Sarah L. Coristine

The Applicant father sought interim child and spousal support, imputation of income to the Respondent mother, and an order severing the divorce.

The Respondent mother cross-moved for interim child and spousal support, imputation of income to the father, and professional valuations of the father's assets and income.

The court imputed an income of $10,000 to the mother, declined to impute additional income to the father from gifts, ordered child support for one child (D.) and a s. 7 approach for another (Q.), and found the third child (A.) was not a child of the marriage for support purposes.

Interim spousal support was ordered at the high end of the SSAG.

The divorce was severed, and the mother's requests for professional appraisals were denied.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary child support under a separation agreement after discovering the respondent mother’s income had been significantly understated when the agreement was executed.

The court addressed income determination under ss. 16 and 17 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, including the appropriateness of three‑year income averaging where income fluctuates.

The court also considered imputing income under s. 19, finding the father intentionally under‑employed and imputing income of $50,000 to him.

Applying the shared parenting analysis under s. 9 of the Guidelines and the framework from Contino v. Leonelli‑Contino, the court assessed budgets, income disparity, and standards of living between households.

The respondent’s income for 2010–2011 was calculated using three‑year averaging and her 2012 income was based on actual income, with adjustments for non‑deductible legal expenses.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $4,000 monthly child support retroactive to 2010 and proportionate s. 7 expenses.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside an administrative order dismissing the action as abandoned pursuant to Rule 48.15(1).

The court applied the four‑factor test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., considering explanation for delay, intention to proceed, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was largely attributable to procedural missteps and indulgences between counsel, and that the plaintiff had always intended to proceed with the action.

The defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice arising from the delay.

The administrative dismissal order was therefore set aside and no costs were awarded.