Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-07-16
Docket: COA-24-CR-0285
Coram: Trotter, Thorburn and Sossin JJ.A.

Between:
His Majesty the King, Appellant
and
Ashley Gilmore, Respondent

Appearances:
Baaba Forson, for the appellant
Christopher O’Connor, for the respondent

Heard: 2025-06-19

On appeal from the sentence imposed on February 7, 2024 by Justice Daniel F. Moore of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Trotter J.A.:

A. Introduction

[1] This Crown appeal illustrates the tension between the principle of proportionality and the objective of public protection in sentencing.

[2] The respondent, Ms. Gilmore, entered pleas of guilty to two counts of assault, one count of robbery, and one count of breach of probation. The offences occurred within a very short time period. The attacks were random, the victims strangers. She was subject to three probation orders. She has over 120 previous convictions for various offences, many of them violent.

[3] The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence and a Long-Term Supervision Order (“LTSO”) under s. 753.1 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Defence counsel sought a reformatory term of imprisonment.

[4] Even though the sentencing judge found that there is a “substantial risk” that Ms. Gilmore will “violently reoffend” and that individuals will be “seriously harmed when that occurs”, he imposed a 14-month reformatory sentence, less pre-sentence custody (“PSC”). He dismissed the Crown’s LTSO application.

[5] These reasons explain why I would allow the appeal, impose a penitentiary sentence (less PSC), and make a 10-year LTSO.

B. The Offences

[6] The offences were committed on March 1, 2022. Ms. Gilmore had been released from custody just two weeks earlier.

[7] The first assault occurred when Ms. Gilmore sucker-punched a 32-year-old woman in the eye as she left a Starbucks store in downtown Toronto. The woman was hit with such force that she fell to the ground. When she screamed for help, bystanders came to her assistance. The victim was rattled and cried immediately after the attack. Emergency services were called. In the meantime, Ms. Gilmore left, yelling obscenities as she walked towards the Dundas TTC station.

[8] When Ms. Gilmore arrived at the station, she got on an escalator. Without warning, she turned around, yelled “Hey bitch” and kicked a 47-year-old woman who was on her way to work. The woman dropped the coffee she had been carrying and called Ms. Gilmore a “fucking bitch”. Ms. Gilmore said, “try me” and spat on the victim. She proceeded down the escalator and shouted allegations that the victim was stalking her. The victim was crying and clearly shaken by this ordeal. In her Victim Impact Statement, she described how the incident has affected her sense of security when traveling in the city, especially on the subway.

[9] After assaulting the second victim, Ms. Gilmore boarded a subway. As the subway left the station, she stared at a 23-year-old woman who was seated in the same subway car. When the train reached the Bloor Street station, Ms. Gilmore got off the train, but then quickly returned, lunged at the woman and attempted to pry an iPhone from her hand while pushing her with the other. She yelled “give me your phone”. Four or five male passengers came to the victim’s assistance and pulled Ms. Gilmore off her. Ms. Gilmore tried to spit on them. The victim sustained a cut to her hand, but needed no medical attention.

[10] After this third offence, Ms. Gilmore was arrested by TTC Constables. She struggled to prevent her arrest, and she initially mis-identified herself.

[11] Ms. Gilmore was bound by three probation orders, imposed on March 28, 2019, January 27, 2020, and October 13, 2021. Two of them were imposed by the sentencing judge in this case. The probation orders related to convictions for an array of offences: assault; assault with a weapon (x2); uttering threats (x2); assault police officer (x3); assault with intent to resist arrest (x2); fail to comply with a probation order (x8); theft (x2); and robbery (x4).

C. Ms. Gilmore’s Background and Circumstances

[12] Ms. Gilmore was 29 years old when she was sentenced. She has endured a very hard life. Her mother was a drug user, her father a drug dealer. She was raised primarily by her grandparents. At the age of 4 or 5, she was sexually assaulted by her mother’s boyfriend’s son. Ms. Gilmore suffered further physical and sexual abuse when she worked in the sex trade.

[13] Ms. Gilmore’s criminal offending started when she was 20 years old. Her victims are mainly strangers and include pedestrians, TTC patrons, a taxi driver, security guards and police officers. She tends to kick, punch, scratch, bite, and spit upon her victims. She has many convictions for breaching court orders.

[14] Dr. Mark Pearce, a forensic psychiatrist, prepared a report in support of the Crown’s LTSO application and testified at the sentencing hearing. Ms. Gilmore suffers from a “treatment resistant” form of schizophrenia, dating back to when she was 20, coinciding with the inception of her offending. This disease contributes to her offending and her risk of future violence. She has also been diagnosed with a severe polysubstance abuse disorder and a personality disorder with antisocial and borderline traits. Ms. Gilmore also has Tourette’s syndrome that may also play a role in her offending conduct and her outbursts.

[15] In terms of reoffending, Dr. Pearce observed a “slow uptick” in the severity of her offending. Although she may commit a severe offence, she is more likely to commit low to moderately severe offences. As he wrote in his report: “Overall, in considering the aforenoted risk assessment, Ms. Gilmore is at high risk of violent re-offence. She may re-offend imminently, frequently and severely, given her history.” In his testimony, Dr. Pearce acknowledged that Ms. Gilmore has not yet committed “a severe offence thus far, although some have been close”.

[16] In terms of managing Ms. Gilmore’s risk, Dr. Pearce wrote that, “with respect to her major mental illness, her prognosis is fair with perhaps some reason for optimism.” There are anti-psychotic medications, such as Clozapine, which have not yet been tried and which may produce results. As for her polysubstance abuse disorder, she has a “very guarded” prognosis. He held the same view about her antisocial personality disorder. He noted that targeted treatments for her multiple challenges are available through Correctional Services Canada. Dr. Pearce gave the following overall opinion:

In summary and considering the aforenoted factors, there may be reasons for optimism that this lady will be manageable in the community while subject to a LTSO and after the expiry of such an Order. It is a very difficult determination, in my opinion and from a purely psychiatric perspective, as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of eventual control of Ms. Gilmore’s risk in the community. However, given that many treatment and risk management opportunities remain unexplored, and should assertive and prolonged options in these domains be pursued, in my opinion one could conclude there is a reasonable expectation of eventual control of the risk. [Emphasis added.]

[17] Dr. Pearce supported a 10-year LTSO because “the longer the long-term supervision order, the better chance of the smallest risk at the end of it to the public.”

D. The Sentencing Judge’s Decision

[18] The sentencing judge provided detailed reasons for his decision to impose a total sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment. Ms. Gilmore had spent approximately 23 months in PSC, some of it in solitary confinement, which was very difficult given her mental health challenges.

[19] In considering the sentencing judge’s reasons for not making a LTSO, I set out the criteria for such a determination in s. 753.1 of the Criminal Code:

753.1(1) The court may, on application made under this Part following the filing of an assessment report under subsection 752.1(2), find an offender to be a long-term offender if it is satisfied that
(a) it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more for the offence for which the offender has been convicted;
(b) there is a substantial risk that the offender will reoffend; and
(c) there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community. [Emphasis added.]

[20] The sentencing judge was satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of Ms. Gilmore’s risk in the community ((1)(c)). He also found that she was a substantial risk to reoffend ((1)(b)). As he said in his reasons:

…I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a substantial risk that Ms. Gilmore will violently reoffend and that individuals will be seriously harmed when that occurs. Simply looking at Ms. Gilmore’s past record satisfies me that there is a near absolute certainty that she will violently reoffend in the future, most likely at a level equivalent to her past offending. [Emphasis added.]

[21] These findings are not challenged by Ms. Gilmore on appeal. However, the sticking point for the sentencing judge was whether it was “appropriate” to impose a custodial sentence of two years or more ((1)(a)). This determination is at the heart of this appeal.

[22] The sentencing judge set out the fundamental principle of sentencing in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” Apart from a passing reference to rehabilitation, no other statutory sentencing objectives are mentioned.

[23] The focal point of his analysis was on the 26-month jail sentence (less PSC) he imposed on Ms. Gilmore in 2021 for four robberies. He noted that the current offences were “extremely similar” to the earlier offences, but “significantly less serious.” He said in his reasons:

Finally, it is important to note that I am sentencing Ms. Gilmore today for two assaults, one robbery, and one failed to comply, all committed within a short period of time. In 2021, I sentenced Ms. Gilmore for four robberies of three different victims, one count of assault and one count of threatening, for a total of 5 victims committed over the course of a week.

[24] The sentencing judge noted that, in 2021, the Crown sought a sentence of six years’ imprisonment, whereas in the present case, it only sought a sentence of four years. He also noted that the injuries suffered by the victims in this case were minimal. However, he said: “Clearly though, all three victims suffered the trauma of random violence, of losing their sense of trust and safety in the community, and particular while travelling on the TTC, which is an essential service.”

[25] The sentencing judge reviewed Dr. Pearce’s report and his testimony, which “provided much more solid support for the role that Ms. Gilmore’s mental illness played in the commission of the index offences and her diminished degree of responsibility as a result.” However, it did not lessen her degree of responsibility beyond what he considered at the previous sentencing.

[26] As for probation compliance, the sentencing judge predicted that Ms. Gilmore will likely fail to report, and a warrant will be taken out for her arrest. He said: “All we can really hope for is that it gets executed before she has a chance to reoffend violently, and not after. I certainly encourage probation and the police to take whatever steps they can to arrest her at the earliest opportunity if she breaches to protect the community” (emphasis added).

[27] After listing some aggravating factors, the sentencing judge returned to the comparison with his previous sentence. He concluded: “For the 2020 offences I sentenced Ms. Gilmore to the equivalent of 26 months’ custody. Given the much greater gravity of those offences and their greater number and all the other aggravating and mitigating circumstances being essentially the same, a sentence of two years or more cannot be justified for these offences.”

[28] The 14-month jail sentence was broken down as follows: seven months for the robbery; four months consecutive for the first assault; 90 days consecutive for the second assault; and 30 days’ concurrent for failing to comply with a probation order. Ms. Gilmore was credited with about 23 months of PSC, nine months more than the sentence he determined was fit. She was entitled to immediate release. However, to allow her to collect her belongings from jail, the sentencing judge imposed one day of imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

E. Analysis

(1) Introduction

[29] The appellant submits that the sentencing judge imposed a sentence that is demonstrably unfit and that his reasons reveal errors in principle. Counsel for Ms. Gilmore submits that the sentencing judge made no errors and that the sentence imposed was fit in all of the circumstances.

[30] Since R. v. Shropshire, the Supreme Court of Canada has mandated a limited scope of appellate review for sentencing decisions, an approach rooted in deference to sentencing judges: see e.g. R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, para 14; R. v. L.F.W., 2000 SCC 6, para 25; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, paras 43-46. An appellate court may only intervene to vary a sentence if: (1) the sentence is demonstrably unfit; or (2) the sentencing judge made an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para 11; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, para 26; and R. v. J.W., 2025 SCC 16, paras 51-52.

[31] In this case, the sentencing judge made errors in principle that impacted on his determination of a fit sentence, which in turn led to his decision not to impose a LTSO. In particular, he misapplied the fundamental principle of proportionality. He did so by anchoring his proportionality analysis exclusively in a comparison between the offences in this case and those for which he previously sentenced Ms. Gilmore. This approach caused him to minimize Ms. Gilmore’s extensive criminal record and to downplay the seriousness of her current offences.

(2) The Purpose, Objectives and Principles of Sentencing

[32] Part XXIII – Sentencing of the Criminal Code addresses both substantive and procedural aspects of sentencing. The purpose and objectives of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code:

Purpose
718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [Emphasis added.]

[33] These objectives are largely utilitarian in nature, and in service of the stated fundamental purpose of sentencing: Julian V. Roberts and Andrew Von Hirsch, “Legislation the Purpose and Principles of Sentencing”, in Julian Roberts and David P. Cole, Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), at pp. 52-53. A number of these objectives were in play in this case, particularly denunciation (s. 718(a)), deterrence (s. 718(b)), separating offenders from society, where necessary (s. 718(c)), and rehabilitation (s. 718(1)(d)).

[34] Parliament has identified the “fundamental principle” of sentencing in s. 718.1: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” The proportionality principle is rooted in retributive or desert-based theories of punishment that define a just sanction as one that is deserved by an offender, based solely on the seriousness of the offence and an offender’s moral blameworthiness: see Benjamin L. Berger, “Proportionality and the Experience of Punishment”, in David Cole & Julian Roberts, eds., Sentencing in Canada: Essays in Law, Policy, and Practice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020), at p. 369. In Canada, proportionality operates as a restraint or limitation on punishment: see R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, para 37.

[35] Proportionality is not a self-applying concept; nor does it operate in a vacuum: Friesen, at paras. 33, 39; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, para 11; and J.W., at para. 46. Rather, section 718.2 identifies “other sentencing principles” or “secondary principles” (Parranto, at para. 10) that sentencing judges “shall” consider “in giving effect to proportionality”: J.W., at para. 44. The section provides for the principle of individualization, that a sentence “should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender.” Moreover, s. 718.2(b) identifies the parity principle, which explains that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.”

[36] The fundamental principle of proportionality in s. 718.1, and the secondary principles of sentencing in s. 718.2, operate within the broader framework of sentencing in Part XXIII. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada has highlighted the opening words of s. 718: “The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions…” (emphasis added): see, e.g., Friesen, at para. 122; J.W., at paras. 39-40. In R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, para 33, Karakatsanis J. wrote: “It is clear from the plain language of s. 718 that public protection is part of the very essence of the purpose and principles governing the sentencing process” (emphasis added). Proportionality acts as a brake to ensure that, in the pursuit of public protection measures, including deterrence and denunciation, sentences are not unduly excessive; but it does not remove public protection from the equation, nor does it nullify the objectives of sentencing in s. 718.

[37] The public protection purpose of sentencing is most clearly evident in Part XXIV – Dangerous and Long-Term Offenders of the Criminal Code: L.M., at para. 42. As LeBel J. explained in Ipeelee, at para. 48:

Reading the Criminal Code and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 (“CCRA”) and the applicable jurisprudence together, we can therefore identify two specific objectives of long-term supervision as a form of conditional release: (1) protecting the public from the risk of reoffence, and (2) rehabilitating the offender and reintegrating him or her into the community. The latter objective may properly be described as the ultimate purpose of an LTSO, as indicated by s. 100 of the CCRA, though it is inextricably entwined with the former.

(3) The Sentencing Judge’s Approach

[38] I return to the sentencing judge’s reasons. The sentencing judge was satisfied that there was a substantial likelihood that Ms. Gilmore will re-offend and that other unsuspecting people will be harmed. He was also satisfied that there was a reasonable possibility that her risk could be eventually controlled in the community. All that stood in the way of imposing a LTSO was his decision to impose a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment.

[39] The sentencing judge’s analysis was dominated by a comparative assessment of the seriousness of the offences from his last sentencing decision. Absent from his analysis was a consideration of other important factors that led him to impose a penitentiary sentence the last time around, factors that remained important to sentencing for the current offences. As he said in his previous decision:

In addition to some of the offence-specific aggravating factors above, I consider Ms. Gilmore's record and continuous history of offending undeterred by probation or other sentences to be aggravating. I consider her poor prospects for rehabilitation to be the absence of a mitigating factor such that rehabilitation can be given almost no weight in the sentence.

The only real mitigating factors are her guilty pleas and her somewhat diminished moral responsibility as a result of her mental illness. But while her guilty pleas certainly resulted in saved court time, she is not truly remorseful as she really has little or no insight into how profoundly her actions impacted the victims in this case.

I have great deal of sympathy for Ms. Gilmore. I have no doubt that she finds herself where she is today as a result of childhood trauma, mental illness, homelessness, abuse by intimate partners and drug addiction. But in the absence of any real attempts at rehabilitation on her part, the sentence I impose today is primarily guided by proportionality and deterrence. [Emphasis added.]

[40] In sentencing Ms. Gilmore for her more recent offences, the sentencing judge appears to have removed relevant aggravating factors from the equation, preferring instead to rely solely on a consideration of the sentence he previously imposed. This caused him to downplay her lengthy criminal record. In fact, her continued offending increased her moral blameworthiness. Her record was also relevant to deterrence and denunciation, but the sentencing judge’s reasons were silent on these important objectives in s. 718 of the Criminal Code.

[41] The sentencing judge’s approach also prevented him from giving effect to the serious nature and circumstances underlying the new offences. He did not assign sufficient weight to the random nature of the offences, and her offending while on public transit.

(a) The Importance of Ms. Gilmore’s Criminal Record

[42] Ms. Gilmore’s growing criminal record and the often violent nature of her offences was a critical factor in sentencing. It informed Dr. Pearce’s opinion about the suitability of a LTSO. And even though the sentencing judge did not make a LTSO, the opinion was relevant to determining the length of the custodial sentence. The fact that an offender is likely to re-offend, and in short order, is an aggravating factor on sentencing. It engages almost all of the objectives set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code.

[43] In his detailed comparison between Ms. Gilmore’s most recent offences and the previous set of offences, the trial judge did not consider this broader picture. He assumed that his previous sentence should anchor his analysis. This was not the correct approach. As the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held, “[i]t is an error in principle to determine a fit sentence for an offence based simply on the sentence for a previous conviction”: R. v. Squires, 2012 NLCA 20, para 55. At some level, Ms. Gilmore’s more recent offences were less serious than her earlier offending. However, this comparison downplayed the importance of her criminal record, which had worsened in the meantime.

[44] An extensive criminal record suggests that an individual is more morally blameworthy because they have previously been sanctioned yet remain undeterred and unwilling or unable to rehabilitate: R. v. Taylor, para 39. As explained by Fish J. for the Supreme Court in R. v. Larche, 2006 SCC 56, para 28: “The offender’s previous convictions … are aggravating as opposed to mitigating circumstances because they warrant more severe – not more lenient – sentences” (emphasis in original).

[45] This is particularly true in this case given the timing of these offences. Ms. Gilmore committed these offences just two weeks after being released from custody on the previous set of offences. Any apparent diminution in offence seriousness was overshadowed by this timing. The situation merited a global sentence at least equal to the previous sentence, not one that was more lenient.

(b) The Serious Nature and Circumstances of the Offences

[46] In keeping with her past offending, Ms. Gilmore randomly attacked three unsuspecting women who were going about their business in downtown Toronto. These types of attacks, which seem all too common, undermine the sense of peace and security to which all people are entitled as they come and go in this city.

[47] There was an added dimension of seriousness in her most recent offences – two of the offences occurred on the TTC. This was an important aggravating factor: see e.g. R. v. Brown, paras 46-47; R. v. Reszetnik, [2021] O.J. No. 1988 (S.C.), at para. 67; R. v. O’Brien-Tobin, 2025 ONSC 1291, para 51; and R. v. Easterbrook, 2022 ONCJ 647, paras 43-44.

[48] The TTC is used by thousands of people every day as they move around the city, whether for work, recreation, shopping for groceries, or visiting friends. Those who have no alternative means of getting around must rely on public transit. Everyone should be able to use the TTC with a sense of security, confident that they will not be abused by others.

[49] Assaultive and abusive behaviour on public transit, especially in a subway station or on a train, may impact on more people than an offender’s immediate target. Subway platforms are locations where caution must always be exercised. Subway cars are confined spaces from which passengers are unable to extricate themselves between stations. Aggressive behaviour can quickly create volatile situations, putting others at risk of injury, whether intentional or otherwise.

[50] In this case, Ms. Gilmore’s behaviour caused 4 to 5 men to enter the fray to protect the robbery victim. She resisted arrest when apprehended by TTC employees. It was only because of their intervention that this brief, but violent, crime spree ended. This, too, was an important factor in gauging the seriousness of the offences.

(c) The Impact on the Sentence

[51] The sentencing judge’s failure to consider these aggravating factors impacted on the sentence he imposed. These factors amplified the gravity of the offence and Ms. Gilmore’s blameworthiness. Relatedly, they ought to have led to the application of the objectives of deterrence and denunciation, tempered, but not eliminated, by the fundamental principle of proportionality.

[52] I accept that there were mitigating factors that deserved consideration. Ms. Gilmore’s mental health challenges are very much a factor in her offending. The mental health challenges of an offender may serve to mitigate a sentence, especially where there is a direct causal connection between the offender’s mental illness and their offending: see, e.g., R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, para 38; R. v. Fabbro, 2021 ONCA 494, para 25; R. v. Husbands, 2024 ONCA 155, para 88, leave to appeal requested, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 268; R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, paras 161-166; and R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, paras 46-50.

[53] The sentencing judge took this into account, as he did when he previously sentenced Ms. Gilmore. Although the evidence on the most recent sentencing hearing provided more insight into her challenges, it did not alter his assessment of her moral blameworthiness or responsibility. I agree with this conclusion. Ms. Gilmore’s mental health challenges were mitigating, not exonerating.

[54] Ms. Gilmore relies heavily on her guilty plea to these offences. She has never gone to trial; she always pleads guilty. This is generally considered to be a mitigating factor. But when he previously sentenced Ms. Gilmore, the sentencing judge said: “But while her guilty pleas certainly resulted in saved court time, she is not truly remorseful as she really has little or no insight into how profoundly her actions impacted the victims in this case.” A guilty plea loses its lustre when someone re-offends as frequently as Ms. Gilmore.

[55] The trial judge failed to impose a sentence that matched the gravity of Ms. Gilmore’s offending, especially in light of her serious criminal history and the risk she poses to almost anyone she might encounter.

(4) The Appropriate Sentence

[56] As noted at the beginning of these reasons, the Crown sought a global sentence of four years’ imprisonment, a position that is maintained on appeal. In my view, a sentence of this length would be too harsh; it would be disproportionate to the gravity of Ms. Gilmore’s offences and her degree of responsibility. The sentence should have been at least as long as the 26-month sentence previously imposed on Ms. Gilmore, not shorter. Given her circumstances, discussed throughout these reasons, there is no need to impose a longer sentence.

[57] I acknowledge that, on one level, there is a certain artificiality to this exercise. The sentencing judge recognized that, when determining the length of sentence for the purposes of s. 753.1(a) of the Criminal Code, it is the sentence that a judge determines to be “appropriate”, not the net sentence after granting credit for PSC: R. v. Hall, para 62. When Ms. Gilmore was sentenced, she was sitting on 23 months of PSC. Credited on a 1.5:1 basis, it could have functionally satisfied the requirements of a 34.5-month sentence. Thus, the sentencing judge could have imposed a penitentiary sentence, one that was fit, spared Ms. Gilmore any further jail time, and allowed the Crown’s compelling LTSO application: Hall, at para. 62. I would impose a global sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment, less PSC.

F. Conclusion and Disposition

[58] I would allow the appeal and impose the following sentences: 12 months on the robbery charge; 10 months consecutive on the first assault; four months consecutive on the second assault; and 90 days concurrent on the breach of probation charge. This amounts to a total sentence of 26 months imprisonment. I would apply credit for her roughly 23 months of PSC, reducing the custodial portion of the sentence to time-served. I would set aside the probation order.

[59] I would impose a LTSO that will last for 10 years. The conditions of this order will be determined by the Parole Board of Canada. In this regard, I would make an order under s. 760 of the Criminal Code, sending the materials specified in that section to the Correctional Service of Canada.

[60] So far, Ms. Gilmore has been either unwilling or unable to benefit from what probation has had to offer. It is hoped that she will take advantage of the more intensive supervision programming facilitated by a LTSO to break her seemingly endless cycle of reoffending and reincarceration. Only then will the public be protected.

[61] Finally, I wish to commend Mr. O’Connor for the interest he has taken in Ms. Gilmore’s situation over the years, and his willingness to represent her again on this appeal.

Released: July 16, 2025

“G.T.T.”
“Gary Trotter J.A.”
“I agree. Thorburn J.A.”
“I agree. Sossin J.A.”