Peter Annis

The applicant father brought a motion to vary child support under a separation agreement after discovering the respondent mother’s income had been significantly understated when the agreement was executed.

The court addressed income determination under ss. 16 and 17 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, including the appropriateness of three‑year income averaging where income fluctuates.

The court also considered imputing income under s. 19, finding the father intentionally under‑employed and imputing income of $50,000 to him.

Applying the shared parenting analysis under s. 9 of the Guidelines and the framework from Contino v. Leonelli‑Contino, the court assessed budgets, income disparity, and standards of living between households.

The respondent’s income for 2010–2011 was calculated using three‑year averaging and her 2012 income was based on actual income, with adjustments for non‑deductible legal expenses.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $4,000 monthly child support retroactive to 2010 and proportionate s. 7 expenses.

The moving parties sought partial summary judgment to enforce payment obligations under a promissory note issued pursuant to a settlement agreement resolving a joint venture development dispute.

The responding parties argued the note was security for the broader agreement and alleged misrepresentations concerning project budgets, indicating they intended to commence an action in deceit.

The court held that the note could not be considered independently of the settlement agreement and that the allegations raised potential issues requiring a fuller evidentiary record.

Applying the principles in Combined Air regarding premature summary judgment motions, the court found it appropriate to stay the motion to permit the responding parties to commence a deceit action and develop the record.

The stay was granted subject to strict timelines, with partial costs awarded to the moving parties for delay attributable to the responding parties.

The respondent husband brought a motion to vary spousal support provisions contained in Final Minutes of Settlement following a significant decline in his income from self-employment.

The court considered whether arrears of support barred the motion, whether the Divorce Act or the Family Law Act governed, and whether a material change in circumstances had occurred.

Interpreting the settlement agreement, the court held that a material change tied to income or employment was contemplated by the parties and that the respondent’s approximately 50% decline in business income constituted such a change.

The court varied the support order and directed that spousal support be recalculated using the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines to equalize the parties’ net disposable income, subject to specified adjustments.

A common-law spouse applied for dependant’s relief under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act and sought a vesting order over the deceased’s home based on a constructive trust.

The application was brought against the deceased’s children as beneficiaries of an intestate estate.

The court held that claims for dependant’s support must be brought against the estate, through its executor or administrator, rather than directly against beneficiaries.

Because no estate administrator had been appointed and the estate itself was not named as a respondent, the proceeding was procedurally defective.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to reapply once an administrator of the estate was appointed.

Following dismissal of three motions for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions in ongoing civil litigation, the court addressed costs.

The responding parties sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the self‑represented defendant had engaged in vexatious litigation and judge‑shopping through numerous unmeritorious motions.

The court accepted that the volume of motions suggested abuse of process but concluded that some of the issues raised were novel and not entirely devoid of merit.

Substantial indemnity costs were therefore not warranted.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded with a 15 percent reduction to reflect limited success by the defendant on certain procedural points and some duplication in the responding parties’ work.

The defendant sought leave to appeal three interlocutory decisions arising from a defamation action, including a ruling dismissing a refusals motion, a case management judge’s refusal to schedule a motion to set aside that ruling, and a subsequent decision dismissing a further refusals motion.

The court granted an extension of time to bring the leave applications but found that none met the stringent requirements under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against a prior judge based on the existence of a scholarship memorializing the judge’s son at the University involved in the litigation and a boardroom named after him by the University’s law firm.

The court held that these circumstances could not reasonably give rise to an apprehension of bias and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

Leave to appeal each interlocutory decision was therefore refused.

The defendant sought leave to appeal three interlocutory rulings in a defamation action, including decisions dismissing a refusals motion and a case management decision declining to schedule a motion alleging judicial bias.

The court granted an extension of time to seek leave but held that the defendant failed to meet the stringent requirements under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a memorial scholarship and law firm tribute connected to the judge’s deceased son were rejected as untenable and incapable of grounding an objective concern of partiality.

The court also held that the case management judge properly declined to schedule a motion seeking to set aside another Superior Court judge’s decision.

Leave to appeal all impugned interlocutory decisions was refused.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs totaling $17,234.66 plus HST, while the defendant argued the plaintiff should recover only $6,795.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of proportionality, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the full amount claimed.

The requested costs were reasonable, particularly as they were less than the amount originally claimed by the defendant when it anticipated success on the motion.

The respondent mother brought an interim motion seeking sole custody of the parties’ two children along with child and spousal support.

The court declined to grant interim sole custody, finding no evidence that the existing de facto joint custody arrangement negatively affected the children’s interests.

However, the court ordered the father to pay combined child and spousal support based on imputed incomes of $60,000 for the father and $12,000 for the mother, along with retroactive support and proportional payment of section 7 expenses.

Standard decision‑making and communication clauses were imposed to improve parental cooperation and guide joint decision‑making pending trial.

The applicant father brought an interim motion seeking custody, shared parenting, property equalization, spousal support terms, and various ancillary orders shortly before trial.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion seeking interim support.

The court declined to alter the existing de facto custody arrangement with the mother, holding that credibility disputes and parenting determinations should be resolved at trial.

However, the court granted limited procedural relief including production of CAS records and increased access as proposed by the mother.

On the cross-motion, the court ordered interim spousal support and increased child support based on the father’s income and the mother’s financial hardship.

The plaintiffs, initially self-represented by a solicitor acting for himself and his company, failed to respond to a Status Notice, resulting in an administrative dismissal of their action for unpaid loans.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside the dismissal order.

The court applied the holistic test for setting aside a Registrar's dismissal, finding that despite the plaintiffs' procedural failures and delay, the merits of the action (unpaid loans acknowledged by the defendants) and the lack of prejudice to the defendants justified setting aside the order.

The court also vacated a previous security for costs order and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The applicant sought property tax exemptions under s. 3(1), para. 23 of the Assessment Act for two amusement attractions at a waterpark, along with related pump houses and structures housing operational machinery.

The court interpreted the statutory exemption for “mechanical amusement devices on which a person rides,” considering the purpose of the exemption and principles of tax statute interpretation.

It held that a mechanically generated lazy river ride and wave pool qualified as mechanical amusement devices because patrons experience mechanically produced movement on the water.

However, buildings housing the pumps and equipment were not exempt, as they constituted buildings rather than machinery or equipment, though specific concrete foundations supporting machinery were exempt.

The court ordered amendments to the assessment roll and refunds of any taxes improperly levied.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to reopen the defence case to permit testimony from the complainant’s daughter.

The proposed witness lived with the complainant and the accused during the relevant period and was said to possess relevant evidence regarding whether the complainant actually feared the accused.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapprehended the relevance of the proposed evidence and improperly imposed a due diligence requirement when applying the test for reopening evidence established in R. v. Hayward.

The daughter’s evidence was potentially significant to the key element of whether the accused’s conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety.

The refusal to reopen the evidence created the potential for a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant father brought an emergency motion seeking custody and primary residence of the child after alleging that the respondent mother repeatedly violated prior court orders and deliberately frustrated his access.

The court found the mother had repeatedly made unsubstantiated allegations of abuse against the father, withheld information necessary for the child’s care, and interfered with court‑ordered access.

The judge determined that the father had demonstrated consistent and cooperative parenting while the mother’s conduct undermined the child’s relationship with him.

Concluding that the mother was presently unable to facilitate the father’s role in the child’s life, the court found that the child’s best interests required an interim transfer of custody and primary residence to the father, with liberal access to the mother and a view toward future shared parenting.

During a lengthy civil trial concerning federal relocation service contracts, the plaintiffs brought a motion to vary an earlier production order that had refused disclosure of a competitor’s administration fees.

After hearing extensive trial evidence, the court concluded that the administration fees were relevant to both liability and damages, particularly in understanding the effect of a zero‑percent bid for property management services.

Newly discovered facts showed that the defendant’s expert had requested and used the fees in internal analyses despite earlier representations suggesting otherwise.

Applying Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that orders may be varied where new facts arise or are discovered that would have materially affected the earlier decision.

The court therefore ordered limited disclosure of the administration fees and related reconciliation documents.

The applicant sought a declaration that her homeowner’s insurer owed a duty to defend counterclaims alleging negligent supervision of a child that resulted in injury to her son.

The counterclaims arose after the family sued third parties for injuries sustained by the child, and those defendants sought contribution and indemnity against the applicant.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exclusion for bodily injury to the insured or any person residing in the insured’s household.

The court held that the exclusion, read together with the policy’s liability coverage provisions, clearly removed coverage for claims relating to bodily injury suffered by a household member.

Because the injured child fell within the policy definition of “you”, the insurer had no duty to defend the counterclaims.

The applicant sought orders under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 appointing it as guardian of the respondent’s property following a capacity assessment concluding the respondent was incapable of managing property due to mental illness and delusional beliefs.

The applicant also requested an order compelling the respondent to undergo an Occupational Health Assessment to enable access to employment disability benefits, along with enforcement provisions including possible police assistance.

The court accepted the capacity assessment and appointed the applicant as guardian of property.

The court further ordered the respondent to attend an Occupational Health Assessment and directed disclosure of health and financial records necessary for the guardianship.

However, the court declined to authorize police apprehension or hospital examination at this stage, finding that the assessment should occur at the respondent’s residence and that enforcement measures could be sought later if necessary.

Supplementary reasons in a family law matter addressing transportation obligations for access exchanges and clarification of an interim access schedule pending the potential implementation of a shared parenting regime.

The court agreed with the respondent’s interpretation of the earlier reasons and declined to convert the respondent’s willingness to assist with transportation into a binding obligation.

The court confirmed the interim access arrangements and encouraged the parties to develop a shared parenting schedule during the final month of the six‑month interim period.

If the parties are unable to reach agreement, the court indicated that a case conference could be scheduled.

The parties brought opposing motions regarding the mother's unilateral relocation to Toronto with their infant child.

The mother alleged she moved due to fears for her safety based on the father's abusive behaviour.

The father sought the child's return to Ottawa and orders for custody and contempt, arguing the mother was frustrating his access.

The court found the mother's allegations lacked credibility and that she relocated to frustrate the father's access rights.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the court ordered the mother to return the child to Ottawa within 21 days, maintained the father's unsupervised access, ordered a parenting capacity assessment, and ordered the father to pay interim child support.

The plaintiffs sought a ruling confirming the admissibility of documents produced pursuant to a prior court order in litigation concerning federal relocation services procurement processes.

The defendant argued that the documents constituted hearsay, lacked authenticity, and were irrelevant to the fairness of the procurement process.

The court rejected these objections, finding the documents relevant to issues including alleged bias or preferential treatment in favour of another service provider and the conduct of government officials during the procurement processes.

The court held that the documents formed part of contractual documentation required under the relevant requests for proposal and were admissible for evidentiary purposes, including cross‑examination and proof of their contents.

Costs of the ruling were awarded to the plaintiffs on a partial indemnity basis.