ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
KEVIN DAVID DOUSE
Before Justice C.A. Brannagan
Heard on 19 September 2025 & 5 February 2026
Reasons for Sentence delivered on 27 February 2026
Counsel: Ms. A. Rodrigo.................................................................................... counsel for the Crown Mr. G. Pickard ............................................................................ counsel for the Defendant
OVERVIEW
Over the course of seven years, Kevin Douse used his position as a financial advisor to defraud the public in excess of $1.8 million, of which more than $1.3 million remains unrecovered.
Mr. Douse counts among his victims young couples, senior citizens, retired persons, personal friends, friends and family members of his ex-wife and her parents, and clients who were otherwise referred to him as someone who they could count on for his professionalism, honesty, and trustworthiness. Rather than living up to these laudatory attestations, Kevin Douse used his good reputation to manipulate his clients while he engineered an extensive web of lies and deception to defraud each of them.
On 19 September 2025, Mr. Douse entered a plea of guilty before me to one count of defrauding the public in excess of $5,000, contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. I heard submissions from counsel on 5 February 2026.
These are my reasons for sentence.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE
An Agreed Statement of Facts was filed and made Exhibit #1 on this proceeding. That document is six pages in length. It recounts in detail the facts agreed to by Kevin Douse, and it formed the basis for the court finding him guilty. For brevity, I will only summarize that document here.
At all material times, Kevin Douse was a licenced financial advisor in Orillia. In that role, he committed a large-scale fraud between 3 October 2016 and 28 November 2023.
In total, he misappropriated $1,804,283.82 from 25 victims, leaving unrecovered losses totalling $1,380,535.47.
Mr. Douse’s fraudulent activities were well-planned and sophisticated. He accepted funds from clients to invest but instead deposited those funds directly into his personal bank account. He forged signatures and falsified financial statements and other documents. He impersonated clients. He took out unauthorized redemptions and loans against his clients’ policies. He redirected funds between clients’ accounts to cover up his earlier embezzlements.
Kevin Douse exploited his relationships of professional and personal trust – including among friends, long-time acquaintances, referrals through family and friends, and even his own in-laws.
Mr. Douse engaged in this criminal conduct for more than seven years, until a Canada Life investigation exposed his deception and led to the termination of his employment on 20 December 2023.
The Ontario Provincial Police then conducted a criminal investigation into Mr. Douse’s fraudulent activities, and he was charged accordingly.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
A pre-sentence report (PSR) was ordered at Mr. Pickard’s request.
The purpose of a PSR is to provide the sentencing court with information about “the offender’s age, maturity, character, behaviour, attitude and willingness to make amends.” Its function is to aid the court in imposing a fit and appropriate sentence by portraying the offender’s background, character and circumstances: Criminal Code, s. 721(1) & (3); R. v. Green, 2006 ONCJ 364, at paras. 12-13; R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55, at para. 28; R. v. Di Paola, 2025 SCC 31, at para. 98.
The report was made Exhibit #2 on this proceeding, on consent of both Counsel.
Mr. Pickard made submissions on behalf of Mr. Douse, in part relying upon the report’s contents. I will refer to both the contents of the pre-sentence report and to Mr. Pickard’s submissions jointly here.
Kevin Douse comes before this court with no prior criminal record. He is 41 years of age, having been born in Sarnia on 17 September 1984. He is a Canadian citizen.
Mr. Douse graduated from the University of Windsor with a Bachelor’s degree in Commerce. He has been steadily employed since graduation, including having worked in banks, although he reported a dislike for the world of finance.
Mr. Douse does not suffer from any substance use issues.
He had a positive upbringing and continues to have strong family support. He resides with his parents, who describe him as loving, dependable, and present with his children.
He shares two young children with his ex-wife, and their co-parenting relationship is described as positive and cooperative. Mr. Douse’s crimes brought about the demise of his marriage.
He currently works as an operational manager at a craft brewery near Orillia.
During much of the time of his offending, he worked as a financial advisor with WLTH Inc. in Orillia. Mr. Douse described his time there as “painful” and “traumatizing”, noting that it was high pressure.
He claims to suffer from mental health issues, including anxiety, depression, and possible post-traumatic stress disorder because of his employment with WLTH Inc. Mr. Douse indicated that he is attending counselling with a psychiatrist and social worker to address these issues; attempts made by the pre-sentence report’s author to confirm both diagnoses and treatment were unsuccessful.
Mr. Douse described himself to the report’s author as being “honourable, trustworthy, a good person, an exceptional parent, naturally reliable, extremely emotive, impressionable, a people pleaser”.
When asked about his criminal activity, he told the author of the report that the reasons for his offending included desperation and survival in relation to his work life; he told the author he had “no other choice”. When asked what he believes may prevent further similar offences he stated, “to never encounter a boss or someone like him” again, and that if he did not encounter such a “terrible situation” he would not have “gotten trapped”.
In his allocution, Mr. Douse told the court that he accepted full responsibility for his crimes. He acknowledged the devastation and ruin that have befallen his victims through his criminal actions. He told the court that he knows his victims continue to suffer and said that he thinks about them every day. He told the court that he worked in a very unhealthy environment, claiming that it “decimated” his mental health and that his judgement became seriously compromised as a result. He made choices that he deeply regrets and told the court that he has experienced debilitating shame and tremendous remorse in the result.
A letter of support, Exhibit #4, asserts that Mr. Douse’s offending was out of character with the person she has known for more than 30 years.
Mr. Pickard emphasized that Mr. Douse’s guilty plea is a sign of his remorse. He submitted that his client’s guilty plea has saved significant court resources at both levels of the trial courts, and that the only dates that were set for this matter were those before me, for his guilty plea and sentencing.
Mr. Pickard acknowledged that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing principles that must animate the sentence I impose but submitted that rehabilitation remains a factor.
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
In determining a fit sentence to be imposed on an offender, section 722 requires the court to consider the harm suffered by victims of crime and the impact of the offence on victims through victim impact statements.
The Crown filed, as Exhibit #3, an exhibit book that includes 12 victim impact statements from 16 of Mr. Douse’s victims. It also includes 11 statements on restitution from 16 of Mr. Douse’s victims, some of whom declined to file victim impact statements: s. 737.1(4).
Half-a-dozen of the victim impact statements were read aloud in court, five by the victims themselves, and one by the Crown. Others were left committed to writing.
The victim impact statements are thoughtful, sincere, many heartbreaking. There are too many to faithfully recount here, so I will instead summarize the recurring themes used to describe the losses suffered by Mr. Douse’s 25 victims.
The victim impact statements describe themes of profound betrayal of trust, financial insecurity, emotional and psychological harm, disruption of family stability, loss of dignity, long-term financial consequences, and permanent erosion of personal security and peace of mind. Several victims were elderly or otherwise vulnerable, and three passed away before they could address the court; I accept that the harm caused them through Mr. Douse’s betrayal was no less profound.
Having read the statements, and heard many of them read out in court, I accept the gravity of loss – financial, emotional, personal – suffered by each of the offender’s victims as both devastating and inescapable.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Crown seeks a sentence of five-and-one-half years imprisonment, a restitution order totalling $561,430.97, a fine in lieu of forfeiture equal to the unrecovered losses, a 20-year prohibition order under s. 380.2, and a six-year default term of imprisonment.
The Defence submits that a four-year penitentiary term is fit, agrees to restitution and a s. 380.2 order but seeks a shorter prohibition period, a longer payment window, and the minimum five-year default term of imprisonment.
LAW & ANALYSIS
The Offence of Fraud
The offence of fraud requires the Crown to show than an accused has committed a dishonest act, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, and that a deprivation has been caused by the prohibited act. The deprivation may consist in actual loss or placing a victim’s pecuniary interests at risk. The mens rea for fraud requires the specific intent to deceive, lie, or commit some other fraudulent act: R. v. Plange, 2019 ONCA 646, at para. 24.
Criminal fraud is a “deliberately practiced fraudulent act which, in the knowledge of the accused, actually puts the property of others at risk”: Plange, supra, at para. 25, citing to R. v. Theroux, 1993 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, at p. 26.
Parliament has assigned a maximum term of imprisonment of 14 years for this offence and a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years where the total value of the fraud exceeds $1,000,000. These statutory parameters reflect Parliament’s view of the offence’s seriousness and establish the framework within which the court must determine a proportionate sentence in the circumstances of the offence and the offender: s. 380(1)(a) and s. 380(1.1).
Sentencing Objectives – Purpose and Principles of Sentencing
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions with the following legitimate objectives of sentencing: denunciation; deterrence; rehabilitation; the protection of society; and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or the community: s. 718.
The relative weighting of these principles often depends upon the nature of the crime and the individual circumstances of the offender. Ultimately, “the overarching duty of a sentencing judge is to draw upon all the legitimate principles of sentencing to determine a ‘just and appropriate’ sentence which reflects the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender”: R. v. C.A.M., 1996 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 82.
The Fundamental Principle of Proportionality
All sentencing starts with the principle that a fit and appropriate sentence is one that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: s. 718.1; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at para. 10, citing to R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 30; R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at para. 59.
As the Court of Appeal for Ontario has recently reaffirmed:
The proportionality principle is rooted in retributive or desert-based theories of punishment that define a just sanction as one that is deserved by an offender, based solely on the seriousness of the offence and an offender’s moral blameworthiness. In Canada, proportionality operates as a restraint or limitation on punishment.
R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517, at para. 33.
The principle requires that “[t]he more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be”: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 12; Morris, supra, at para. 66.
This includes consideration of the harm caused to victims by the offender’s crime: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 43; Morris, supra, at para. 64.
Other Relevant Sentencing Objectives
Section 718.2 contemplates a list of additional principles, aggravating and mitigating, that sentencing judges must consider in arriving at a just and appropriate sentence for the individual offender.
The following principles are engaged on this record and inform a proportionate, individualized sentence:
Abuse of a position of trust or authority in relation to the victims: s. 718.2(a)(iii).
Significant impact on victims considering their age, health, and financial situation: s. 718.2(a)(iii.1).
Parity with sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences: s. 718.2(b).
Restraint, particularly for first offenders: s. 718.2(e); R. v. Priest, 1996 1381 (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 3369 (C.A.).
Effect of a guilty plea as a sign of remorse: R. v. Johnston and Tremayne, 1970 281 (ON CA), [1970] 4 C.C.C. 64 (Ont. C.A.).
Sentencing Jurisprudence for Large-Scale, Complex & Major Frauds
The Court of Appeal for Ontario has long identified a three-to-five-year range of imprisonment for offenders of major frauds: R. v. Scholz, 2021 ONCA 506, at para. 18; R. v. Davatgar-Jafarpour, 2019 ONCA 353, at para. 34; R. v. Dobis (2002), 2002 32815 (ON CA), at paras. 36-37.
Yet, the Court of Appeal has itself observed that the three-to-five-year range that it has set should be approached with caution, given that it was established prior to the increase in the maximum sentence for Fraud Over $5,000 from 10 to 14 years, in 2004: Scholz, supra, at para. 18, fn. 3; R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, at para. 39; An Act to amend the Criminal Code (capital markets fraud and evidence-gathering), S.C. 2004, c. 3, s. 2(1); Criminal Code, s. 380(1)(a).
The Supreme Court of Canada has observed that increases in maximum sentences reflect Parliament’s desire for “such offences to be punished more harshly”, with the increase in the maximum sentence being understood as “shifting the distribution of proportionate sentences” for the given offence: Scholz, supra, at para. 39, citing to Friesen, supra at para. 97; see, also, R. v. Georgopoulos, 2026 ONCA 27, at para. 26.
In 2011, Parliament once more amended the sentencing regime for Fraud Over $5,000, by adding to the Criminal Code a mandatory minimum sentence of two years where the total value of the fraud exceeds $1,000,000: Standing up for Victims of White Collar Crime Act, S.C. 2011, c. 6, s. 2; Criminal Code, s. 380(1.1).
By operation of s. 380(1)(a) and s. 380(1.1), therefore, Mr. Douse faces penal liability of between two and 14 years in prison. The only question is where within that range Mr. Douse’s sentence should fall.
Sentencing is more of an art than a science, and sentencing ranges are a form of appellate guidance that provide a tool to begin the exercise of crafting a fit and proportionate sentence. Ranges are not straitjackets. Sentencing judges must consider and balance a constellation of factors, and it remains a discretionary exercise for courts to weigh all relevant factors to meet the basic objectives of sentencing, with the goal in every case being a sanction that is fair, fit and principled: Parranto, supra, at paras. 1 & 9-10 & 37.
With that said, the traditional sentencing range of three-to-five-years endorsed by our Court of Appeal appears to have broadened with the passage of time; an incremental but evolving jurisprudential reflection of Parliament’s will as expressed through the legislative changes to the Criminal Code.
For example, in R. v. Dhanaswar, 2016 ONCA 172, a fraud of $2.3 million, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld a six-year sentence imposed by the trial judge, finding that “the sentence was fit and within the acceptable range”: at para. 11 (underlining added for emphasis). Indeed, the trial judge found that the appropriate range of sentence for a fraud of that scale was “between three and eight years in prison”: R. v. Dhanaswar, [2014] O.J. No. 6388 (S.C.J.), at para. 23.
In R. v. Pavao, 2018 ONSC 4889, a fraud of $1.1 million, the offender was sentenced to five years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction and the sentence, but only the restitution order and fine in lieu of forfeiture, not the quantum of jail imposed: R. v. Pavao, 2021 ONCA 527.
In R. v. Wagar, 2018 ONCA 931, a financial advisor pleaded guilty to defrauding three people of close to $800,000. At the trial level, defence argued that the range was between two and five years, whereas the Crown submitted the range was five-to-seven-years. The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of five-and-one-half years, finding, at para. 10:
The sentence is neither manifestly excessive nor demonstrably unfit. The appellant exploited highly vulnerable victims, the offences involved significant breaches of trust and large sums of money, the offences were committed over a lengthy period of time and motivated by greed. The devastating victim impact was clear and the pre-sentence report included few redeeming features.
In R. v. Motayne, 2019 ONSC 6084, a fraud of close to $1.1 million, the court found that the appropriate range was “at least four to eight years” and sentenced the offender to 6.5 years: para. 105 (appealed to the Court of Appeal on basis of conviction only, dismissed at 2022 ONCA 562, and again dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada at [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 324).
I acknowledge that the traditional three-to-five-year range identified in earlier cases remains an important starting point. However, subsequent legislative amendments and recent case law demonstrate that, in large, trust-based frauds, proportionate sentences may fall above the traditional range where circumstances warrant it.
While Defence relies on the recent decision of R. v. Rathore, 2026 ONCJ 51, I do not find that case persuasive in these circumstances.
Whereas Rathore was a syndicated mortgage fraud involving the misrepresentation of value and risk of investments to a broad group of commercial investors, Mr. Douse’s crimes involved a trust-based advisor-client fraud involving personal misappropriation, forged documents, false statements, unauthorized redemptions, and impersonation, all to the detriment of clients personally known to him, and to whom he owed fiduciary responsibilities.
In short, the personal trust element in Mr. Douse’s criminal activities was central and extreme; his victims chose to work with him based on personal and family trust, which he exploited through his role as their trusted financial advisor.
THE SENTENCE
The evaluation of an individual offender’s moral culpability is assessed by weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the offence and the offender: s. 718.2(a).
While the principle of sentencing parity remains a salient consideration, and is itself “an expression of proportionality”, no two cases are alike, and “[i]ndividualization is central to the proportionality assessment. Whereas the gravity of a particular offence may be relatively constant, each offence is ‘committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile’”: Parranto, supra, at para. 12.
Within the context of the sentencing ranges for similar offences found within the jurisprudence, the sentence in a given case will be pushed higher up or lower down the scale depending upon the relative importance of the mitigating and aggravating features of the case: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2012 SCC 6, at para. 43.
Mitigating Circumstances
- I have considered the following aspects of Kevin Douse’s case in assessing mitigation:
i. Mr. Douse comes before this court as a first-time offender. He has no prior criminal record.
ii. He has pleaded guilty to this offence, thereby saving the time and expense of a trial, and numerous victims and witnesses have been spared from having to testify. The court was aware of Mr. Douse’s intention to resolve this case as far back as August of 2025, when the matter was judicially pre-tried before me. The only dates that were scheduled were those required for the guilty plea, submissions, and sentencing.
iii. Mr. Douse expressed remorse for his crime. Genuine remorse is a mitigating factor where it reflects insight and an acceptance of responsibility. However, the mitigating weight of this offender’s remorse is moderated by his continued suggestion that workplace pressure and his employer somehow contributed to the commission of these crimes. It is further attenuated by his assertion to the PSR author that he is an “honourable, trustworthy” person, given that the deliberate intent to deceive and lie is an essential element of this offence. Mr. Douse’s self-assessments betray a lack of full insight into the deliberate and sustained nature of his criminal conduct. The record before this court is clear that all misappropriated funds were intended for Mr. Douse’s personal benefit, and that he abused his reputation as being an “honourable, trustworthy” person to defraud the public of more than $1.8 million.
iv. The disintegration of Mr. Douse’s family, including the divorce from his wife and its effect on their children, resulting from his criminal conduct is a collateral consequence that the court is required to take into consideration: R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, at para. 19.
v. Mr. Douse continues to enjoy the love and support of his family, which is mitigating insofar as it is evidence of his potential for eventual reintegration into the community and the meaningful supports that will promote his rehabilitation.
vi. Although the letter of support filed as Exhibit #4 suggests that this criminality was out-of-character for Mr. Douse, s. 380.1(2) specifically precludes me from considering as mitigating the offender’s status or reputation in the community if those circumstances were relevant to, contributed to, or were used in the commission of the offence. The victim impact statements speak entirely to the use Mr. Douse made of his status and reputation in the community, which he exploited to manipulate others in pursuit of his own personal greed.
vii. The Court of Appeal for Ontario has repeatedly confirmed that mental health challenges may mitigate and lower an offender’s moral blameworthiness when there is a causal connection between the mental health challenges and the offences at issue. In this case, there is no evidence establishing a causal connection between the emotional and/or psychological difficulties described by Mr. Douse today and the commission of this offence across the better part of a decade: R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, at paras. 46-50.
Aggravating Circumstances
- I find the following aspects of Kevin Douse’s case to be aggravating:
i. This was not a one-time moral failing on Mr. Douse’s part; rather, he repeatedly engaged in the fraudulent conduct over a period of seven years.
ii. The magnitude, complexity, duration and degree of planning of the fraud was significant. Mr. Douse ran a long-term, sophisticated fraud in which he diverted client investment funds into his personal bank account, forged documents, impersonated clients, made unauthorized transactions, and shuffled money between accounts to cover-up his earlier crimes: s. 380.1(1)(a).
iii. The offence involved more than two dozen victims, 25 in total, and his crimes affected countless others more collaterally – see Exhibit #3: s. 380.1(1)(c).
iv. The offence had a devastating impact on the victims given their personal circumstances, including their financial situations – see Exhibit #3: s. 380.1(1)(c.1); s. 718.2(a)(iii.1).
v. Mr. Douse took advantage of his position as a trusted financial advisor and the high regard in which he was held in the community – see Exhibits #1 and #3: s. 380.1(1)(d); s. 718.2(a)(iii).
vi. Mr. Douse did not comply with the professional standards normally applicable to the activities associated with his role as a trusted financial advisor, as the Canada Life investigation that led to his termination confirms: s. 380.1(e).
vii. The value of the fraud committed was well in excess of $1,000,000, at $1,804,283.82. His victims were left with an unrecovered loss of $1,380,535.47: s. 380.1(1.1).
viii. I find that Mr. Douse’s offending was motivated by personal gain and financial self-interest. His fraudulent scheme only came to an end because he got caught. I have no confidence that Mr. Douse would have otherwise ceased defrauding his clients of his own free will.
In all these circumstances, I find Mr. Douse’s offending to be grave, and his individual moral culpability to be substantial.
Specific to the ‘white collar’ crime of Fraud Over $5,000, where the offender has used their position to commit a breach of trust, the courts have consistently found that denunciation and general deterrence are the paramount sentencing considerations, and that the length of the sentence imposed is what vindicates those objectives: R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, at para. 160; R. v. Castro, 2010 ONCA 718, at para. 30; Dobis, supra, at para. 42.
Relevant factors for the sentencing court’s consideration include the length of time over which the conduct took place, whether the offence was a sophisticated and well-planned scheme, the amount involved and, most importantly, the impact of the offender’s conduct on the victims. Secondary to these considerations are specific deterrence, rehabilitation and any mitigating circumstances such as a plea of guilty or co-operation with the authorities in tracing the funds: Castro, supra, at para. 30; R. v. Scherer, 1984 3594 (ON CA), [1984] O.J. No. 156, at para. 34.
Mr. Douse has been found guilty of a single count of Fraud Over $5,000, for defrauding the public of more than $1.8 million, comprising investment funds stolen from 25 victims, leaving unrecovered losses totalling more than $1.3 million.
He faces a mandatory term of imprisonment of no less than two years. His maximum exposure to penal liability is imprisonment for up to 14 years.
The mandatory minimum jail sentence is reserved “for the ‘best’ offender and should have an inflationary effect on the sentences imposed on even more culpable offenders”: Campbell, 2024 ONSC 5242, at para. 86.
On these facts, I find that a fit sentence lies in the range of five to eight years in prison.
Disposition
I sentence Kevin Douse to a period of incarceration of five-and-one-half years in a federal penitentiary. A term of imprisonment of this length is consistent with the sentence upheld in Wagar for a comparable breach-of-trust fraud by a financial advisor and is proportionate here for the reasons already given.
Mr. Douse will make a restitution in the amount of $561,430.97, which will be payable in the quanta associated with the individual persons named in the restitution order: s. 738(1)(a). That Order shall take priority over payment of the fine in lieu of forfeiture to be imposed.
To balance denunciation and general deterrence with proportionality in the ancillary orders – and having regard to the priority of restitution and to the offender’s anticipated post-release earning capacity – I fix the fine in lieu of forfeiture at $1,380,535.47, payable within 15 years of release. Any amounts paid toward restitution shall reduce the outstanding fine dollar for dollar, ensuring that victims are paid first and avoiding an unduly crushing cumulative financial burden: R. v. Jeannotte, 2026 ONCA 79, at para. 25.
Should Mr. Douse default in payment of the fine in lieu of forfeiture, he shall be imprisoned for a term of five-and-one-half years, consecutive to any other term of imprisonment, in accordance with sections 462.37(4)(a)(vii) and (b).
Pursuant to s. 380.2, I order that Mr. Douse is prohibited from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, or becoming a volunteer in any capacity, that involves having authority over the real property, money or valuable security of another person for a period of 20 years. This period includes the carceral period to which Mr. Douse has been sentenced: s. 380.2(1) and s. 380.2(2).
The victim fine surcharge is waived, pursuant to s. 737(2.1)(a).
Released: 27 February 2026.
Signed: Justice C.A. Brannagan