ODC 2015

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, the respondents sought their costs.

The applicant argued it should be shielded from costs as a public interest litigant, but the court found it failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the test.

The court fixed costs at $15,000 for Preston Sand and $9,000 for the Township.

Preston Sand's request to have costs awarded personally against the individual members of the applicant corporation was dismissed, as it failed to prove the corporation was a 'man of straw' and failed to provide adequate notice to the non-parties.

The appellant dentist appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $21,687.49 for dental negligence.

The respondent suffered permanent damage to her lip implants during a wisdom tooth extraction.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant breached the standard of care by failing to inform himself on how to handle the implants and breached his duty of informed consent by failing to disclose the material risks of the procedure to the implants.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant lawyer sued the respondent in Small Claims Court for unpaid legal fees, alleging she orally promised to pay for her son's legal representation.

The trial judge dismissed the claim in a brief endorsement, citing the lack of a written retainer agreement between the appellant and the respondent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the trial judge's reasons inadequate because they failed to explain why the appellant's evidence regarding the oral promise was rejected.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The moving parties (respondents in a judicial review application) brought a motion to strike twelve affidavits filed by the responding parties.

The underlying application challenged a university tribunal's decision to suspend several tenured professors for workplace harassment.

The court struck the affidavit of an expert witness because it improperly opined on Ontario law.

However, the court declined to strike the remaining affidavits, finding that the evidence regarding the pre-hearing investigation, hearing process, and post-hearing impacts was relevant to the responding parties' procedural fairness arguments and should be assessed by the panel hearing the judicial review.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his claim to rescind $75,000 in child support arrears enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the claim exceeded the $50,000 statutory limit under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal, noting the appellant's failure to move expeditiously, his history of using proceedings to delay payment, and the lack of legal merit in the appeal.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent public complainant sought partial indemnity costs of $9,316.87 from the applicant police officer following a proceeding.

The applicant did not dispute the quantum but argued no costs should be ordered because the matter was a test case concerning the standard of proof in police disciplinary cases.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that while the co-respondent police service did not seek costs, the proceeding was not a test case for the public complainant, who was maintaining a civil claim against the applicant.

The court awarded the requested costs to the respondent public complainant.

Trinity Western University (TWU) applied for judicial review of the Law Society of Upper Canada's decision to deny accreditation to its proposed law school.

The Law Society denied accreditation because TWU's community covenant, which prohibits sexual intimacy outside of heterosexual marriage, was found to be discriminatory against LGBTQ individuals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Law Society's decision was reasonable.

The Court held that while the decision infringed TWU's freedom of religion, the Law Society proportionately balanced this right against its statutory mandate to protect the public interest and the equality rights of its future members.

The appellant law firm appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a requisition obtained by the respondent client under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act for the assessment of legal accounts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the accounts were interim and the requisition was properly made within one month of the delivery of the final account.

The court also upheld the motions judge's exercise of inherent jurisdiction to permit the assessment and his refusal to order security for costs.

The applicant obtained a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) to construct industrial wind turbines.

The respondent municipality, an 'unwilling host' to wind projects, passed a resolution refusing the applicant access to a municipal road necessary for the project.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court quashed the resolution, finding that it frustrated the purpose of the provincially-issued REA and was passed in bad faith for the improper purpose of stopping the project rather than legitimately regulating roadways.

The municipality was ordered to consider the applicant's road use and permit applications in good faith.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's alleged refusal to grant a development permit for a gas bar unless the applicant entered into an agreement restricting the transfer of the lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry had not purported to require the agreement, but rather offered it as an alternative to standard setback requirements.

Furthermore, the application was premature as the applicant had not submitted a revised site plan, meaning no statutory power of decision had yet been exercised.

The appellant sought to vary an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court that quashed her appeal and judicial review regarding her eviction from a co-operative housing unit.

The underlying proceedings were quashed because the appellant failed to comply with a prior order requiring her to pay monthly rent and produce documents related to her claim for a rent subsidy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to vary, finding no error in the single judge's decision and noting the appellant's persistent failure to pay rent or comply with court orders.

The self-represented appellant sought to enforce three New York State judgments in Ontario under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application because New York is not a reciprocating state and the materials were insufficient to support a claim based on judicial comity.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim rather than converting it into an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment debt.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside, and the application was converted into an action under the Simplified Rules with a timetable for pleadings.

The appellant, CNH, appealed a decision of the Agricultural, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal.

During an attendance before the Divisional Court, the parties consented to refer the matter back to the Tribunal but could not agree on costs.

Following the Tribunal's subsequent decision, both parties sought costs for the earlier court attendance.

The court found neither party was entitled to the excessive costs sought and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the attendance fixed at $2,500.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding him liable for unregistered and illegal trading of securities and imposing sanctions.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commission's findings on liability, concluding it was reasonable to find the appellant engaged in acts furthering trade and received commissions.

However, the court found the Commission erred in its sanctions analysis by misapprehending the timing of a previous ban imposed on the appellant in Alberta.

The appeal was allowed in part, with the trading bans and administrative penalty set aside and remitted to the Commission for a fresh determination.

The appellant's parked vehicle was struck by the respondent's vehicle.

The respondent signed a handwritten agreement accepting fault and promising to pay up to $15,000 for the damages, minus any insurance payout.

After receiving $6,500 from his insurer, the appellant sued the respondent for the remaining $8,500.

The Small Claims Court dismissed the action, finding no consideration and that the claim was barred by section 263 of the Insurance Act.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the appellant's agreement to cap his claim at $15,000 constituted valid consideration, and that the action was permitted under the contract exception in section 263(5)(a.1) of the Insurance Act.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to seal documents and transcripts related to a Mareva injunction.

The defendants argued that the documents should be sealed because one of the defendants was facing criminal fraud charges.

The motion judge had ruled that sealing was unnecessary because the defendants were protected by the privilege against self-incrimination and the implied undertaking rule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel which upheld a finding of professional misconduct for facilitating mortgage fraud in ten real estate transactions.

The Appeal Panel had substituted a three-month suspension for a reprimand and increased the costs award against the appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Panel's decisions on misconduct, penalty, and costs were all reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that it had discriminated against the respondent in terminating his employment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Tribunal had not yet decided the question of remedy in the bifurcated proceeding.

The Court also held that the parties must exhaust the reconsideration process available at the Tribunal before seeking judicial review.

The appellant, a registered car dealer, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeals Tribunal directing the revocation of his registration.

The tribunal based its decision partly on the appellant's continuing assertion of innocence regarding a sexual assault conviction and the negative credibility findings made by the criminal trial judge.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the tribunal erred in law by treating the appellant's exercise of his right to assert innocence and appeal his conviction as aggravating factors.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a fresh hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal, which dismissed its request for an increase in its chicken processing quota.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's factual determination regarding the date of rebasing was supported by evidence and reasonable.

The Court also held that the applicant could not rely on a contract it had expressly abandoned before the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal was not required to provide reasons for declining to depart from its usual policies.