Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The moving party sought leave to appeal multiple parenting and costs orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a temporary spousal support order.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the sole issue of whether the motion judge failed to consider and apply the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Leave was denied on all other issues, including findings of fact and income determination.

The underlying decision was not stayed pending the appeal, and costs were reserved.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, was given notice that the court was considering dismissing his application under Rule 2.1.01.

Despite directions to provide a list of decisions he sought to review, the applicant responded with voluminous documents, abusive emails, and failed to state a case within the court's jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, without prejudice to the applicant filing a properly drafted notice.

The appellant appealed a family court order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the relief appealed from was granted under the Divorce Act, meaning jurisdiction properly lay with the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court ordered the appeal transferred to the Court of Appeal under s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision regarding the form of an order in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court considered whether to dismiss the application under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is not available to review decisions of Superior Court judges and that the applicant's proper recourse was an application for leave to appeal, which had already been dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order releasing $60,000 from trust to the responding party for living expenses and legal fees.

The court found that the moving party failed to establish a conflicting decision on a matter of principle or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The proposed appeal did not raise matters of general or public importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

During a family law proceeding, the motion judge ordered Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario to pay costs to the parties due to a delay caused by a court staffing shortage.

Ontario, a non-party, appealed the costs order, arguing it was made without notice.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle and was plainly wrong to make a costs order against a non-party without notice.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his motion to change and terminate his $1,000 monthly spousal support obligation following his voluntary retirement at age 55.

He argued his retirement constituted a material change in circumstance and that paying support from a previously divided pension amounted to double dipping.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's finding that the retirement was a voluntary, self-engineered withdrawal from the workforce partly motivated by a desire to avoid support obligations.

A cross-appeal by the respondent to remove a court-imposed termination date of age 64 was granted on consent.

The minor appellant brought an application seeking child support from her biological father.

The motion judge held that the appellant was required to have a litigation guardian under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the Family Law Rules did not adequately cover the situation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Family Law Rules do adequately cover the situation, specifically exempting a child in a child support case from the definition of a 'special party'.

The appeal was allowed, and the order requiring a litigation guardian was set aside.

The appellant appealed a trial decision regarding spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the rule against double recovery, imputing income, and weighing medical evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Boston principle in light of the parties' separation agreement and the appellant's reckless depletion of assets.

The court also upheld the imputation of $5,000 in annual income due to the appellant's poor financial decisions and found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the medical evidence.

The parties separated after a 25-year marriage and equalized their assets, including the appellant's pension.

The appellant later retired and brought a motion to reduce his spousal support obligations.

The motions judge reduced the support but included the appellant's full pension income in the calculation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the motions judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to exclude the previously equalized portion of the pension, resulting in inequitable double recovery.

The appeal was allowed and spousal support was reduced based only on the unequalized portion of the pension.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment regarding child support, spousal support, unjust enrichment, and costs.

She argued the trial judge was biased, erred in apportioning child support with the biological father, improperly limited spousal support to 9 years despite her disability, and wrongly dismissed her constructive trust claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, needs and means analysis, or application of the test for unjust enrichment.

The appellant father appealed a child support order, arguing the trial judge erred in finding his step-daughter was a child of the marriage, in determining his income to be $40,000, and in ordering the full table amount for his biological daughter despite a joint custody order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or significant misapprehension of the evidence.

The trial judge properly applied the Chartier test for the step-child, made credibility findings regarding the appellant's income, and correctly noted the appellant's parenting time did not meet the 40 percent threshold under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order granting the responding party interim disbursements of $25,300.99 for legal fees, payable from the proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home.

The application judge had ordered the disbursement to 'level the playing field' after the moving party's legal aid lien was paid from the proceeds.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions on whether interim disbursements can be ordered solely for legal fees and whether they should be paid from funds over which the opposing party has an arguable claim, particularly when the party receiving the funds will likely owe an equalization payment.

The appellant father sought leave to appeal and a stay of an interlocutory order finding him in contempt and requiring him to reinstate a $400,000 life insurance policy to secure child support, or alternatively travel to Ontario for a medical examination.

The father argued that his child support obligations had been previously suspended, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to order life insurance to secure a non-existent support obligation.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of ordering life insurance as a 'future fund' without an existing support obligation, and stayed the lower court orders pending the appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her motion to vary child support and declining to impute additional income to the respondent.

She argued the motion judge erred by adjourning the hearing to allow the self-represented respondent to provide further medical evidence regarding his back injury, and by relying on that evidence even though it did not strictly comply with the judge's directions.

The Divisional Court majority dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or breach of procedural fairness, as the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the respondent or file responding evidence but chose not to do so.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the medical evidence did not meet the motion judge's criteria and its use was unfair.

The appellant appealed an interim order for spousal and child support, arguing the motions judge erred by including $100,000 from a share redemption as income available for support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the Child Support Guidelines to attribute corporate income to a sole shareholder.

The court also admitted fresh evidence that confirmed the availability of the funds, noting any necessary adjustments could be made at the upcoming trial.

The appellant appealed an order that dismissed his claim for reimbursement of child support overpayments.

A previous final judgment had already ordered the respondent to pay the appellant for the overpayments.

The Divisional Court held that the motion judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the final judgment.

The appeal was allowed, the subsequent order was set aside, and the respondent was permitted to set off outstanding costs awards against the judgment debt.

The applicant's solicitor appealed an order requiring him to personally pay $1,000 in costs for unreasonably refusing an adjournment after serving a late affidavit.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the solicitor paid the costs and advised the court that the appeal was purely academic.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no public interest reason to hear a purely academic appeal regarding an interlocutory costs order in private litigation.

The moving parties, the parents of a child made a Crown ward, sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for failure to perfect, and requested an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The respondent Children's Aid Society argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the child had already been placed for adoption following the Registrar's dismissal.

The Divisional Court held that the placement of the child for adoption overrides the opportunity for a review of the Registrar's order under Rule 61.16(5), subject to the child's best interests.

Finding that further delay in permanent placement would not be in the child's best interests, the court dismissed the motion.