ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
BRIAN COBEL
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Findings of Guilt on October 24, 2025; Submissions on May 8, 2026
Before Justice C.A. Brannagan
Mr. J. Park counsel for the Crown
Mr. E. Willschick counsel for the Defendant
OVERVIEW
Brian Cobel appeared before me on October 24, 2025, charged with arson causing damage to property (s. 434), assault with a weapon (s. 267(a)), and making an explosive device (s. 81(1)(d)(i)). These offences arise from events on April 4, 2025, when he deliberately burned down his landlord’s home.
Counsel advised at the outset that the matter would proceed by way of an agreed statement of facts pursuant to s. 655 of the Criminal Code, rather than by guilty plea. Following a modified plea inquiry, Mr. Cobel confirmed his agreement to this procedure: R. v. D.M.G., 2011 ONCA 343, at paras. 52-60.
The Crown proceeded by indictment. Mr. Cobel elected to be tried before me. He pleaded not guilty. The Crown read-in the agreed statement of facts and Mr. Cobel admitted them, electing not to call any evidence. I found Mr. Cobel guilty on all counts: D.M.G., at para. 57.
These are my reasons for sentence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE OFFENCES
Two agreed statements of facts were entered as Exhibits #1-A and #1-B. The essential facts follow.
David Dunn resided at 1705 Peninsula Road in Severn Township. He invited Mr. Cobel to live in a detached garage apartment on the property in exchange for maintenance work. Mr. Cobel was not permitted to enter the main residence where Mr. Dunn resided, but he repeatedly did so.
On April 4, 2025, Mr. Dunn directed Mr. Cobel to vacate the property. That evening, Mr. Dunn returned to change the locks and again found him inside the main residence. He was told to leave; Mr. Cobel said he needed time to gather his belongings.
Shortly after, Mr. Dunn heard shouting from the basement, followed by silence. He then observed Mr. Cobel outside, running between the house and garage, yelling and laughing. Flames quickly became visible near the front entrance and spread rapidly. Mr. Dunn was unable to control the fire and called 911.
At the same time, a separate fire was set at the neighbouring property of Scott Naylor at 1709 Peninsula Road. Mr. Cobel used gasoline as an accelerant, leaving a gas can on the burning deck. Mr. Naylor extinguished the fire and confronted him. Mr. Cobel punched Mr. Naylor, brandished a large fixed-blade knife (not recovered), threatening to kill him. Mr. Naylor and his wife fled the chaotic scene.
Police arrived and observed Mr. Cobel actively setting fires between the two properties. He resisted arrest and was subdued with a conducted energy weapon and an ARWEN. He was found in possession of two lighters, a folding knife, and a pill bottle containing Oxycocet medication, prescribed in his name.
The fire at Mr. Dunn’s residence fully engulfed the home, destroying it and all its contents. Fire investigators located multiple gasoline containers and an improvised incendiary device – a wine bottle containing gasoline with a wick (commonly known as a Molotov cocktail) – near the front entrance. The fire was deliberately set using gasoline, with ignition points at the front entrance and northwest wall.
Neighbouring homes sustained secondary damage, including significant damage caused to Mr. Naylor’s property exceeding $200,000.
VICTIM IMPACT
Section 722 of the Criminal Code requires the court to consider the harm suffered by victims of crime and the impact of the offence on victims through victim impact statements.
The Crown filed six such statements. Collectively, they describe devastating and far-reaching harm extending well beyond property loss, affecting multiple individuals, families, and the surrounding community.
David Dunn’s uninsured home at 1705 Peninsula Road was destroyed, resulting in the total loss of his residence and all personal belongings. He was left homeless and reports ongoing psychological trauma marked by depression, insomnia, nightmares, reliance on medication, and a persistent fear of the offender’s return. The emotional impact is compounded by a profound sense of betrayal, having attempted to assist the offender prior to the offence.
That impact has deepened over time. As described by his brother, Dean Dunn, David’s health deteriorated significantly following the fire, leading to addiction, hospitalization, and ultimately his placement in a retirement home at age 66. His life trajectory has been permanently altered. Irreplaceable family history was lost.
Neil Dunn, a co-owner of the property, describes both the exploitation that preceded the offence and the aftermath, including guilt, depression, and ongoing fear. The wider family has lost a central place of connection and continues to experience instability and anxiety. Lori Dunn similarly describes the loss of security and the continuing emotional toll on the family.
Scott and Karen Naylor describe parallel harm. Their home was also deliberately set on fire while they were inside. Mr. Naylor fled through flames, was assaulted, and threatened with a knife. He suffered physical injury, and both Naylors continue to experience post-traumatic stress, insomnia, and hypervigilance. Their sense of safety has been fundamentally undermined.
Robert Rennie describes the broader community impact, including property damage, heightened anxiety, changes to daily life, and the installation of security measures driven by fear of recurrence.
Collectively, the offender’s conduct destroyed homes and property, inflicted lasting psychological harm on multiple victims, and destabilized the surrounding community. The harm is severe, ongoing and, in many respects, permanent.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
A pre-sentence report was prepared and filed on consent. Its purpose it to aid the court in assessing the offender’s background, character and risk of recidivism to craft a fit sentence: s. 721; R. v. Di Paola, 2025 SCC 31, at para. 98.
Mr. Cobel is 62 years of age. He reports a difficult upbringing marked by instability and abuse. As an adult, he maintained long-term employment in roofing and renovation and has a demonstrated ability to secure work. He maintains positive relationships with his two adult children and benefits from ongoing family and community support.
His history is, however, marked by longstanding alcohol misuse and problematic use of prescription medication. These issues contributed to personal and professional instability.
At the time of the offence, Mr. Cobel was heavily intoxicated by alcohol and had consumed prescription medication. Substance use and untreated mental health issues significantly contributed to his behaviour.
While in custody, Mr. Cobel attempted suicide and sustained a serious neck injury, an event reflective of his grim mental‑health distress. He reports ongoing mental health symptoms.
Mr. Cobel has a limited and unrelated criminal record. He has previously complied with court-ordered supervision. He expressed remorse for his conduct.
The PSR identifies both mitigating and aggravating considerations. On the one hand, Mr. Cobel presents with prosocial supports, employment prospects, and rehabilitative potential. On the other, the offences represent a marked and serious escalation in behaviour, involving highly dangerous conduct with catastrophic consequences.
The report identifies substance abuse and untreated mental health issues as central risk factors and concludes that any community-based supervision would require strict conditions focused on treatment and monitoring.
THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Mr. Park for the Crown
The Crown emphasizes the extreme seriousness of the offences. It highlights the grave risk to human life, the complete destruction of property, and the profound and lasting impact on multiple victims. Denunciation and general deterrence are identified as the primary sentencing objectives.
Despite this, the Crown joins the defence in a joint submission of ‘time-served’, followed by three years’ probation, and restitution. It submits that the proposed sentence falls within an acceptable range when all relevant circumstances are considered. The Crown relies on the offender’s early resolution of the matter, which avoided a complex and lengthy trial.
The Crown notes that Mr. Cobel has accrued 400 days of actual pre-sentence custody,1 equivalent to 600 days’ credit under R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26. It accepts that the offender’s mental health and substance use issues, while not reducing the gravity of the offences, are relevant to his level of moral blameworthiness, rehabilitation and future risk management.
A central feature of the Crown’s position is the offender’s agreement to substantial restitution, exceeding $330,000. The Crown submits that this is a meaningful and significant component of the sentence, particularly in light of the devastating financial losses suffered by the victims, including one who was uninsured.
The Crown further submits that the offender has the capacity to make restitution through employment and access to family resources. Embedding restitution within probationary conditions promotes accountability and gives effect to the reparative objectives of sentencing.
The Crown submits that the joint position appropriately balances denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and reparation, and should be afforded deference.
Mr. Willschick for the Defence
The defence submits that the offender’s resolution of the charges is a significant mitigating factor. Although Mr. Cobel has no memory of the offences due to intoxication and a drug‑induced mental state, he accepted responsibility through a ‘no contest’ position2 and did not pursue a not-criminally-responsible defence, thereby avoiding a lengthy and resource-intensive proceeding.
The defence situates the offences within the context of significant and untreated mental‑health and substance‑use issues. While acknowledging the seriousness of the conduct, it submits that these factors reduce moral blameworthiness and render the behaviour highly uncharacteristic.
Counsel highlights the offender’s otherwise pro‑social history, including limited and dated criminal record, stable employment, business experience, and strong community and family support. Additional personal stressors, including family illness and loss, are said to have contributed to his destabilization.
The defence also submits that the offender’s pre‑sentence custody was particularly harsh, marked by prolonged lockdowns, overcrowding, serious medical concerns (including possible undiagnosed cancer), and a suicide attempt. These conditions, it is argued, materially increase the punitive impact of pre-trial incarceration.
The defence places significant weight on the offender’s agreement to substantial restitution, submitted as evidence of genuine accountability and a meaningful contribution to repairing the harm caused. It maintains that the joint submission is fit, proportionate, and within the acceptable range.
THE LAW
(A) The Offences before the Court
i. Arson, Damage to Property, s. 434
Arson causing damage to property is a serious indictable offence carrying a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. Sentencing in arson cases is driven primarily by denunciation and general deterrence, reflecting the inherent and often unpredictable danger posed by fire: R. v. Sousa, 2014 ONCA 550, at para. 18.
Sentences vary widely depending on the circumstances, but custodial terms are the norm in serious cases: six months’ imprisonment at the low end (Sousa, supra & R. v. Ismail, 2017 ONCA 597), to 14-24 months’ at the middle range (R. v. O’Hanley, 2020 ONSC 1310, R. v. Ravindharaj, 2012 ONSC 6260, R. v. Bos, 2016 ONCA 443, R. v. Van-Luyk, 2018 ONCJ 807, R. v. Wright, [2004] O.J. No. 3321 (S.C.J.)), to three years’ imprisonment (R. v. Fournel, 2014 ONCA 305).3
ii. Assault with a Weapon, s. 267(a)
Assault with a weapon carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. In this case, the offence arises from the use of a knife to threaten and intimidate during the course of ongoing dangerous conduct. While no physical injury was inflicted with the weapon, the surrounding circumstances elevate its seriousness.
Broadly similar sentencing considerations apply as between the offences of assault with a weapon and aggravated assault: R. v. Seerattan, 2019 ONSC 4340, at para. 35. The range for this offence includes non-custodial sentences in exceptional cases, intermittent sentences in the most mitigated cases, high reformatory sentences in the mid-range, and 4-8 years imprisonment in the most aggravated cases: Seerattan, at para. 36.
iii. Make or Possess Explosive Device, s. 81(1)(d)(i)
A person commits this offence where they make or have in their possession any explosive substance with intent to endanger life or to cause serious damage to property. It is a straight indictable offence with a maximum penalty of 14 years.
There is a dearth of case law involving this offence. Most cases where making, possessing or using explosive devices are discussed is in the context of terrorism offences. That does not strike me as surprising. Nor do those cases strike me as being particularly helpful to the case at-hand.
One case that I did find helpful was from my sister Justice McLeod, presiding in Barrie, in R. v. Gabourie, 2021 ONCJ 9. Her Honour sentenced the offender to 900 days for arson endangering life and 120 days consecutive for throwing an explosive substance (also a Molotov cocktail, as in this case).
(B) Relevant Sentencing Principles
i. The Fundamental Principle of Proportionality
- The fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: s .718.1. Sentences must also remain proportionate in their real-world effect: R. v. Oryia, 2026 ONCA 166, at para. 28.
ii. Other Sentencing Principles
Section 718.2 enumerates a list of additional principles that judges must consider in arriving at a just and appropriate sentence for a particular offender.
The mitigating and aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, s. 718.2(a), are always relevant.
For Mr. Cobel, I find the following factors to be mitigating:
i. Although he did not plead guilty to these offences, he effectively took a ‘no contest’ position in respect of them. Through facts admitted under s. 655, Mr. Cobel took responsibility for these offences. I accept that as a sign of his remorse and the consequent saving of court resources.
ii. Although Mr. Cobel does have a criminal record, he has only one unrelated entry on it. As his lawyer put it: “he’s not a first offender, but he’s not far off.”
iii. Mr. Cobel has significant support among friends and family, which speaks to his rehabilitative potential through reintegration into the community.
iv. He has a proven ability to work and become a pro-social contributor moving forward, which also speaks to his rehabilitative potential.
v. Counsel led evidence about potential undiagnosed cancer concerns, while the staff at the Central North Correctional Centre (CNCC) appear either unable or unwilling to medically investigate. Physical health conditions are relevant as mitigating factors “even if they did not contribute to the offending conduct or diminish moral blameworthiness”: R. v. Kulatheeswaran, 2026 ONCA 128, at paras. 22-25.
vi. Mr. Cobel’s substance use and mental health challenges were substantial factors in his offending, which mitigates his sentence here by reducing his moral fault: R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517, at para. 52; R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, at paras. 47-49; R. v. Wesley, 2025 ONCA 51, at para. 95.
vii. Relatedly, offenders suffering from significant mental health issues “may render imprisonment more severe and must be taken into account”: R. v. Purvis, 2026 ONCA 187, at para. 37. The video of Mr. Cobel’s suicide attempt, Exhibit #4, is the clearest example of this principle at play.
viii. The punitive conditions of Mr. Cobel’s pre-sentence custody at CNCC, including lengthy lockdowns and triple bunking, are additionally mitigating: R. v. Clarke, 2026 ONCA 152, at paras. 12-13.
I find as aggravating the following factors:
i. Mr. Cobel was in a relationship of trust with Mr. Dunn. Mr. Cobel used his continued access to Mr. Dunn’s property as the basis upon which he was able to commit the arson.
ii. The arson was planned. Evidence of that planning comes from the fact that Mr. Cobel had two lighters on his person upon his arrest. It also comes from the fact of the Molotov cocktail that was found within the home, alongside multiple canisters of gasoline.
iii. Mr. Cobel committed the arson knowing that other persons were nearby. He was aware of Mr. Dunn’s presence at the home. He was aware of Mr. Naylor’s presence when confronted by him.
iv. The extent of destruction caused by this arson is indescribable. Mr. Dunn’s entire home was razed to the ground. All his personal belongings were destroyed in the fire. The losses suffered by Mr. Dunn, which reverberated throughout his family, were profound and devastating.
v. The secondary fire damage to the Naylor and Rennie properties is additionally aggravating, particularly considering the magnitude of damage caused to the Naylor residence.
vi. Arson always jeopardizes the lives of fire fighters and other emergency personnel who respond to fires: Mirzakhalili, at para. 9.
The parity principle, s. 718.2(b), is also relevant in this case. While the above-described sentencing ranges are important considerations, “absolute parity is not required”: R. v. Pearce, 2021 ONCA 239, at para. 17.
Sentencing ranges are a form of guidance – one tool in the judge’s toolbox – that provide a place to begin the exercise of reaching a fit and proportionate sentence: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at para. 1; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, at para. 25.
As sentencing tools, ranges have been described as “navigational buoys” and “there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime”. Sentencing judges must conduct an individualized analysis of the case before them, taking into account all relevant factors and sentencing principles: Parranto, at para. 16.
Restitution is itself a form of punishment, which must be taken into account in conjunction with terms of imprisonment per the principle of totality: R. v. Jeannotte, 2026 ONCA 79, at para. 49.
iii. Joint Submissions in Sentencing
The proposed sentence is a true joint submission in law and attracts a high degree of deference. I may depart only where the result would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest: see R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, at paras. 1-2, 32-34; R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, at para. 1; Wesley, supra, at para. 68.
This is a high threshold. The question is not whether I would have imposed a different sentence, but whether the proposed disposition is so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that a reasonable and informed person would lose confidence in the justice system. I return to that issue below.
The gravity of these offences – taken alone – would ordinarily justify a significant custodial sentence measured in years, at the high-end of the identified range. The harm was catastrophic, and the degree of risk to human life was grave.
However, sentencing in this case is constrained by the joint submission and my role is limited to applying the test set out in Anthony-Cook.
While the proposed disposition is lenient relative to the seriousness of the conduct, I cannot find that it is so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender as to meet the threshold prescribed by the appellate courts.
In particular, the offender’s acceptance of responsibility, the mitigating impact of his mental health and custodial circumstances and, most notably, his agreement to substantial restitution exceeding $330,000 – a meaningful and enforceable attempt to repair profound financial harm – provide a rational basis for this resolution.
Considering the deference owed to joint submissions, I am satisfied that the proposed sentence, although at the low end of the available range, remains within the bounds of what a reasonable and informed person could consider just and is not contrary to the public interest.
SENTENCING DISPOSITION
Mr. Cobel has served 419 days of pre-sentence custody. Applying 1.5:1 credit, I attribute 629 days — approximately 21 months — to the arson count.
Twelve months’ pre-sentence custody will be noted on the assault with a weapon count, and nine months’ pre-sentence custody will be noted on the incendiary device count. Each of those sentences is concurrent to the arson sentence, and to each other.
The effective sentence is one further day in jail on the arson count, followed by probation for three years. The conditions are as follows:
i. Report to Probation within three business days of your release from custody, and thereafter as directed;
ii. Reside at an address approved of by Probation;
iii. Take all counselling as directed by Probation, including but not limited to addictions and mental health, and sign all releases;
iv. Do not have any contact or communication, directly or indirectly, through any physical, electronic or other means with David Dunn, Neil Dunn, Lori Dunn, Scott Naylor, Karen Naylor, or Robert Rennie (except through legal counsel or for required court purposes);
v. Do not attend within 500m of any place you know any of the above-named persons to live, work, study, worship, frequent, or otherwise know them to be (except through legal counsel or for required court appearances);
vi. Make a minimum monthly restitution payment of $300 to David Dunn, beginning on September 1, 2026, and each month thereafter, not later than the first of each month, for the full duration of your Probation Order;
vii. Make a minimum monthly restitution payment of $200 to Scott Naylor, beginning on September 1, 2026, and each month thereafter, not later than the first of each month, for the full duration of your Probation Order; and,
viii. Do not possess any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code, and do not possess any incendiary material, incendiary device or explosive substance.
Mr. Cobel will make restitution in the amount of $250,000.00 to David Dunn, and restitution in the amount of $82,176.00 to Scott Naylor, pursuant to s. 738(1)(a). Payments made during probation shall reduce these amounts dollar for dollar.
A weapons prohibition order is mandatory under s. 109. Although no physical injury resulted from the fire, the manner of its commission created a real risk of violence to others.4 A 10-year prohibition is therefore imposed on the arson count, as well as on the s. 267(a) count.
A DNA order is made on a primary basis for the s. 267(a) and s. 81(1)(d)(i)) offences, and on a secondary basis on the s. 434 offence: s. 487.04(a)(ix) & (a.1)(i.04), and s. 487.04(a).
The victim fine surcharge is waived in favour of restitution.
Released: 27 May 2026
Signed: Justice C.A. Brannagan
Footnotes
- As of the date of submissions.
- Canadian criminal law does not recognize a formal plea of “nolo contendere”: D.M.G., supra, at para. 43.
- Parenthetically, I note that the range of sentence for arson endangering life – an offence with which Mr. Cobel was not charged – is between three and five years: R. v. Bevacqua, 2014 ONSC 6279. Conditional sentence orders are generally inappropriate for serious arson offences, as they fail to reflect either the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender: R. v. Mirzakhalili, 2009 ONCA 905.
- The Court of Appeal in Sousa, supra, found that the arson offence is a “serious personal injury offence” as defined in s. 752 of the Code. Section 109 and s. 752(a)(i) each require the offence be an indictable offence in which violence against a person was used or attempted (or threatened, for s. 109), and for which the offender may be imprisoned for 10 years or more.