaling just under $9,000 annually.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that under sections 6 and 19 of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court because the amount in issue is under the monetary threshold.

The court declined to reconstitute itself as a panel of the Divisional Court or transfer the appeal.

The petitioner requested a review of a Tribunal decision that rescinded a $1,500 allowance previously ordered in his favour.

The allowance had originally been conditional on the petitioner signing a release for potential erosion and pollution damages, which he subsequently refused to sign.

The Tribunal denied the request for review, finding no error of law or fact in its previous decision and noting it lacked jurisdiction to award damages for insufficient outlet.

The appellant's truck became mired in soft ground and sustained severe mechanical damage to its rear differential gear during various attempts to extricate it using other vehicles.

The appellant's insurer denied coverage, and the Small Claims Court dismissed the appellant's action for indemnification.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the trial judge erred in law by interpreting Section 6 of the insurance policy as requiring an actual impact or accident with another motor vehicle.

The court held that the trial judge should have applied the Amos test to determine if the damage was caused by the use or operation of the other vehicles involved in the towing attempts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard.

The Summary Conviction Appeal judge affirmed the conviction, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself to decide credibility in light of the entire evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no error by the trial judge or the Summary Conviction Appeal judge, and dismissed the appeal.