ODC 2015

The appellant mother appealed a consent order making her daughter a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued that she did not understand she was consenting to adoption and believed the children's aid society was withdrawing its application.

The Divisional Court reviewed the record, including the signed consent document and the appellant's subsequent communications, and found that she had independent legal advice, read the document, and understood its contents.

The court concluded the consent was valid and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment, which had argued that the plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal fees was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court denied leave, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the defendants' undertakings to protect the plaintiff's account likely estopped them from relying on a limitation period defence, and suggested the matter proceed to a summary trial.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario Discipline Committee Panel, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a former patient.

The panel's decision was split 3-2, with the minority finding the sexual abuse allegations unproven.

The appellant argued the majority's credibility assessments and factual findings were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the majority's findings were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board confirming the revocation of its licence to operate a long-term care home.

The appellant argued that the revocation order was issued without notice, breaching procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearing before the Board was a hearing de novo, which cured any prior procedural defects regarding notice.

The court also noted that any prejudice suffered by the appellant stemmed from the appointment of an interim manager, an order the appellant chose not to appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration board's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a policy grievance regarding probationary faculty workload.

The union argued the board's reasons were inadequate and incomprehensible.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the board failed to engage with the union's arguments or explain its conclusion regarding the collective agreement's exception for policy grievances.

The application for judicial review was granted, the arbitration award was quashed, and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted board.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board approving a subdivision plan, arguing it was denied natural justice because it did not receive notice of the hearing.

The moving party held an easement over land near the proposed subdivision but was not on the municipal tax roll.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the Board followed its standard notice procedures and was not required to notify an easement holder it could not have known about.

The court also found no error in the Board Chair's refusal to review and re-open the decision.

The applicant lawyer sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved claims by investors that the applicant breached duties and knowingly assisted in breaches of trust related to mortgage investments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the motions judge's decision to require a trial for complex factual and legal issues did not give rise to a question of broad significance or general application affecting the development of the law.

The appellant association appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles (DDT) fixing the southern waterfront boundaries of two lots on a registered plan of subdivision at the water's edge instead of the 'high water mark' shown on the plan.

The appellant argued the DDT exceeded her jurisdiction and that her decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the DDT reasonably interpreted her jurisdiction under the Boundaries Act to determine the true intention of the original subdivider.

The Court held that the DDT's conclusion that the subdivider intended to convey all the land he owned to the water's edge, but mistakenly believed the Crown owned the land between the high water mark and the water's edge, was supported by the evidence and reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry's alleged decision to exempt a wind farm project from compliance with the Endangered Species Act regarding the Redside Dace.

The Ministry had communicated via email that there were no Redside Dace issues in the project area, and thus the proponent did not need to apply for a permit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's emails did not constitute an exercise of a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review, applying the precedent from Sierra Club.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision dismissing her appeal for lack of standing.

After initiating a claim against Tarion for the cost of an unapproved fireplace installation, the appellant sold her home but entered into a collateral agreement with the purchasers to maintain her claim.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, confirming that under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, warranties run with the home and former owners lack standing.

The court further held that the collateral agreement could not assign the fireplace claim, as the purchasers had no such claim to assign, and assigning warranty claims violates s. 13(6) of the Act.

The appellant commenced an action in Small Claims Court against the respondent business bureau for libel and breach of contract, which was dismissed after trial.

The appellant subsequently commenced multiple separate actions against the business bureau, its employees, and its legal counsel.

A Deputy Judge struck these subsequent actions under Rule 12.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court based on cause of action estoppel.

The appellant appealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Deputy Judge's application of the doctrine of cause of action estoppel or Rule 12.02.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal an interim order requiring him to pay retroactive spousal support of $25,894 per month.

He argued there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order because the motion judge failed to consider the tax implications of retroactive support, which might not be deductible.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the interim nature of the order meant the trial judge retained discretion to adjust the support amount upwards or downwards to address any unfair tax consequences.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a director's delegate's decision upholding an arbitrator's finding that the insurer's refusal to designate the respondent as catastrophically impaired did not trigger the two-year limitation period under s. 281.1(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness, rejecting the insurer's argument for correctness.

The Court found the director's delegate reasonably concluded that a catastrophic impairment determination is not a benefit itself, and the insurer's denial letter did not constitute a clear and unequivocal refusal of a benefit.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding her $3,000 for two incidents of violence but denying her other claims.

The appellant argued the Board erred in failing to compensate her for other incidents, awarding insufficient damages for pain and suffering, and failing to compensate for increased rent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Board proceeding in the appellant's absence after she failed to attend the hearing.

The Court held that the Board's factual findings were reasonable based on the record before it, and noted that the appellant's attempt to introduce new evidence should be directed to the Board under its statutory power to vary decisions.

The plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall at a Mike's No Frills store but mistakenly named Dickie's No Frills as the defendant in the statement of claim.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff sought and was granted leave by a Master to amend the claim to name the correct store operators based on the doctrine of misnomer.

The appellants appealed the Master's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's application of the 'litigating finger' test, as the intended defendants shared an insurer with the named defendant and their staff were aware of the incident, meaning they would have known they were the intended defendants.

The appellant, Day & Ross Inc., appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering it to pay $18,100 to the respondent, a factoring company that purchased invoices from a motor carrier.

Day & Ross had withheld payment, claiming equitable set-off for a spoiled load of cauliflower that it had paid the shipper for.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that Day & Ross acted as a load broker with no legal obligation to pay the shipper, that there was no implied assignment of the shipper's claim, and that equitable set-off did not apply.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion in writing for leave to appeal a final child support order made under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was not required because the order was final, not interlocutory.

However, the applicant was out of time to file the appeal.

Rather than dismissing the motion, the court stayed it and granted the applicant leave to amend the motion to proceed as a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the Chief Building Officer's revocation of a building permit.

The appellant argued the judge erred by precluding an appeal to the OMB, finding the revocation mandatory rather than discretionary, and failing to grant relief based on promissory estoppel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judge did not adumbrate OMB appeal rights, the revocation was mandatory due to non-compliance with the Building Code Act, and neither the Chief Building Officer nor the judge on appeal had the authority to apply promissory estoppel.

The plaintiffs settled wrongful dismissal claims with the defendant, which included confidentiality provisions.

A court order directed the settlement to be filed.

The plaintiffs filed the settlement agreements for costs submissions.

The defendant claimed this breached confidentiality and sought to appeal a judge's endorsement that the filing was 'required by law'.

The appeal was quashed as the endorsement was not an order, or alternatively was interlocutory.

The defendant moved to set aside the quashing order and brought a motion for contempt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the endorsement was not an order and there was no merit to the contempt claim.

The court ordered the settlement documents sealed and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the defendant.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord $10,747.65 for rent arrears, repairs, misappropriation of glass doors, and clean-up costs following the end of a commercial lease.

The landlord cross-appealed the finding that track lighting constituted chattels or trade fixtures.

The Divisional Court applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review and found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.