A. Nature of the Offence

On the afternoon of June 26^th 2010, an organized, peaceful political protest march on the occasion of the G20 Summit in Toronto took an ugly turn. Legitimate, peaceful protesters had been infiltrated by anarchists with an entirely different purpose, a purpose that was anything but peaceful. At the tail end of the march, part of the crowd turned and set upon two police cars that were bringing up the rear. The officers in those cars were rescued by other officers and were lucky to get out with relatively minor injuries. The mob then turned on the cars. Both police cars were completely trashed and then set on fire. The fires were massive and intense. This occurred right on Queen Street in downtown Toronto, adjacent to many business premises and apartments and in front of hundreds of onlookers. The cars were completely incinerated.

Many of the onlookers captured the events on their cameras and cell phones. In the aftermath of the riot, some of those individuals posted still photos and videos on Facebook and other social media sites and others turned over photos and videos directly to the police. The process of identifying the perpetrators began, and ultimately, multiple charges were laid.

One of those identified was Ashan Ravindhraraj. He was charged with two counts of mischief in respect of damage he caused to the police cars and one count of arson in respect of one of the police cars. He pleaded guilty to the two mischief charges but not guilty to arson. He testified at trial that he had absolutely nothing to do with setting fire to the police car. The jury clearly did not believe him. They convicted him of attempted arson, but not of arson itself.

I will not speculate on what caused the jury to reach that conclusion. It is possible that they believed Mr. Ravindhraraj’s attempts to set fire to the car were unsuccessful because other bystanders intervened to put out the fire. It is also possible that they believed that although Mr. Ravindhraraj tried to set fire to the car, the actual fire that resulted in incinerating the car was caused by somebody else. I really cannot tell. What is clear, however, is that the jury cannot have believed Mr. Ravindhraraj’s testimony about the matter.

For purposes of sentencing it is relevant to look at the particulars of Mr. Ravindhraraj’s conduct. He was not one of the political protesters, nor was he one of the group who infiltrated the legitimate protesters with the intention of causing violence and mayhem. He went to the area with two friends simply out of curiosity, like hundreds of other people in Toronto.

However, Mr. Ravindhraraj was not a passive onlooker. It would appear that he and his friends arrived at Queen Street after the initial assault on the police cars. The officers had retreated by then and various individuals were already in the process of vandalizing and ransacking the vehicles. Very shortly after his arrival, Mr. Ravindhraraj was right into the thick of things with those hooligans. He jumped up and down on the hood of one vehicle, rummaged through papers in the vehicles, and smeared paint on one of the cars. With a group of other individuals, he attempted to turn over one of the cars. He stopped that activity only when a conscientious member of the public waded into the group and pulled him and others off.

Incidentally, although his counsel submits that Mr. Ravindhraraj should get some credit for being the first one to desist in this attempt, I disagree. He was the one on the end, and therefore the first person the man who intervened was able to grab. Mr. Ravindhraraj did not then leave the scene; he just went looking for other trouble.

Mr. Ravindhraraj also smashed his foot into the windshield of one of the police cars. This is an aggravating factor and one I must be satisfied of beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Ravindhraraj testified that he was merely posing with his foot raised for the sake of his friend getting a more dramatic photograph. I do not believe that. It is not consistent with the photographic evidence. The photograph clearly captures Mr. Ravindhraraj in the process of kicking the window with one foot while balancing on the other. I have no doubt whatsoever that this was deliberate and part of his overall and varied attacks on the police cruisers.

I am also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ravindhraraj was acting in concert with others and in particular with one other individual who can be seen wearing a white tank top in many of the videos. He acted with those other individuals in attempting to set fire to the police cruiser.

This was not a pre-planned event. The individuals he was involved with were strangers to him before this incident. However, the fact that this was a coordinated effort is nevertheless an aggravating factor.

Likewise, I am satisfied that Mr. Ravindhraraj made repeated attempts to set the cruiser on fire. This is not a necessary implication of the jury verdict and is an aggravating factor. The Crown is therefore also required to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt in order to rely upon it. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ravindhraraj made multiple attempts to set fire to the cruiser.

Detective Constable Barry Thom was at the scene in an undercover capacity and was right beside the cruiser at the time of the initial attempt to set it on fire. DC Thom was looking directly at the individual we referred to at trial as the “white hoodie guy” who was in the driver’s seat at this point playing with the radio. He saw Mr. Ravindhraraj approach and toss an item into the passenger side of the vehicle. He testified that he could not see what had been thrown but that immediately afterwards smoke was billowing out of the car. Detective Constable Thom, who was deliberately watching the “white hoodie guy”, was very clear in his evidence that he was not the one who started the fire. Because DC Thom believed it must have been Mr. Ravindhraraj, he took a picture of Mr. Ravindhraraj to be used later in evidence. In addition to that photograph, there was a Youtube video of this incident, which was an exhibit at trial (Exhibits 4 and 9).

It is clear to me that Mr. Ravindhraraj was in a position to cause the fire, that his actions were consistent with having done so, and that nobody else was in the position to do so at that crucial point in time. I found DC Thom to be highly credible and very fair in his evidence. In my view, the only logical conclusion consistent with the evidence is that Mr. Ravindhraraj attempted to set the cruiser on fire while the “white hoodie guy” was in the passenger seat. That fire was extinguished due to the efforts of the “white hoodie guy” and another man we referred to at trial as the “red suit guy.”

Not long after this first attempt to set fire to the police cruiser, Mr. Ravindhraraj made further attempts. On this issue, the testimony of Matthew Castonguay is critical. Mr. Castonguay is a civilian witness who had merely come to the event to take pictures with his sophisticated new camera. I found Mr. Castonguay to be completely credible. He had no reason whatsoever to colour his evidence for either side, and he did not do so. I also found his evidence to be reliable, particularly with respect to his observations of Mr. Ravindhraraj attempting to set fire to the cruiser. Mr. Castonguay testified that his attention was drawn to Mr. Ravindhraraj and to another individual we referred to as “white tank top guy.” He saw what they were doing around the cruiser and described them as “being the main instigators.” Mr. Castonguay was about ten feet away from the cruiser at this point. He testified he saw Mr. Ravindhraraj and the “white tank top guy” going in and out of the cruiser about five times and saw two occasions where a fire was actually started.

On the first such occasion, he saw Mr. Ravindhraraj’s arm go into the car and then come out, and after he did so, there was fire where his hand had been. Mr. Castonguay took a number of photographs, one of which, Exhibit 7A, shows Mr. Ravindhraraj’s arm reaching into the window, a sheet of paper next to his hand, and flames coming from that area. A bystander threw water on the flame and the “red suit guy” also intervened again and pulled burning debris from the car in an attempt to put out the fire.

Mr. Castonguay’s evidence was that notwithstanding those efforts to stop him, Mr. Ravindhraraj and the “white tank top guy” persisted in their efforts to set a fire, going back repeatedly to the cruiser as part of that attempt. It is beyond doubt that the person involved was Mr. Ravindhraraj. I have no hesitation whatsoever in concluding that Mr. Ravindhraraj was repeatedly attempting to set the cruiser on fire; indeed, one rarely sees a case in which the evidence is as ironclad as it is here. There were two reliable and credible eye witnesses who were completely independent of each other each observing at essentially the same time the same behaviour minutes apart. Each took a picture or pictures of the perpetrator. Further, there is some corroboration of their evidence and photos from video footage of the incident obtained by the police from other sources.

I therefore find that Mr. Ravindhraraj made repeated and concerted attempts to set fire to the police car.

B) Position of the Parties

The Crown submits that general deterrence requires a jail term in this case and that the appropriate range of sentence is between 20 and 24 months, to be followed by two years’ probation, to include a requirement of 150 hours’ community service. The Crown further seeks a restitution order in the amount of $10,000.00.

The defence submits that the appropriate sentence is six to nine months, to be served conditionally in the community. Defence counsel also submits that a period of community service would be appropriate and suggests 175 hours of service at Habitat for Humanity in light of Mr. Ravindhraraj’s education and experience in the field of urban planning.

Two principal issues arise: (1) whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in this case; and (2) the length of the appropriate sentence.

C) Conditional versus Custodial Sentence

I agree with both counsel that the range of sentence in this case is less than two years. It is therefore necessary to consider whether a conditional sentence is appropriate, and in particular, if a conditional sentence is sufficient to satisfy all of the principles and goals of sentencing.

In my view, a conditional sentence is not appropriate in this case for three major reasons.

(i) Mr. Ravindhraraj’s attitude and lack of insight;

(ii) Mr. Ravindhraraj’s conduct while on bail in relation to these offences; and

(iii) the importance of denunciation and general deterrence in light of the nature of the offence.

I will deal with each of these factors in more detail.

(i) Mr. Ravindhraraj’s Attitude

There are many aspects of Mr. Ravindhraraj’s circumstances that support a conditional sentence. He is a young man, 25 years old at the time of the offence, and he has no criminal record. Indeed, he has no history of any conduct akin to what happened here, and it would appear to be completely out of character for him.

Mr. Ravindhraraj has a stable family background and his family members remain supportive of him. He graduated from Ryerson in 2009 with a degree in Urban Planning and had obtained a job in his field with the Toronto Transit Commission following graduation. He was employed there at the time of these offences. He was fired by his employer as a result of these offences, and it is reasonable to conclude that his career as an urban planner is in serious jeopardy as a result of this conduct, particularly in light of this being an attack on public property on a public street and in a highly public manner.

While the loss of his employment can be seen as a natural consequence of his conduct, it is nevertheless a form of punishment that is in addition to anything this Court might impose.

Mr. Ravindhraraj has reasonable prospects for rehabilitation. I do not see him as being at a risk to re-offend, and in that sense he does not represent a danger to society.

That said, I do not see any, or at least very little genuine remorse from Mr. Ravindhraraj. He did plead guilty to public mischief, but that was in the face of overwhelming photographic and video evidence, which made his conviction a certainty in any event. Even at that, he consistently tried to minimize his conduct. He describes his conduct as “stupid” and “goofy” and “senseless.” He is sorry he did it, not because of the appalling nature of the conduct itself, but because of the effect it has had on him and on his family. My impression of him from both the trial and sentencing hearings is that he continues to lack any real insight into the serious nature of his criminal conduct.

I share the concerns expressed by the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report, as follows at page five of Exhibit 1:

The subject presented as somewhat arrogant and undeserving of the consequences he has already received.

And further, at page seven:

The subject has expressed remorse for the situation, but it would appear that his remorse is directed more towards how this has impacted him as opposed to remorse for his actions. The subject feels sorry for himself and has displayed little regard for how his actions and what he contributed to affected society: the storeowners, police, and other victims. He justified his actions with an array of excuses, most often with ‘everyone was doing it.’ The consequences of his actions did not occur to him as a result of this. Of concern is that he admitted to being surprised that he was wanted by the police and subsequently arrested for doing something that so many others were participating in.

At trial, Mr. Ravindhraraj attributed his conduct, at least to some extent, to the fact that he was depressed about his girlfriend having broken up with him. For some reason, he thought she would be impressed to see photographs of him trashing a police car. The probation officer also said at page seven of the pre-sentence report: “Mr. Ravindhraraj blamed his actions on a recent break-up and his decision to quit smoking.” With respect to the latter reason, I note that on June 26^th, in many photographs and on video, Mr. Ravindhraraj can be seen on a number of occasions with a lit cigarette in his hand.

I do not accept “everyone was doing it” as an excuse for this conduct, nor do I believe that being upset about a relationship break-up is any kind of explanation for trashing and attempting to set fire to a police car as part of an out-of-control mob. What troubles me is Mr. Ravindhraraj’s lack of understanding as to the serious nature of the conduct and his personal responsibility and degree of culpability. These are not circumstances that, taken alone, would make him ineligible for a conditional sentence, but they are grounds for concern.

Mr. Ravindhraraj now says he is sorry and that he wants to make up for it by service to the community. However, he has done nothing whatsoever to further that objective over the past two years, for a significant portion of which he was unemployed. Although Habitat for Humanity was mentioned by his counsel in sentencing, submissions as an appropriate project for him, Mr. Ravindhraraj has not even made any inquiries about what he might do there and has never spoken to Habitat for Humanity, much less actually done something to make a positive contribution to his community in order to compensate for his conduct.

(ii) Mr. Ravindhraraj’s Conduct on Bail

Mr. Ravindhraraj was released on bail with a house arrest condition. That term was subject to an exception to allow him to work and to travel to and from work. In September of 2010, Mr. Ravindhraraj left his house to go get coffee, in breach of his bail condition. He admitted to the probation officer that he had done this on several occasions. While driving back from the coffee shop, Mr. Ravindhraraj was pulled over by the police. He compounded the trouble he was already in by lying to the police and saying he was on his way home from work, as permitted under his bail conditions. The police officer checked out that story and learned that Mr. Ravindhraraj had been dismissed from employment. He was charged with breaching his recognizance and obstructing police. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served of 25 days. He was then released on bail again.

It would not be appropriate to sentence Mr. Ravindhraraj again for those offences. They have been dealt with and he has served his time. However, what is relevant for present purposes is Mr. Ravindhraraj’s attitude to this further offence. His explanation to the probation officer was that the bail conditions were “excessive” and that he was only pulled over by the police because of “racial profiling.” Once again, this attitude of arrogance and blaming others for his own criminal conduct is troubling. Further, Mr. Ravindhraraj’s readiness to disregard court orders and blatantly lie to police are not characteristics of a good candidate for a conditional sentence. I have a serious concern that Mr. Ravindhraraj would ignore any restrictions imposed, which would cause the public who knew about it to have a poor opinion of the justice system.

iii) General Deterrence

I come, then, to the primary reason why a conditional sentence is not appropriate in this case. This is the kind of crime that requires public denunciation. We cannot have individuals rioting in the street, publicly defiling the very symbols of law and order in our society, purely for their own enjoyment. Mr. Ravindhraraj did not even have some misguided sense of social justice underlying his conduct. This was destruction and the degradation of the Toronto Police solely for the fun of doing so. It was done blatantly and brazenly. It was dangerous to everyone around. There were hundreds of innocent bystanders and dozens of businesses and residences nearby. All were put in considerable danger purely for the sport of it.

Several more responsible members in the crowd tried to stop Mr. Ravindhraraj and others like him, but he was undeterred. He continued his rampage and indeed was proud of his actions right up to the time of his arrest.

The G20 riots were an ugly stain on the reputation of our city. The images of our own citizens looting stores, vandalizing public and private property, and celebrating around blazing police cruisers are ugly pictures carved into our collective memories and will not soon be forgotten. It was a dangerous situation and one that resulted in an estimated two million dollars in property damage, to say nothing of the damage to Toronto’s reputation.

In addition, the criminal actions of these rioters had a terrible, disruptive impact on those individuals who came to participate in a lawful and peaceful demonstration. Those people were exercising their constitutionally-protected right to freedom of expression. They had political messages they wanted to convey and were entitled to convey. That message was virtually lost in the aftermath of the violence and mayhem wreaked by Mr. Ravindhraraj and others like him. That is an additional negative impact on the public interest as a result of these criminal acts.

These events shocked and outraged Torontonians. It is the public aspect of these crimes that requires strong denunciation by the courts and raises the importance of general deterrence as a dominant factor in sentencing. In my view, this is exactly the kind of situation contemplated by Chief Justice Lamer when he stated in R. v. C.A.M. 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at paragraph 81:

The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of a particular offender’s conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive law. As Lord Justice Lawton stated in R. v. Sargeant [1974][60 CR Appeal Report 74 at 77]: Society, through the courts, must show abhorrence for particular types of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentence they pass.

Even in the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading decision on the advantages of conditional sentences, R. v. Proulx 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, the Court recognized that there are some situations for which a conditional sentence cannot meet the objectives of sentencing, particularly where denunciation and general deterrence are paramount. Chief Justice Lamer stated at paragraph 127.8:

There may be some circumstances, however, where the need for denunciation or deterrence is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct or to deter similar conduct in the future.

These principles were dealt with by Madam Justice Weinper in R. v. Catenacci, May 13^th 2011 [O.C.J. Unreported], a case strikingly similar to the one before me. Mr. Catenacci pleaded guilty to arson in relation to the other police cruiser on Queen Street during the G20 March on June 26^th. He lit some newspaper and placed it in the second cruiser. This was after the first cruiser, with which Mr. Ravindhraraj had been occupied, was already a burned out shell. Mr. Catenacci was not the only person involved in setting fire to the second cruiser. Another man also threw lit newspapers inside.

After Mr. Catenacci’s guilty plea, the Crown sought a jail term of 18 to 24 months and the defence argued for a conditional sentence of 12 to 18 months. Mr. Catenacci was a 41-year-old cocaine addict. He had mental health issues and a criminal record with 17 entries largely related to his drug addiction. He had no prior crimes of violence or involving arson. He was not part of the Black Block group that had pre-planned to disrupt the event with violence. He had recently lost his job and was depressed. The trial judge described him as being “swept up in a group activity, thereby making an error in judgment when he was on drugs and in personal crisis.”

The trial judge also noted that Mr. Catenacci was remorseful, that he played a limited role in the arson compared to the other individual, and that he was not involved in any of the earlier acts of vandalism on the cruiser. Notwithstanding this, she concluded that the nature of the offence required a term of imprisonment to meet the objectives of deterrence and denunciation. I share her sentiments, as follows, from pages 28 to 29 of her Reasons:

The objectives of deterrence and denunciation are key in this case. The court needs to send a message to the community that this type of conduct is reprehensible and will not be tolerated. I am sensitive to the need to rehabilitate Mr. Catenacci, and to that end to ensure that he gets the appropriate drug abuse and psychological counselling to ensure that he never commits a similar offence in the future. However, in my view, the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation are more important than the objective of rehabilitation in this case. Further, a conditional sentence would not adequately address the objectives of deterrence and denunciation nor would a conditional sentence reflect the seriousness of this offence of arson. The sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offence and a conditional sentence is manifestly inadequate in the circumstances. Criminal conduct of this nature calls for immediate imprisonment. A conditional sentence is inappropriate in light of the gravity of the offence committed and Mr. Catenacci’s moral blameworthiness.

(See R. v. Catenacci May 13^th 2011 [O.C.J. Unreported].

Weinper, J. sentenced Mr. Catenacci to 17 months in jail and three years’ probation and ordered him to pay 200 dollars a month during the probation period as restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the restitution order because of Mr. Catenacci’s inability to pay. However, the jail term was upheld. The Court of Appeal held at paragraph one:

We agree with the trial judge that general deterrence and denunciation were the paramount considerations in this case, which arose out of the G20 riot. The sentence imposed took adequate account of the appellant’s role in setting fire to the police cruiser and the factors, such as his history of addiction and depression. Rehabilitation and the appellant’s personal circumstances were of much-reduced significance in this kind of case. The so-called jump principle had no application in this case. This offence was much more serious than the many offences on the appellant’s record.

(See R. v. Catenacci [2012] ONCA 187.)

A similar conclusion was reached in R. v. Mdongwa, also a case involving arson at the G20 riots. Mr. Mdongwa was the other person who set fire to the police cruiser Mr. Catenacci was also involved with. Mr. Mdongwa was also convicted of having his face masked at the time of committing this offence. He was 32 years old and a refugee from Zimbabwe, along with his parents and siblings. He had a criminal record for impaired driving in 2006. He was not part of the organized plan to commit violence; rather, like Mr. Catenacci and also Mr. Ravindhraraj, he was caught up by the excitement in the street and joined in the vandalism. However, there was no evidence of any vandalism apart from setting fire to the cruiser. Madam Justice Shamai held at page 13 that “the denunciatory principle is key in sentencing this type of action. The Court must send a message that this type of action must be discouraged and deplored, essentially to avoid copycat actions.” Mr. Mdongwa was sentenced to effectively 21 months in custody, being six months in addition to time served.

(iv) Conclusion on the Form of Sentence

In my view, these principles are essentially applicable to Mr. Ravindhraraj. The offence he was convicted of is attempted arson rather than arson. However, his intention to commit arson was clear and he made several attempts. Further, he engaged in various other forms of vandalism against the police cars. This is the kind of conduct that on its own requires strong denunciation and an emphasis on general deterrence. A conditional sentence is simply not adequate to address those concerns. Further, there are the additional problems with Mr. Ravindhraraj’s attitude towards his crime and his demonstrated disrespect for court orders and the justice system, as shown by his breach of recognizance and lying to the police about that. Imposing a term of house arrest in those circumstances sends entirely the wrong message. A term of imprisonment is required.

In coming to that conclusion, I have not lost sight of the fact that Mr. Ravindhraraj is a youthful first offender. Unfortunately, the nature of the offence and the requirement of general deterrence and denunciation override those factors.

D) Length of Sentence

I have already reviewed the mitigating and aggravating factors. On the aggravating side of the equation, there is: the repeated attempts to set fire to the cruiser; the repeated and varied acts of vandalism; the impact on the public; the disruption of legitimate political expression; the dangerous nature of the conduct; and Mr. Ravindhraraj’s lack of insight into the serious nature of his wrongdoing.

On the plus side, there are mitigating factors, including: Mr. Ravindhraraj’s youth and lack of a criminal record; his prior good reputation in the community; and the likely loss of his chosen career.

I must also have regard to the principle of parity in sentencing. The sentence I impose on Mr. Ravindhraraj should be in line with other sentences for similar conduct by persons in similar circumstances. As I mentioned, Mr. Catenacci was sentenced to 17 months for setting fire to a different police car on the same occasion. He had a criminal record that was extensive but minor in nature and unrelated to violence or arson. He was high on cocaine at the time of the offence and had mental health issues. He was also 41 years old, and therefore did not have the benefit of age as a mitigating factor. On the other hand, he was guilty only of arson. He committed no other acts of vandalism. Also, he had the guilty plea as a mitigating factor and had taken steps towards rehabilitation during the time prior to sentencing.

Mr. Mdongwa is also in a somewhat similar position. He was 32, older than Mr. Ravindhraraj. He had an unrelated criminal record for a single incident of drunk driving, which is worse than Mr. Ravindhraraj’s situation, although not significantly so. On the other hand, he did not commit other acts of vandalism, which put Mr. Ravindhraraj in a worse position.

In R. v. Fuller [1995] Q.J. 3127, a 22-year-old man was sentenced to six months after his participation in a Stanley Cup riot in Montreal. He was found to be immature and displayed a lack of remorse and failed to recognize the serious nature of his conduct. In this respect Mr. Ravindhraraj is similar. However, Mr. Fuller’s crime consisted of vandalising and stealing street signs. The fact that he did this in the course of a public riot and was seen as inciting others to violence were factors that contributed to the sentence. Clearly, Mr. Ravindhraraj’s conduct was worse.

R. v. Henry is another G20 case. The sentence was a 12- month conditional sentence. However, this was on a guilty plea, and the extent of the offence was smashing two store windows. Mr. Ravindhraraj’s circumstances are more serious. On the other hand, Mr. Henry’s actions were to some extent pre-meditated, as he came to the event as part of the Black Block, intent upon causing trouble, and was masked for at least part of the time.

A distinguishing fact, however, is the extent of Mr. Henry’s remorse for his action. He had taken significant steps to remove himself from his prior associates, rejected the troublesome aspects of his former life, attended counselling and worked towards making amends through community service, locally and abroad. These are not mitigating factors available to Mr. Ravindhraraj.

A similar disposition, a six-month conditional sentence, was imposed by Justice Bigelow on Andrew Loughrin, a youthful first offender. However, his only crime was to assist in trying to tip over a police car. He was extremely remorseful and had done community service work. Those circumstances are far more favourable than is the case for Mr. Ravindhraraj.

In R. v. Cote the accused was also a young man who participated in vandalism as part of the Black Block group. He damaged two police cruisers, one by kicking in a window and the other by hitting it with a wooden stick. He was 19 years old at the time. Justice Feldon was impressed by the extent of Mr. Cote’s remorse and insight into his actions. That is missing in Mr. Ravindhraraj’s case. Also, Mr. Ravindhraraj’s conduct was worse, even though it was not pre-planned. Mr. Cote was sentenced to six months in jail.

In R. v. Nolte-Rowley, Mr. Justice McMahon of this court dealt with another Black Block member. While masked, he smashed in the window of a Winners store with a metal chair, terrorizing the customers inside. He was 21 years old and had contributed substantially to his community, both before and after the offence, through volunteer work. In addition, he was given credit for remorse, as evidenced by his guilty plea. However, he did have a prior criminal record, consisting of two counts of drug possession as a youth, for which he had been placed on probation. Justice McMahon imposed a sentence of a total of six months plus two years’ probation with a restitution order of $50.00 a month during the probation period.

Finally, the defence relies on the decision of Justice Greene in R. v. Muzzin. Mr. Muzzin was sentenced to 90 days intermittent. However, the determining factor there was that Mr. Muzzin was very remorseful, was previously of good character, made substantial amends through volunteer work in his community, and was the sole support for his wife and three young children. Those circumstances are not like those of Mr. Ravindhraraj. Further, Mr. Muzzin’s actual criminal conduct was far less serious. He threw two chunks of granite through the windows of police headquarters.

Taking all of these factors into account, it seems to me that the appropriate sentence for Mr. Ravindhraraj is somewhat less than the 17-month sentence given to Mr. Catenacci due to his youth and lack of a criminal record. However, a sentence of six months or less would be unfit in light of the sentences given to others with serious offences and more mitigating factors.

I believe the range is from 12 months to 16 months.

Mr. Ravindhraraj’s attitude and the repeated and varied nature of his attacks on these police cars move the sentence towards the top of the range. However, his youth, the prospects of rehabilitation, and the fact that this is really his first jail term move the sentence towards the lower end of the range. Accordingly, in my view, the appropriate sentence is 14 months.

Defence counsel submits that Mr. Ravindhraraj should be given some credit for the time spent on bail. He was under house arrest for eight months and subject to a curfew for another 15 months. Given Mr. Ravindhraraj’s repeated breaches of his house arrest, I am not inclined to give very much credit against the sentence. However, there is no evidence of any breach after his conviction for obstructing justice and breach of recognizance. I therefore find that some credit is appropriate and I fix that at two months, leaving 12 months remaining to be served.

This term of imprisonment is to be followed by three years’ probation. The usual statutory conditions will apply. In addition, Mr. Ravindhraraj shall be required to complete 150 hours of community service, as approved by his probation officer.

Finally, I agree with the Crown that a restitution order is appropriate, given the extent of the damage to which Mr. Ravindhraraj contributed. I would fix that at $100.00 per month for the period of the probation. Mr. Ravindhraraj has a good work history, a supportive family and a university education. This amount of restitution should be manageable for him.

THE COURT: I hadn’t in mind any other provisions in the probation order apart from the statutory conditions, but if counsel have any other submissions, I’m happy to hear them. I also have taken a global approach with respect to the total amount of sentence and I haven’t addressed how to apportion that between the three, so if you have any views on that, I will hear from you.

MS. RHINELANDER: All right. Thank you, Your Honour. If I understand correctly, the probation order you indicated was three years?

THE COURT: Three years.

MS. RHINELANDER: All right. And just in terms of apportioning the sentence, I ask for 14 months to reflect the arson, and I’d be satisfied if Your Honour was to consider perhaps six months for each of the mischiefs concurrent.

THE COURT: Concurrent? Any problem, Mr. Bellehumeur?

MR. BELLEHUMEUR: Well, I would have thought that -- I don’t have any serious problems with that, Your Honour, but it would seem that the mischief charges could very well be -- if you’re thinking in terms of six months for the mischief charges, I would be suggesting four months would be a more appropriate consecutive or concurrent. I would just think on balance the mischief charges, considering there was a plea, would be of less impact on your sentencing.

THE COURT: Yes. I think six months is kind of what other people got, though, for minor vandalism, like throwing things through windows and these were the police cars, not windows. I think in the long run it doesn’t really make a lot of difference but I’ll apportion it as six months on each of the mischief counts --

MR. BELLEHUMEUR: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- and the 14 months on the attempted arson, but those are concurrent. Anything further?

MS. RINELANDER: Yes, Your Honour. I believe I asked for a DNA order on the last occasion, and if I didn’t, it was an oversight.

THE COURT: You may have. I don’t recall that. Is that objected to?

MR. BELLEHUMEUR: I don’t understand the point of the DNA order.

MS. RHINELANDER: It’s a secondary designated offence, which gives Your Honour discretion; however, it’s very minor intrusiveness, and given the nature of this particular offence and the public nature, I would be requesting it.

I can indicate as well Justice Weinper in R. v. Catenacci also ordered a DNA order with respect to him, given his involvement and the similar role that Mr. Ravindhraraj played.

THE COURT: Mr. Catenacci had a long criminal record --

MS. RHINELANDER: He did. Yes.

THE COURT: -- and there was every expectation he would -- that may not be fair. He had a long criminal record and history of drug addiction and there was a reasonable prospect that he would continue to be involved with the justice system.

MS. RHINELANDER: I’ll leave it in Your Honour’s discretion.

THE COURT: I don’t think it’s required in this case. I’m not going to order the DNA. Anything further?

MS. RHINELANDER: With respect to Mr. Ravindhraraj’s matter? I don’t believe so, Your Honour.

THE COURT: Mr. Bellehumeur?

MR. BELLEHUMEUR: No. Thank you.

-- MATTER IS ADJOURNED.

I, Alana Trumpy, certify that this document is a true and accurate recording, made out to the best of my ability, of R v. Ravindhraraj, taken from Recording No. 216 at the Superior Court of Justice, 361 University Ave.

Date ________________________

Signature ___________________

Copies of this transcript bearing photostatic signatures are not certified and have not been paid for. Unless transcripts bear the original signature of Alana Trumpy, IN BLUE PEN, they are not valid, and accordingly, are in direct violation of Ontario Regulations 587/91, Court of Justice Act, January 1, 1990.

Her Majesty the Queen v. Ashan Ravindharaj, 2012 ONSC 6260

Case Summary

A. Nature of the Offence

B) Position of the Parties

C) Conditional versus Custodial Sentence

D) Length of Sentence

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Financial Outcomes

Issues