ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and -
VICTOR MIGUEL BUERON
J. Howard and J. Spare, for the Crown
F. Davoudi, for Mr. Bueron
HEARD: May 19, 2026 and July 15, 2026
J.M. BARRETT J.
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
OVERVIEW
1On September 24, 2023, Joyous Magdirila died after he was stabbed once in the chest during an altercation with three masked and hooded males. On March 25, 2026, following a four-week jury trial, Victor Bueron was found guilty of manslaughter for his role as a party to this fatal stabbing.
2The sentencing hearing proceeded over two non-consecutive days, due to a defence requested adjournment for which an explicit s. 11(b) waiver was provided to the continuation date of July 15, 2026.
3Counsel agree that a penitentiary sentence is required but dispute the appropriate length. Crown counsel argues that seven to nine years’ imprisonment is appropriate. Mr. Bueron argues that three to four years’ imprisonment is a fit sentence. Counsel agree on the applicable ancillary orders, namely a DNA order, and a lifetime weapons prohibition order, pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. c. C-46.
4In my view, five years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, is a fit sentence. Mr. Bueron will also be subject to a DNA order and a lifetime s. 109 order.
5What follows are my reasons.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE
6At trial, the parties admitted that Joyous Magdirila died from a single stab wound to the chest. The stabbing occurred at about 9:50 p.m., on September 24, 2023, at the intersection of Yonge Street and Bishop Avenue, in the City of Toronto.
7While the stabbing itself was not captured on video, events before and after it were. The recordings from before the stabbing reveal its motive: Mr. Bueron and two others were recruited by Mr. Bueron’s friend, J.R., to participate in a group assault of Joyous Magdirila in retaliation for an unprovoked assault by the deceased on J.R. and J.R.’s girlfriend about 30 minutes earlier. The two others were Lawrence Laurente and Ian Arcositas.
8Video surveillance and phone records provided a compelling account of how events unfolded that fatal evening. After J.R. was assaulted, he phoned his friends. Within minutes, J.R. met his three friends at 6000 Yonge Street. From there, they went in Lawrence Laurente’s minivan and headed back to the vicinity of the initial assault. When Joyous Magdirila was spotted on his bicycle, Mr. Laurente stopped his vehicle, allowing the others to exit. J.R., Mr. Bueron and Mr. Arcositas all ran towards Mr. Magdirila. J.R. was armed with a large metal pole that he swung at least twice at Mr. Magdirila. The stabbing occurred when all four males were out of camera view after which Mr. Magdirila ran across Yonge Street as his three attackers headed in the opposite direction. In a panic, Mr. Laurente sped away in the minivan, almost crashing into a road barrier. About one minute later, Joyous Magdirila returned to Yonge Street where he collapsed on the pavement in a live lane of traffic, bleeding heavily. He was transported to Sunnybrook Hospital by ambulance and was pronounced dead at 10:39 p.m. I understand that the single stab wound was the only injury noted in the post-mortem report.
9At trial, the defence called no evidence. The defence raised the issues of identity and party liability. Specifically, the defence argued there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bueron was one of the three males who exited from Mr. Laurente’s minivan. Alternatively, if the jury was satisfied of Mr. Bueron’s identity, the defence argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish Mr. Bueron’s culpability as a party, given the absence of evidence that he was armed, had knowledge of a knife, or was physically involved in the confrontation.
10Section 724(2)(a) of the Criminal Code requires me to consider and “accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty”: R. v. Brown, 1991 CanLII 73 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518, at p. 523; R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at para. 18. This requires that I “identify any relevant factual determinations the jury has made by examining what facts were essential to the jury’s verdicts, and then apply those facts when sentencing the offender”: R. v. Aragon, 2022 ONCA 244, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 79, at para. 106. I must not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict that was rejected by the jury: Brown, at p. 523; Ferguson, at paras. 17, 21.
11My task is not to follow the logical process of the jury, but to come to my own determination of the relevant facts. I must determine only those facts necessary to determine an appropriate sentence with the onus on the Crown to prove any aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt: Ferguson, at paras. 15-18.
12The verdict in this case demonstrates that the jury was satisfied that Mr. Bueron participated in what was clearly a planned group assault of Joyous Magdirila, knowing of a risk of non-trivial non-transient bodily harm, and which caused the death of Joyous Magdirila.
13During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Bueron argued that his moral blameworthiness was low because Joyous Magdirila was stabbed with his own knife and Mr. Bueron did not physically participate in the confrontation. The Crown disputes both issues.
14In my view, I need not determine the origin of the knife. What matters for purposes of determining a fit sentence for Mr. Bueron is that there is no evidence that he possessed the knife, used the knife, or knew of its existence.
15Based on the evidence adduced at trial, it is impossible to determine who inflicted the single fatal wound. Mr. Bueron was not the instigator. He and the others were recruited by J.R. to assist in the retaliatory attack. I find that there was no intent to kill Joyous Magdirila. I am satisfied, however, that Mr. Bueron participated physically in the three-on-one attack. I accept Mr. Laurente’s testimony that he witnessed all three of his friends physically involved in the attack on Mr. Magdirila. While Mr. Laurente’s testimony needs to be viewed with great caution, this aspect of his account remained consistent and is supported in part by the video surveillance.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
16At the time of the jury’s verdict, I inquired whether a pre-sentence report should be ordered. Counsel for the Crown and Mr. Bueron agreed this was unnecessary. A number of materials have been filed to provide helpful background information. Further, Mr. Davoudi represented Mr. Bueron on his Barrie charges (which I discuss below) and is familiar with Mr. Bueron’s personal circumstances.
17Victor Bueron was born in the Philippines on October 23, 2002. He is now 23 years old. He was 20 years old at the time of this offence. He is a permanent resident of Canada. His older sister, Leilani Bueron, testified as a Crown witness at trial. She is one year older than Mr. Bueron. He has three brothers. I understand that Mr. Bueron’s family lead pro-social lives and remain supportive of him.
18Mr. Bueron came to Canada as a child and completed his high school diploma. He then held odd jobs, but ultimately started down the wrong path and began drug dealing. Mr. Bueron knew J.R. and the others from school.
19Mr. Bueron was arrested on February 1, 2024, several months after the incident. At that time, he was already in custody, having been arrested in January 2024 for drug related charges in Barrie. His Barrie charges were resolved on August 20, 20251 before Edwards J., when he pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded firearm. Edwards J. accepted the joint submission for three years’ imprisonment concurrent, less credit for 576 days of pre-sentence custody for which Mr. Bueron was credited 864 days. This sentence expired on April 8, 2026.
VICTIM IMPACT
20Joyous Magdirila lost his life suddenly and violently when he was only 23 years old. With the death of Mr. Magdirila, his family lost a son, a brother, an uncle and a nephew. The victim impact statements speak to how much Joyous Magdirila was loved by his family, many of whom attended court daily throughout the trial and sentencing proceedings. His unexpected loss at such a youthful age is a tragedy that is now woven into the fabric of their daily lives. His mother read her statement during the sentencing hearing describing her daily battle with grief that now defines and consumes her life.
21All victim impact statements described the emptiness that Joyous’ death has left. To lose a son, brother, uncle, nephew and friend in such tragic circumstances, at such a youthful age, has left all who knew him with broken hearts that can never heal. With Joyous Magdirila’s passing at only 23 years of age, they mourn his life and the future that has been taken away.
22The profound victim impact in this case is an aggravating factor. No sentence can bring Joyous Magdirila back and allow him to live out his life surrounded by his loved ones. I recognize the profound and lasting impact of his death, but in determining an appropriate sentence, I am guided by the statutory purpose and principles of sentencing as reviewed below.
POSITIONS OF PARTIES
23In support of its position that seven to nine years’ imprisonment is appropriate, the Crown relies on the following decisions: R. v. Haggart, 2024 ONSC 5957; R. v. Krstic, 2017 ONSC 5204; R. v. Lee, 2021 ONSC 6704; and, R. v. Nicholls, 2015 ONSC 8136.
24Mr. Bueron also filed numerous decisions in support of his position of three to four years’ imprisonment, including: R. v. Creighton-Chevalier, 2026 ONSC 400; R. v. MacFarlane, 2012 ONCA 82, 288 O.A.C. 114; R. v. Walker-Hammond, 2024 NBKB 100; R. v. Ahmed, 2024 ONCJ 568; R. v. Turner, 2019 ONSC 5435; and R. v. Turcotte (2000), 2000 CanLII 14721 (ON CA), 48 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.).
25As of July 22, 2026, the pre-sentence custody totals 106 days (i.e., April 8, 2026, to July 22, 2026). That is the balance of time following the expiry of his sentence on April 8, 2026. In other words, Mr. Bueron’s time in custody from August 20, 2025 to April 8, 2026, is because he was serving a sentence for the Barrie charges. Mr. Bueron’s time in custody prior to August 20, 2025, was credited as pre-sentence custody by Edwards J. when sentencing Mr. Bueron on the drug charges.
26The parties agree that Mr. Bueron is entitled to the standard credit of 1.5 days for each of his 106 days spent in pre-sentence custody: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575. Applying this credit, he has now served the equivalent of 159 days.
27Mr. Bueron filed institutional records detailing the number of lockdowns and triple bunking while at the Toronto South Detention Centre and Central North Correctional Centre since his arrest on the Barrie charges in January 2024. Based on these records, Mr. Bueron seeks some unspecified additional credit for the harsh conditions of his pre-sentence custody in accordance with the principles set out in the decision of R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, at para. 6.
28While known as a “Duncan credit”, the decision of R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, makes clear that rather than a calculated set credit, harsh conditions of pretrial custody is a mitigating factor; one that is factored into fashioning an appropriate sentence along with all other mitigating and aggravating factors: at para. 52; R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164, at paras. 3-4; R. v. Clarke, 2026 ONCA 152, at para. 13. A “Duncan credit” is not automatic upon proof of triple bunking or lockdowns. Rather, evidence should generally be tendered to establish the adverse impact arising from the harsh conditions: Clarke, at paras. 17-18. As stated by Doherty J.A., in R. v. Omoragbon, 2020 ONCA 336, at para. 32:
Enhanced credit for lockdown days is neither an entitlement nor routinely granted upon the filing of institutional records. In the absence of evidence of any adverse effect of the lockdown conditions on the appellant, enhanced credit is not warranted.
29In this case, Mr. Bueron has not submitted an affidavit detailing the impact of the lockdowns or triple bunking.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
30The “fundamental purpose” of sentencing as set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code, is to “protect society and to contribute […] to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives”: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community”.
31In crafting an appropriate sentence, regard must also be given to the fundamental principle of sentencing: proportionality. Imposing a proportionate sentence is a highly individualized exercise; one that is tailored to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm caused by the crime: see R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at pp. 557-59.
32Section s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code directs sentencing courts to consider a number of other statutory principles, including: a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any mitigating or aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender (s. 718.2(a)); a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances (also known as the principle of parity set out in s. 718.2(b)); and the need to exercise restraint in imposing imprisonment (ss. 718.2(d) and (e)).
33The concept of proportionality is contextual and dependent on the mitigating and aggravating features relevant to the offender and the offence: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 43; R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517, at para. 35. An assessment of moral culpability requires a consideration of several factors, including the nature, quality and gravity of the act; the method and manner by which the act was committed; the offender's awareness of the risk; and what should have been in the offender's mind, had he acted reasonably: R. v. Ferguson, 2006 ABCA 261, 397 A.R. 1, at paras. 60-61, aff'd 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96.
34The gravity of the offence of manslaughter is reflected in the prescribed maximum sentence available, namely life imprisonment: Criminal Code, s. 236(b). As the offence did not involve a firearm, there is no minimum sentence, making the sentence available anything from a suspended sentence to life imprisonment. This broad range is reflective of the vast set of circumstances that may give rise to a manslaughter conviction. At the low end, are unintentional killings akin to reckless accidents. At the upper end, are deaths arising from an intent just short of what is required for murder: R. v. Gibson, 2026 ONCA 463, at para. 48; R. v. Carrière (2002), 2002 CanLII 41803 (ON CA), 164 C.C.C. (3d) 569 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 10; R. v. MacKinnon, 2022 ONSC 1349, at para. 73; R. v. Creighton, 1993 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 48-49.
35While the objectives of deterrence and denunciation are paramount when there is an unlawful killing, the principles of rehabilitation and restraint are still operative, particularly in circumstances such as the instant case where Mr. Bueron is a youthful first offender: Gibson, at para. 49; R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at paras. 30-32. The restraint principle operates within the boundaries of the principle of proportionality: Gibson, at para. 57.
ANALYSIS
36Sentencing is one of the most difficult things a trial judge does. It is especially difficult in a case like this which involves the senseless loss of Mr. Magdirila’s life and the unbearable lifelong suffering of his family, but also a youthful offender who, at the time of the stabbing, had no prior criminal record. Mr. Bueron’s role was as an aider and abettor. He did not inflict the fatal stab wound, nor was he the instigator of the group assault.
37Also relevant is the fact that Mr. Bueron is a permanent resident who will be subject to deportation. That said, his deportation would follow regardless of any sentence I impose due to the penitentiary sentence imposed by Edwards J. in August 2025. Moreover, although deportation is a relevant collateral consequence, it cannot result in the imposition of what would be an unfit sentence: R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 15-16; R. v. Farac, 2026 BCCA 64, at paras. 28-30, 36-37. In other words, there is no special range of sentence for offenders facing immigration consequences. While I have considered this factor, it is of limited relevance in the circumstances of this case.
38As for the conditions at the Toronto South and Central North custodial facilities, I do not regard this as a mitigating factor. In the absence of an affidavit by Mr. Bueron, there is no evidence of what, if any impact the conditions have had on his well-being. Further, all time served, except for the most recent three months of his incarceration was due to his Barrie charges. Finally, in arguing for credit for “over 2,600 hours in lockdown”, Mr. Bueron relied on days where the lockdown was due to reasons other than staffing issues (i.e., medical isolation, contraband search, and “inmate behaviour”). Mr. Bueron argued that the fact that most of this time was for the Barrie charges was irrelevant because (i) he never received a Duncan credit when being sentenced by Edwards J.; and (ii) but for the manslaughter charge, once sentenced in August 2025, he would have been moved to a federal penitentiary and spared the harsh conditions of the urban detention centres. I disagree. In my view, this runs afoul of s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code, which states that “a court may take into account any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence”. As noted, prior to April 2026, all of Mr. Bueron’s time in custody was not “as a result” of the manslaughter offence. Even if this period could be considered, in my view enhanced credit is not warranted in this case as there is no evidence of what impact the harsh conditions had on Mr. Bueron.
39Most aggravating in this case are the circumstances of the offence. Mr. Bueron participated in a group attack of Joyous Magdirila in which he and his friends were all masked and hooded. All knew J.R. was armed with a metal pole. After the stabbing, all three suspects fled, rendering no assistance. To state the obvious, this was a vicious group assault with tragic consequences. Mr. Magdirila’s death continues to have a devastating impact on those closest to him, particularly his mother.
40In arriving at an appropriate sentence, s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code requires that I consider sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences, while keeping in mind that sentencing is highly individualized. No two cases are identical. Notably, J.R., who was the instigator and principal offender, pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a disposition of three years. This is the maximum sentence available under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1. While J.R. is a young offender, as the instigator, his level of moral blameworthiness is higher. That said, J.R.’s disposition was the product of a joint submission rendering it of limited precedential value: R. v. Purvis, 2026 ONCA 187, at para. 21. I also note that the two other individuals involved in the group assault were never charged with any offences stemming from the attack. That said, the principle of parity does not apply to persons who were not charged, nor does it address the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in determining who to charge: R v. Van Huigenbos, 2026 ABCA 66, at para. 7.
41I have reviewed all cases cited by counsel. Given the individualized contextual nature of sentencing, it is no surprise that none are on all fours with this case. While the cases cited by the Crown involve party liability for a stabbing, all involve more aggravating circumstances.
42For instance, in Haggart, the offender pleaded guilty to being a party to manslaughter for her role in encouraging her boyfriend to stab a young man who had sexually assaulted Ms. Haggart. Ms. Haggart knew her boyfriend, who often carried a knife, was easily influenced as he had Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder. The victim died from a single stab wound to the chest. Ms. Haggart was 37 years old and had a minor unrelated record. She was sentenced to 7.5 years’ imprisonment.
43Similarly, in Krstic, the 18-year-old accused was the instigator of a fatal stabbing. Ms. Kristic was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment (less credit for pre-sentence custody) following her guilty plea to manslaughter for her in having her current boyfriend confront her ex-boyfriend after being threatened by her former boyfriend while on public transit. In addition to arranging the confrontation, Ms. Krstic assisted by striking the victim from behind immediately before the victim was stabbed. After the fatal stabbing, both Ms. Krstic and her co-accused fled the city.
[44] In Lee, a sentence of 7.5 years’ imprisonment was imposed after trial for a manslaughter conviction in relation to a fatal stabbing that occurred during a confrontation between two groups of young persons at an underage party. At one point, the deceased attempted to run away but was chased by the accused and co-accused. During the chase, the victim fell to the ground and was stabbed once in the chest by the co-accused. The entire incident was over in minutes. The accused and co-accused fled. Both were 19 years old at the time of the offence and 23 years old at the time of sentencing. The accused was a first offender, but was on bail at the time of the stabbing. In crafting a fit sentence, Kelly J. referenced decisions from the Court of Appeal of Ontario to find that the applicable range of sentence is usually between 8 to 12 years in cases where the offender’s conduct is accompanied by aggravating features: R. v. Clarke (2003), 2003 CanLII 28199 (ON CA), 172 O.A.C. 133 (C.A.); R. v. Devaney (2006), 2006 CanLII 33666 (ON CA), 213 C.C.C. (3d) 264 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Cleyndert, 2006 CanLII 33851 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Tahir 2016 ONCA 136.
45In Nicholls, an 18-year-old Indigenous offender was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to manslaughter in relation to the stabbing death of a 14-year old who went to Nicholls’ home with others in a planned confrontation. In response, Nicholls grabbed a kitchen knife and approached the group but suffered injuries after the group encircled him and struck him with a stick and pole. The group fled once others arrived, but the deceased was the last to leave and was stabbed once in the chest by Nicholls. Nicholls was diagnosed with borderline Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder and ADHD. He also had an unfortunate childhood during which he was made a Crown ward at age 11. He had no prior criminal record but had an outstanding charge of break and enter. In sentencing Nicholls, Braid J. described the offence as “a stupid and senseless loss of a young life” in circumstances that previously would have ended in a fist-fight, but now ends in death due to young people arming themselves with deadly weapons used in the heat of the moment with tragic irreversible consequences”.
46The cases filed by defence counsel are also distinguishable. In Walker-Hammond and Ahmed, the accused pleaded guilty. A plea of guilt is a significant mitigating factor not found in the instant case. The matter of Turcotte also involved an admission of manslaughter – a significant mitigating factor not found in the instant case. Turcotte is also distinguishable because of the medical evidence that showed Mr. Turcotte was acting under a psychotic condition at the time of the offence.
47A plea of guilt expresses remorse. In the instant case, there is no evidence of Mr. Bueron’s remorse for his role in Mr. Magdirila’s death. This is not an aggravating factor. Rather, it is the absence of a mitigating factor present in several of the decisions relied on by Mr. Bueron: R. v. Zaki, 2026 ONCA 130, at para. 13; R. v. Shah, 2017 ONCA 872, at para. 8.
48Of the cases cited by the defence, I found Creighton-Chevalier and MacFarlane to be most helpful. In Creighton-Chevalier, a sentence of two years plus one day, was imposed in addition to the equivalent of 30 months’ pre-trial custody, after the accused was convicted as a party to the stabbing death that occurred during a three-on-one assault. Creighton-Chevalier knew the stabber was armed with a knife that would be used in the attack. Akhtar J. described the sentence as falling at the “lowest end of the sentencing range for this offence”. In mitigation, Mr. Creighton-Chevalier surrendered himself into custody and conceded several facts at trial, allowing for a streamlined trial. Mr. Creighton-Chevalier also had the support of his family and friends and had experienced harsh conditions during his pre-trial detention.
49In MacFarlane, there was a joint submission for a sentence of four years’ imprisonment following a guilty plea to manslaughter based on MacFarlane’s role as a party to a stabbing. After credit for pre-sentence custody, MacFarlane was sentenced to two years less a day to be followed by two years of probation. There was evidence that MacFarlane knew his co-accused had a knife when they chased and beat the deceased. The deceased was with another male who had previously stolen MacFarlane’s bicycle, but that male managed to escape.
50Having considered all the submissions of counsel and the entirety of the record in this case, I find that Mr. Bueron’s moral culpability is in the medium range. While not the stabber or the instigator, Mr. Bueron chose to accompany the others, masked and hooded, in the search for the person responsible for the earlier incident involving J.R. and J.R.’s girlfriend. That serious bodily harm was the intended result, is obvious.
51Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code states that "all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders”. The need for restraint applies with “special force when sentencing youthful first offenders”: R. v. M.T., 2026 ONCA 346, at para. 7, citing R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 201, at para. 132 and R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at para. 31.
52The principle of restraint also requires that when incarceration is found to be necessary, a court must impose the shortest sentence of imprisonment that will achieve the various sentencing objectives applicable in the circumstances of each case. Further, if it is the offender’s first penitentiary sentence, the principle of restraint requires that it be “as short as possible”: R. v. Borde (2003), 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 417, (C.A.), at para. 3.
DISPOSITION
53For these reasons, I sentence Mr. Bueron to five years’ imprisonment, less credit for the pre-sentence custody served since the expiry of his sentence on April 8, 2026 (i.e., 106 real days). Applying the standard 1.5:1 credit, this is equivalent to 159 days.
54Mr. Bueron has been convicted of an indictable offence involving the use of violence that is punishable by life imprisonment. A weapons prohibition for life will issue pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code.
55Manslaughter is a “primary designated offence” within the meaning of s. 487.04(a) of the Criminal Code. A DNA order is therefore mandatory. Mr. Bueron will provide a sample of bodily substances for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis and storage in the national DNA database.
56The victim surcharge is waived.
J.M. Barrett J.
Released: July 22, 2026