ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
24-38101953 & 24-13102094
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JUSTIN ANDERSON
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Before Justice C.A. Brannagan
Mr. D. Russell ................................................................. counsel for the Provincial Crown
Ms. V. Dhawan..................................................................... counsel for the Federal Crown
Mr. D. Mulak ................................................................................ counsel for the Defendant
I. OVERVIEW
Justin Anderson first appeared before me on September 19th, 2025, in a busy plea court at the Barrie Courthouse. The matter had not previously received judicial case management, though it ought to have before being scheduled for plea.
On that date, Mr. Anderson pleaded guilty to five indictable offences across three informations; those offences include: Possession of Methamphetamine for the Purpose of Trafficking, CDSA s. 5(2), Unauthorized Possession of a Loaded Firearm, s. 95(1), Forcible Confinement against T.J., s. 279(2), Point Firearm at T.J., s. 87, and Unauthorized Possession of Firearm Knowing Possession Unauthorized, s. 92(1).
The matter adjourned for a pre-sentence report to be prepared with sentencing submissions to be heard later.
On December 4th, Mr. Anderson was once again before me. By that appearance, two more informations had been transferred into Barrie from Belleville. That morning, I learned that Mr. Anderson also wished to resolve those charges before me. He entered pleas of guilty to the following additional indictable offences: Forcible Confinement against R.C., s. 279(2), Breaching a Weapons Prohibition Order, s. 117.01(1), Failing to Comply with Release Order by possessing a Firearm, s. 145(4)(a), and Possess Firearm with Defaced Serial Number, s. 108(1)(b).
Mr. Anderson stands to be sentenced on these nine indictable offences across four different informations from two jurisdictions. These are my reasons for sentence.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE OFFENCES
- Although the Belleville pleas were entered after the Barrie charges, I will address them first since they are chronologically earlier in time.
i. In May of 2024, the victim, R.C., was staying at an address in Belleville with a friend, who had introduced her to Justin Anderson.
ii. During the week of May 26th to 31st, R.C. was an occupant in a vehicle driven by Mr. Anderson. Over the course of that week, Mr. Anderson forcibly confined R.C. by having her travel with him throughout Ontario, while he engaged in drug trafficking activities and made cash deliveries.
iii. Throughout that week, Mr. Anderson carried a handgun in his waistband. He would repeatedly flash the handgun towards R.C. as a means of controlling and intimidating her. He controlled her movement and coerced her to stay with him while he engaged in repeated criminal activity.
iv. On May 31st, in the City of Vaughan, R.C. was with Mr. Anderson while he trafficked in a firearm. R.C. later recalled to police having seen Mr. Anderson assume control over a firearm wrapped in a pink sweater.
v. R.C. was able to escape from Mr. Anderson in Vaughan. She reported what had happened to her to York Regional Police. She returned to Belleville safely by train. Mr. Anderson then drove from Vaughan back to Belleville to regain control over R.C. By that time, however, the Belleville Police had been contacted and Mr. Anderson fled to evade his arrest.
vi. Belleville Police formed grounds to arrest Justin Anderson and a first instance warrant was issued to that end.
vii. Mr. Anderson was bound by multiple weapons prohibition orders, including one made on August 23rd, 2021 (s. 109, 10 years in duration), and another made on November 15th, 2022 (s. 110, 5 years in duration).
viii. He was also subject to a Release Order at this time, owing to weapons charges out of Bracebridge, which prohibited him from possessing weapons, including firearms.
- The facts admitted by Mr. Anderson on September 19th, 2025, are as follows:
i. On June 1st, 2024, Barrie Police learned of the Belleville arrest warrant for Justin Anderson. He was known to be the driver of a blue four-door BMW with an identified Ontario licence plate. Just before 5pm, Barrie Police located Mr. Anderson’s vehicle parked in a plaza parking lot at 477 Grove Street East in the City of Barrie. They initiated surveillance.
ii. That evening, the victim T.J. was in the company of her boyfriend, J.L., at an address in Barrie not far from where Mr. Anderson’s BMW was parked. The two were engaged in a conversation that led J.L. to become upset with T.J. In anger, J.L. told the occupants of the residence that T.J. was a “rat”, alleging that she had provided information to the police concerning drug trafficking activities in the City of Barrie.
iii. Justin Anderson was present at the residence and heard J.L.’s accusation of T.J. being an alleged informant. Mr. Anderson became enraged by this. He pulled out a brown and grey handgun and pointed it at T.J., numerous times, forcibly confining her in this manner for approximately one hour.
iv. While pointing the firearm at T.J., he told her that he was going to rape her and force her into the sex trade as a prostitute. T.J. feared for her life.
v. T.J. fled the residence around 11pm. She jumped over numerous fences and hid beneath a motor vehicle. Police located her several hours later.
vi. Soon after T.J. fled the residence, at 11:20pm, members of the Barrie Police Service’s Tactical Support Unit observed Mr. Anderson returning to his BMW. They arrested him on the strength of the Belleville warrant.
vii. Search incident to his arrest revealed that Mr. Anderson was in possession of a firearm tucked into his waistband. It was a CZ 9mm handgun, the magazine loaded with nine rounds of 9mm ammunition.
viii. Mr. Anderson was also in possession of a satchel, which contained the following drugs that were packaged or wrapped in plastic bags:
429.71 grams (~ 15 ounces) of methamphetamine;
64.63 grams (~ 2.25 ounces) of cocaine;
19.44 grams (~ 2/3 ounce) of fentanyl;
948 pills of oxycodone;
12 pills of hydromorphone; and,
60 pills of nabilone (a synthetic cannabinoid).
ix. Mr. Anderson’s satchel also contained $1,185 in cash, and a small scale.
x. Following his arrest, a search warrant for Mr. Anderson’s motor vehicle was applied for and issued. Following the execution of that search warrant, Barrie Police discovered a break-action rifle with a defaced serial number in the trunk of his BMW.
- Mr. Anderson admitted to all these facts, and I found him guilty of the offences to which he pleaded guilty.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
Justin Anderson is 34 years of age. He was born in Markham, Ontario.
He has a lengthy criminal record, beginning in 2015 with entries consistent through to 2025. He has upward of 30 convictions for various types of offences, including breaches of court orders, crimes of dishonesty, property offences, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, flight police, assault police, weapons possession and, most seriously, aggravated assault.
Despite his lengthy criminal record, Mr. Anderson has never been sentenced to the penitentiary. The longest carceral sentence that he has received to-date was 215 days for the aggravated assault conviction in 2021, which resulted in the weapons prohibition order that he has breached under s. 117.01(1).
i. Defence Counsel’s Submissions
Mr. Mulak made capable submissions on his client’s behalf. He largely drew upon the comprehensive and helpful pre-sentence report, which I address below.
Counsel submitted letters from the Central East Correctional Centre (“CECC”) and the Central North Correctional Centre (“CNCC”), by the institutions’ respective security managers. The currency of the letters ended in October 2025.
During the time that Mr. Anderson was housed between CECC and CNCC, he was subjected to lockdowns, almost exclusively for “staffing issues”, for 100 days.
Mr. Anderson was also triple bunked for 173 days in standard cells that are 7’ wide and 15’ long. These cells are designed to hold two inmates, and they contain only two bunk-style beds. That means that one of the three inmates would be left sleeping on the jail cell floor.
The courts have long recognized that both lockdowns and triple bunking are particularly difficult and punitive presentence custody conditions. However, they are mitigating factors only in determining a proper sentence; those hardships alone cannot justify the imposition of an inappropriate sentence: R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, at paras. 50-52; R. v. Avansi, 2023 ONCA 547, at para. 8.
Mr. Mulak also submitted that there were triable issues in both the Barrie and the Belleville cases. The Crown did not contest this. As I discuss below, given the unwillingness by either of T.J. or R.C. to take part in this sentencing hearing, I accept Mr. Mulak’s submission on this point, at least with respect to the two charges of forcible confinement.
ii. The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”)
The purpose of a PSR is to provide the sentencing court with information about “the offender’s age, maturity, character, behaviour, attitude and willingness to make amends.” Its function is to aid the court in imposing a fit and appropriate sentence by portraying the offender’s background, character and circumstances: Criminal Code, s. 721(1) & (3); R. v. Green, 2006 ONCJ 364, at paras. 12-13; R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55, at para. 28; R. v. Di Paola, 2025 SCC 31, at para. 98.
The pre-sentence report was made an exhibit on the proceeding with the consent of both Mr. Anderson and his counsel, without qualification. On that basis, I accept the author’s findings in whole and refer to some of them in detail here.
The PSR conveys that Mr. Anderson was raised in a pro-criminal environment that included exposure to criminal activity and drug use from a young age. His upbringing was void of structure and positive role-modeling, leaving him to fend for himself. His biological parents separated when he was just one year old.
His biological father was a drug user who physically beat Mr. Anderson when he was a toddler. When Justin was three years old, his mother attended at the father’s residence to pick up her son. She found Justin playing with a bag of cocaine.
His parents were both “functioning addicts” during Mr. Anderson’s formative years. His stepfather was the president of a motorcycle club. Unsurprisingly, Justin developed behavioural issues.
Child protection services were in and out of Justin’s life. When he was age 14, his mother took him to such a service provider as she could no longer manage him. By the age of 16, he had returned to his parents’ residence and began selling cocaine to his mother. The two of them would use cocaine together.
As an adult, Mr. Anderson has had three domestic relationships of significance, bearing him a total of four offspring. Each of those relationships ended in acrimony, and Mr. Anderson is not permitted to have contact with any of his children.
He suffered from suicidal ideation after losing his children. During a hospitalization he was diagnosed with depression, bipolar, and attention deficit disorder, for which he takes prescribed medication.
Mr. Anderson is described as lacking pro-social coping skills. He admitted to the PSR author that his peer group consists solely of individuals involved in the drug and gun subculture. He advised that he does not like police. He advised that he regularly uses cocaine and methamphetamine, acknowledging that he has a drug addiction, and that he supports his addiction through drug trafficking. He has never sought treatment for his addictions.
When the PSR author spoke with Mr. Anderson about the offences for which he is to be sentenced, he admitted that he was at the Barrie residence to sell drugs. He acknowledged that he pointed a firearm at the victim while referring to her as a “rat”. He claimed not to have known the victim before this occurrence.
Mr. Anderson reported possessing firearms for protection while dealing drugs, noting the unpredictability of people involved in the drug subculture. He readily acknowledged the inherent dangers of guns, accepting their possession as necessary for someone like him “being in [the] drug game”.
When the PSR author questioned Mr. Anderson about his drug trafficking activities – specifically his fentanyl trafficking amidst an opioid crisis – he acknowledged having seen people die from drug overdoses. He blamed users for being “stupid” and “impatient”. He commented that if they did not buy the drug from him, they would have bought it from someone else.
Between 2015 and 2024, he was subjected to eight separate community supervision orders. His reporting habits were inconsistent and variously resulted in breach charges being laid. Ministry records from previous supervisors indicated that he was not suitable for community supervision.
Considering all of this, I find that Mr. Anderson’s attitude is callous. He demonstrates a marked indifference for the lives or safety of others. He is deeply entrenched in the criminal lifestyle, readily acknowledging his ongoing criminal associations within a subculture that identifies itself through illicit drug trafficking and firearm possession. In my view, he fits the description of a true criminal outlaw.
The PSR author opined that Justin Anderson is at a high-risk to reoffend. That is a finding with which I wholeheartedly agree and adopt.
iii. Victim Impact Statement (“VIS”)
Section 722 of the Criminal Code requires the court to consider the harm suffered by victims of crime and the impact of the offence on victims through victim impact statements. The VIS is the court’s opportunity to hear directly from the victims about the impacts, losses, and harms that the offender’s conduct has caused them.
The PSR author contacted the Barrie victim, T.J., for the purpose of the report. The victim advised that she had not completed a victim impact statement, and she declined to provide any comment for the pre-sentence report.
Given the disturbing ordeal of being threatened with sexual violence and being called a “rat” for allegedly informing on drug trafficking activities, while being forcibly confined at gunpoint for the better part of an hour by an admitted drug trafficker, the absence of victim input in T.J.’s case is unsurprising.
Despite the absence of her VIS, I find that the victim would reasonably have been terrified for her life. Indeed, once she was able to flee the residence where Mr. Anderson had confined her at gunpoint, she concealed herself beneath a vehicle for several hours until police eventually located her. She was clearly fearful that Mr. Anderson would cause physical harm to her person.
R.C., the Belleville victim, also declined to provide a victim impact statement. Nevertheless, the circumstances indicate that she endured significant fear while being compelled to travel across parts of Ontario with Mr. Anderson for nearly a week, while he brandished a firearm and engaged in drug and firearm trafficking. Like T.J., R.C. seized an opportunity to escape, only for Mr. Anderson to pursue her to regain control. The coercive restraint and profound loss of autonomy she suffered are evident.
I find that in both cases, Mr. Anderson used a firearm to threaten, intimidate, control, and strike fear into his female victims. The harm suffered by T.J. and R.C. is both apparent and undisputable.
IV. THE APPLICABLE LAW
(A) The Offences before the Court
i. Forcible Confinement & Point Firearm Charges
When the Crown proceeds by indictment, the maximum penal liability for the crime of forcible confinement, s. 279(2), is 10 years.
The offence protects individual autonomy and bodily integrity. A person commits the offence where, for any significant period of time, the victim is coercively restrained or directed contrary to their wishes, such that they could not move about according to their own inclination and desire: R. v. Rocheleau, 2013 ONCA 679, at para. 28, citing to R. v. Pritchard, 2008 SCC 59, at para. 24.
The sentencing range for this offence is broad and the ultimate disposition will turn on several factors. These may include the duration of the confinement, the circumstances in which it took place, and the purpose for which the offender confined the victim: R. v. Jogiyat, 2024 ONSC 3498, at para. 69.
Where the Crown proceeds by indictment for the offence of point firearm, s. 87, the maximum term of imprisonment is five years.
The point firearm offence is a “use” offence, as the brandishing of a gun or holding it to intimidate a victim falls within its ambit: see R. v. Cheetham, [1980] O.J. No. 721 (C.A.); R. v. G.C.L., 1979 CanLII 2999 (ON CA), [1979] O.J. No. 481. Any time a firearm is used, especially when loaded, as it was here, there is an increased risk of death or bodily injury.
In relation to R.C., Mr. Anderson coercively restrained her at gunpoint for approximately one week while engaging in various criminal activities. Although his precise purpose in confining her is unclear on this record, the evidence shows that after R.C. escaped on May 31, Mr. Anderson returned to Belleville to regain control over her. I regard this as the most serious offence to which Mr. Anderson has pleaded guilty, as it closely resembles a prolonged kidnapping.
Mr. Anderson pleaded guilty to forcibly confining his victim, T.J., just one day later, also at gun point. He did so for approximately one hour. He did so because he believed T.J. to be a “rat” – a person who is seen to cooperate with police investigations. As an admitted drug trafficker, Mr. Anderson appeared to have taken some exception to the possibility of an alleged police informant in his midst. He reacted by repeatedly pointing a firearm at T.J., threatening to rape her and force her into prostitution. T.J. feared for her life and was eventually able to flee.
Given that Mr. Anderson was arrested just 20 minutes after T.J. fled the Barrie residence, and that he was in possession of a loaded firearm upon his arrest, I find that the firearm used by Mr. Anderson to forcibly confine T.J. was loaded when he repeatedly pointed it at her. By inference, it would not be a stretch to believe that the gun was loaded when he forcibly confined R.C. the week prior.
ii. The Firearm Possession Charges
- When Barrie Police arrested Mr. Anderson, he was in possession of a 9mm handgun, loaded with nine rounds of 9mm ammunition. Police also discovered a break-action rifle with a defaced serial number in the trunk of his car. He has pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a loaded prohibited handgun, unlawfully possessing a handgun while knowing that such possession was unauthorized and possessing a firearm with a defaced serial number.
(a) Possession of a Firearm with a Defaced Serial Number, s. 108(1)(b)
The s. 108(1)(b) offence, when proceeded by indictment, carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years.
Courts have found that firearms without serial numbers – untraceable firearms – are the interest of one group in society only: criminals: R. v. Balatoni, [2004] O.J. No. 5311 (S.C.J.), at paras. 12-13. I would add that criminals who seek to threaten, intimidate, injure or even kill other human beings using untraceable firearms do so for one reason only – to circumvent detection by law enforcement.
Possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number is an aggravating factor on sentence: R. v. Samaniego, 2018 ONSC 6785, at para. 20; sentence upheld at the Court of Appeal in 2020 ONCA 439 and appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on other grounds in 2022 SCC 9.
(b) Unlawful Possession of Handgun Knowing Possession
Unauthorized, s. 92(1)
The s. 92(1) offence is a straight indictable offence and carries with it a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. It is a knowledge-based, or mens rea, offence.
A range of 9-12 months custody has been found to be at the low-end of the range for this offence: R. v. Abdulsalam, [2020] O.J. No. 457 (S.C.J.), at paras. 20-21.
Given the relative dearth of case law discussing sentencing ranges for the s. 92(1) offence, the jurisprudence for s. 95(1) sentencing cases has been found to be instructive: see R. c. Baptiste, 2020 QCCQ 1813, at para. 84.
(c) Unlawful Possession of Loaded Prohibited Handgun, s. 95(1)
Section 95(1) is also a mens rea offence. The Crown must prove as an essential element of the offence that the accused knew that the firearm was loaded. That the Crown must establish this additional knowledge component increases the moral culpability of blameworthiness of an accused’s conduct, thereby increasing the seriousness of the offence: R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677 at para. 88; R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128 at para. 66.
In Nur, Justice Doherty endorsed the view that those offenders who are at the “true crime end of the s. 95 spectrum” should be incarcerated in the range of three years. That finding was made despite the Court having found that the three-year mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional. His Honour held at para. 206:
Individuals who have loaded restricted or prohibited firearms that they have no business possessing anywhere or at any time, and who are engaged in criminal conduct or conduct that poses a danger to others should continue to receive exemplary sentences that will emphasize deterrence and denunciation.
Those words were cited with approval in R. v. Mohiadin, 2021 ONCA 122, at para. 12: “In Nur, both this court and the Supreme Court of Canada declined to interfere with a 40-month sentence imposed on a 19-year-old first offender”.
In R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at para. 177, the Court again cited to Justice Doherty in Nur, noting that “[i]n most cases, at the ‘true crime’ end of the spectrum, a penitentiary sentence will be necessary for a s. 95 offence. In some cases, sentences at or near a maximum reformatory sentence will be appropriate.”
In the recent decision of R. v. Nguyen, 2024 ONSC 6830, at para. 18, Justice Schreck observed the “well-established range of sentences for firearm possession offences involving handguns of between two-and-five years imprisonment for a first offence”. His Honour continued:
18The gravity of firearm possession offences is always significant, so where an individual is situated within the range will depend on the offender’s level of moral culpability. This often depends on the reason for which the firearm was possessed.
19Where the firearm was possessed by an “outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade,” the level of moral culpability will be high. Because of this, such offenders tend to receive sentences at the higher end of the range [all citations omitted].
- Mr. Anderson is such an outlaw. He used his handgun as a tool of his drug trafficking activities. He used it to threaten, intimidate and forcibly confine two vulnerable women. That he possessed a second firearm with a defaced serial number is further evidence of his commitment to a criminal lifestyle. That he possessed both firearms while knowing that he was unauthorized to do so calcifies his outlaw status in the eyes of this court.
iii. The Weapons Prohibition Charges
Mr. Anderson pleaded guilty to breaching a weapons prohibition order, s. 117.01(1), and failing to comply with a release order, s. 145(5)(a).
The maximum term of imprisonment for the s. 117.01(1) offence, when proceeding by indictment, is 10 years. For the bail breach, the maximum term is two years.
The protection of the public is the core purpose for conditions and orders that prohibit an individual from possessing weapons. They promote Parliament’s recognition that those who unlawfully possess firearms endanger the community. Those who possess firearms while bound by one or more weapons prohibition order present as an enhanced risk of danger to the community.
Given the policy rationale for these orders, where the possessor of the firearm is prohibited from being in its possession, this can be an aggravating factor in relation to a charge of firearm possession: Jogiyat, 2024 ONSC 3498, at para. 73, and R. v. Henry, [2019] O.J. No. 5711 (S.C.J.), at paras. 27 and 34.
Because weapons prohibition orders are imposed in the interest of public safety, their legal interests are distinct from other firearm possession offences. Sentences for breaches of weapons prohibition orders should typically be served consecutively to other sentences arising from the same transaction or considered to be significantly aggravating if concurrent sentences are ordered: R. v. Showbeg, 2023 ONCA 549, at paras. 5-6; Omoragbon, 2020 ONCA 336, at para. 29; Claros, 2019 ONCA 626, at paras. 51-52; R. v. McCue, 2012 ONCA 773, at para. 22.
Mr. Anderson has demonstrated no regard for court orders, including prohibition orders. This suggests a heightened risk of reoffending similarly in the future.
iv. The Possession of Methamphetamine for the Purpose of Trafficking Charge, s. 5(2) CDSA
Upon his arrest, police discovered a significant quantity of drugs on Mr. Anderson’s person: approximately 15 ounces of methamphetamine, 2.25 ounces of cocaine, two-thirds an ounce of fentanyl, and more than 1,000 pills of various opioids.
He pleaded guilty to s. 5(2) of the CDSA for possessing the 15 ounces of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. He accepted as aggravating that he was also in possession of the balance of the drugs, all of which are Schedule I substances (except for the nabilone, which is a Schedule II substance).
Section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act provides that a person who contravenes s. 5(2), “if the subject matter of the offence is a substance included in Schedule I or II, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life”.
All the Schedule I substances that Mr. Anderson was in possession of are “hard” drugs. As Justice MacDonnell observed almost 20 years ago, when methamphetamines first began infiltrating the streets of this Province:
27…the use of crystal methamphetamine carries with it the potential for enormous grief and misery for individual users and for significant harm to the health and safety of the community. In many respects, the destructive consequences of crystal methamphetamine mirror those of two other hard drugs, heroin and cocaine.
51[The defendant’s trafficking in hard drugs was] activity that was calculated to cause harm that is measured more often than not in ruined lives, and [the defendant] did so without a thought for the destructive consequences of his actions. The courts have an obligation to unequivocally affirm that anyone who participates in this miserable business, particularly those motivated purely by profit, will face lengthy prison terms.
R. v. Villanueva, 2007 ONCJ 87
- The spirit of His Honour’s remarks was renewed years later in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at para. 60:
Even if “criminal justice responses alone cannot solve the problem”, however, the courts must use the tools Parliament has provided to address societal ills. Parliament has chosen to employ the mechanisms of criminal law and sentencing law to advance public safety, hold those who distribute drugs accountable, and communicate the wrongfulness of poisoning people and communities. This is perhaps most apparent in the maximum sentence for trafficking in a Schedule I drug, which is life in prison. As stated in Friesen, “[m]aximum penalties are one of Parliament’s principal tools to determine the gravity of the offence” [all citations omitted].
Trafficking drugs at the multi-ounce level has been accepted by the courts as establishing such offenders as being “mid-level traffickers”: R. v. Nguyen, 2025 ONSC 2255, at para. 17; Villanueva, supra, at para. 49.
The sentencing range for the offence of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking by the mid-level trafficker is between the upper reformatory range to five years: R. v. Nguyen, 2024 ONSC 6830, at para. 23.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario has recently accepted that “the sentence range for commercial [i.e., multi-kilogram] or mid-level trafficking cases involving methamphetamine is between approximately 5 and 12 years in jail”: R. v. Mercier, 2023 ONCA 98, at para. 23.
Justin Anderson was a mid-level trafficker at the multi-ounce level. I find that his role as a trafficker of hard drugs is pitiless and indifferent to the destructive effects his poisons have on our communities. While acknowledging that Mr. Anderson is a user himself, I find that the primary motivation behind his drug trafficking activities was for profit; the sheer quantity of hard drugs found on his person is evidence of that. Mr. Anderson was effectively a travelling pharmacy.
v. The Toxic Combination of Guns and Drugs
The criminal courts have repeatedly rebuked the toxic combination of firearms and drugs, noting that together they pose “a pernicious and persisting threat to public safety and the welfare of the community. The social ills, including associated criminal conduct, fuelled by this combination is now well recognized”: R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, at para. 11.
While firearm and drug offences may often arise from a single transaction, the courts have nevertheless found that the offences serve different legally protected interests. Because of this, these offences can warrant consecutive sentences: R. v. Wisdom, 2024 ONSC 4047, at para. 34.
(B) Relevant Sentencing Principles
i. The Fundamental Principle of Proportionality
The fundamental principle of sentencing is set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”
In R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517, at para. 33, the Court of Appeal reiterated the ‘just deserts’ theory of punishment:
The proportionality principle is rooted in retributive or desert-based theories of punishment that define a just sanction as one that is deserved by an offender, based solely on the seriousness of the offence and an offender’s moral blameworthiness. In Canada, proportionality operates as a restraint or limitation on punishment.
This sentencing principle accords with the law as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. C.A.M., 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, where, at para. 77, the Court explained that “retribution is an accepted, and indeed important, principle of sentencing in our criminal law.”
The Court also stressed, however, that neither retribution nor denunciation alone could provide an exhaustive justification for the imposition of criminal sanctions, considering the sentencing objectives found in s. 718 of the Criminal Code:
the meaning of retribution must be considered in conjunction with the other legitimate objectives of sentencing, which include (but are not limited to) deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation and the protection of society. […] In the final analysis, the overarching duty of a sentencing judge is to draw upon all the legitimate principles of sentencing to determine a ‘just and appropriate’ sentence which reflects the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
C.A.M., supra, at para. 82
- Justin Anderson’s moral blameworthiness is significant. Each of the criminal offences that he has been convicted of is serious.
ii. Other Sentencing Principles
Section 718.2 enumerates a list of additional principles that judges must consider in arriving at a just and appropriate sentence for a particular offender.
The mitigating and aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, s. 718.2(a), are always relevant.
For Mr. Anderson, I find the following factors to be mitigating:
i. The effect of his guilty pleas, both as a sign of his remorse and the saving of court resources.
ii. The resolution of the forcible confinement charges in the face of clear triable issues and potentially uncooperative victims.
iii. The punitive conditions of Mr. Anderson’s presentence custody, including lengthy lockdowns and triple bunking.
iv. I find Mr. Anderson’s tragic personal history mitigating to some extent. As his mother noted in the pre-sentence report, he “never had a chance”.
v. The support of his mother is also relevant, though muted in that she is a recovering addict who cannot be around her son given his own addictions issues, his ongoing criminal lifestyle, and to protect her own sobriety.
- I find as aggravating the following factors:
i. Mr. Anderson’s extensive and persistent criminal record: see Gilmore, supra, at para. 44: “An extensive criminal record suggests that an individual is more morally blameworthy because they have previously been sanctioned yet remain undeterred and unwilling or unable to rehabilitate”.
ii. Mr. Anderson forcibly imposed his will, at gunpoint, on two vulnerable female victims for extended periods of time: s. 718.2(a)(iii.1).
iii. He was arrested with significant quantities of several types of hard drugs.
iv. Although a user himself, the primary motivation for Mr. Anderson’s drug trafficking activities was profit. He acknowledged to the PSR author, for example, that other than having owned his own business doing roofing and exterior finishes between the ages of 22 and 29, his only other reported source of income has been dealing drugs. He is now 34 years of age.
v. He possessed a loaded firearm in public.
vi. He possessed a firearm with a defaced serial number.
vii. He was in violation of multiple court orders that prohibited him from possessing firearms.
The parity principle, s. 718.2(b), is also relevant in this case: see R. v. Pearce, 2021 ONCA 239 at para. 17, where this principle “preserves fairness in sentencing by promoting the equal treatment of offenders according to law. It applies as between […] the offender and others who have committed similar crimes, where those others are similar to the offender in terms of degree of responsibility.”
Importantly for Mr. Anderson, the principle of totality, s. 718.2(c), which is an expression of the fundamental principle, plays a central role today. Where consecutive sentences are imposed for multiple offences, the sentencing court must ensure that the cumulative sentence does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender: C.A.M., supra, at para. 42; McCue, supra, at para. 20; Omoragbon, supra, at para. 28, and R. v. R.B., 2014 ONCA 840, at para. 8.
iii. Joint Submissions in Sentencing
The parties have jointly proposed a sentence of 10.5 years in the penitentiary, less pre-sentence custody. They are also joint on all ancillary orders.
Given that the parties agree entirely on every aspect of the sentence proposed to the court, their plea agreement forms a true joint submission in law: see R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43; R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, at para. 31; R. v. Wesley, 2025 ONCA 51, at para. 68.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Anthony-Cook has explicitly recognized that joint submissions on sentence after a guilty plea are not only an accepted and acceptable means of plea resolution, they are “vital to the operation of the criminal justice system”: at paras. 1 and 2.
That said, “joint submissions on sentence are not sacrosanct. Trial judges may depart from them”: Anthony-Cook, at para. 3.
Indeed, section 606(1.1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code is explicit that “the court is not bound by any agreement made between the accused and the prosecutor”. That I am not bound by the joint submission advanced in this matter was confirmed on the record, directly with the defendant, during the plea inquiries conducted on September 19th and December 4th.
The test for departing from a joint submission – the “public interest test” – is, however, “undeniably high”: Anthony-Cook, at para. 34.
Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. This threshold is met where, despite the public interest considerations that support imposing it, it is so “markedly out of line with the expectations of reasonable persons aware of the circumstances of the case that they would view it as a break down in the proper functioning of the criminal justice system”: Anthony-Cook, supra, at para. 33.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Harasiuk, 2023 ONCA 594, has confirmed that even in cases where the joint submission is “lenient, perhaps even very lenient, this is not a permissible basis for rejecting it”: at para. 25. Similarly, the Court in Fuller, 2020 ONCA 115, at para. 16, confirmed that joint submissions should only be rejected in “rare cases”.
The rarity with which joint submissions should not be endorsed by the court are due “to a large extent because of the quid pro quo provided by accused persons in giving up their right to a trial and pleading guilty in exchange for a joint submission. In exchange for their plea of guilty, accused persons require a high degree of certainty that the joint submission agreed upon will be respected”: Wesley, supra, at para. 72.
Given that this is a joint submission, I accept that I am not free to interfere on the basis that I may have a different view of what the sentence could or should be. I may only interfere where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest.
While I find that this sentence is a generous one, perhaps even very lenient considering the circumstances of the offences and the offender, I am unable to find that the joint submission is “so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender” that accepting it would lead reasonable and informed persons to “view it as a break down in the proper functioning of the criminal justice system”: Anthony-Cook, at paras. 33-34.
Accordingly, I will accede to the joint position of 10.5 years custody.
V. SENTENCING DISPOSITION
Counsel submitted that the sentence should be attributed as six years to the Barrie Criminal Code charges, three years consecutive to the CDSA charge, and 18 months consecutive to the Belleville Criminal Code charges. In my view, that apportionment of this sentence would not adequately meet the requirements of the fundamental principle of sentencing.
Given the constraints of the quantum proposed on this joint position, Mr. Anderson’s 10.5-year sentence will be as follows:
Criminal Code #24-13102094 (offence dates of between May 31 and June 1, 2024, Belleville) – a global sentence of four years:
i. Count #5: Forcible Confinement against R.C., s. 279(2):
3 years (or 36 months, or 1,095 days)
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(a), for 10 years
Primary DNA, s. 487.04(a)(xiv)
ii. Count #8: Breaching a Weapons Prohibition Order, s. 117.01(1):
12 months, served consecutively to Count #5
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(d), for 10 years
iii. Count #9: Failing to Comply with Release Order by possessing a Firearm, s. 145(5)(a):
12 months, served concurrently with Count #5
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(d), for 10 years
Secondary DNA Order, s. 487.04(c)(i.016)
iv. Count #10: Possess Firearm with Defaced Serial Number, s. 108(1)(b):
2 years (or 24 months 730 days), served concurrently with Count #5.
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(d), for 10 years
Criminal Code #24-38101952 (offence date of June 1, 2024, Barrie):
v. Count #1: Unauthorized Possession of a Loaded Firearm, s. 95(1):
3 years (or 36 months, or 1,095 days), served consecutively to the sentences on the Belleville Information.
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(b), for 10 years
CDSA #24-38101951 (offence date of June 1, 2024, Barrie):
vi. Count #9: Possession of Methamphetamine for the Purpose of Trafficking, s. 5(2):
2 years (or 24 months or 730 days), served consecutively to all other sentences.
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(c), for 10 years
Secondary DNA, s. 487.04(b)(i)
Criminal Code #24-38101953 (offence date of June 1, 2024, Barrie) – a global sentence of 18 months:
vii. Count #2: Forcible Confinement against T.J., s. 279(2):
1.5 years (or 18 months or 548 days), served consecutively to all other sentences
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(a), for 10 years
Primary DNA, s. 487.04(a)(xiv)
viii. Count #3: Point Firearm at T.J., s. 87:
1.5 years (or 18 months, or 548 days), served concurrently with Count #2
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(d), for 10 years
ix. Count #5: Unauthorized Possession of Firearm Knowing Possession Unauthorized, s. 92(1):
1.5 years (or 18 months, or 548 days), served concurrently with Count #2.
Mandatory prohibition order, s. 109(1)(d), for 10 years
The total sentence is 3,833 days, or 10.5 years, as jointly proposed.
Mr. Anderson has been in pre-trial custody for a total of 407 actual days. At the usual rate of 1.5:1, I am crediting him with 611 days, which will be noted on the criminal record as pre-sentence custody that has been served. Therefore, he has 3,222 days left to serve in his sentence.
Mr. Anderson is prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, with either of T.J. or R.C., during his incarceration, pursuant to s. 743.21(1).
The victim fine surcharge (totalling $2,700) is waived pursuant to 737(2.1).
Addendum
I strongly encourage counsel to ensure that serious and complex resolutions of this nature are brought before a judge in a pre‑trial setting for judicial case management. This recommendation is grounded in three considerations.
First, given the gravity of these indictable offences and the late transfer of serious charges from another jurisdiction, proper notice to the court was essential. This case was far removed from the type of “quick plea” that is routine in these courts. A judicial pre-trial would have served that notice function.
Second, judicial case management ensures that adequate court time is scheduled for matters of this complexity, allowing them to receive the attention they warrant in a more efficient and effective manner than the fragmented appearances that were required here.
Third, early case management would have permitted all counsel to meet with the sentencing judge in advance to outline their respective positions, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the various charges, advise which charges were anticipated for resolution, and explain the basis for the proposed joint submission. By failing to do so, counsel risked the possibility that the court might not accede to their joint position.
This is not an innovative proposal; it reflects the usual practice for serious cases in the criminal courts. It is unclear why this matter deviated from that norm.
The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that trial judges should actively exercise their case management powers to promote efficiency and prevent undue delay, as part of its directive to “change courtroom culture”: R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, at para. 139; R. v. Cody, at paras. 36-38. Early judicial case management in this case could have streamlined scheduling, facilitated timely resolution, and reduced fragmented appearances, thereby ensuring a more efficient, fair and effective administration of justice.
Released: 11 December 2025.
Signed: Justice C.A. Brannagan