Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action and awarding costs, which was premised on their failure to pay previously ordered costs and to either appoint counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person after their lawyer withdrew.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the undisputed failure of the appellants to pay the prior costs award of $4,095.

No costs were awarded for the appeal itself.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to remove the respondent's lawyer as her appointed appraiser in an insurance dispute arising from tornado damage.

The umpire had suspended the appraisal process due to concerns about the appraiser's dual role as counsel in an impending bad faith claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the umpire must be impartial, the Insurance Act does not require party-appointed appraisers to be independent or disinterested.

The Court also clarified that the appraisal process is a collaborative valuation mechanism, not an administrative tribunal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs decision issued two and a half years after his action was dismissed on summary judgment.

He argued the delay caused him injustice and that the costs were too high.

The Court of Appeal denied an adjournment and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the costs decision was conventional, the amounts were not disproportionate, and the delay itself did not constitute an error in principle.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment in a mortgage enforcement action ordering them to pay over $626,000 and deliver possession of a mortgaged rental property.

The appellants failed to appear for the appeal, which proceeded on written materials after multiple adjournment requests were denied.

The appellants argued the second mortgage was void ab initio because the respondent allegedly knew the first mortgage was in default or failed to conduct due diligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was the appellants' responsibility to ensure the first mortgage was in good standing.

The Estate Trustee During Litigation brought a motion to quash an appeal in a matter involving the estate of Elias Gefen.

The appeal involved multiple parties including the estate trustee, family members, and various institutions.

The motion to quash was granted on March 14, 2019.

The court awarded costs of the motion and appeal to the Estate Trustee During Litigation in the amount of $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes, payable jointly by the appellant and respondents to the motion.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing a defamation action.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment on the grounds that the statements made by the respondent were true.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of legal principles or factual findings and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for wrongful (constructive) dismissal and related relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employment agreement was frustrated, rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding workplace harassment and his inability to return to work within a reasonable time.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that he was constructively dismissed due to termination of employment benefits, finding that the benefits terminated on the same date the employment contract was frustrated.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that granted far-reaching relief to the respondent regarding amounts allegedly owing on a 1994 second mortgage and a 1997 judgment on the covenant.

The Court of Appeal found that the relief granted by the motion judge could not stand.

The court determined that the amounts were duplicated in the judgment, the underlying second mortgage was extinguished by power of sale proceedings, and the debt was extinguished by the bankruptcies of the deceased and one of the defendants.

The court also rejected the finding of fraudulent conveyance and found the claim regarding farm equipment proceeds to be statute-barred.

The only claim that survived was for child support arrears and unpaid costs awards relating to child support.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's class action appeal as statute-barred, the respondent trust companies sought costs.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the action was brought in the public interest and raised a new point of law under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1991.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding no improper conduct by the respondents and concluding that costs should follow the event.

The respondents were awarded their requested costs totaling $61,966.55.

The respondent contractor hired the appellant for epoxy flooring based on a sketch with inaccurate elevations.

When the appellant discovered the error and sought a price increase, the respondent refused, leading to a breach of contract claim and a counterclaim for lost profits.

The trial judge found for the appellant, but the Divisional Court overturned the decision on its own initiative, applying the doctrine of common mistake.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by deciding the case on unpleaded grounds and misapplying the doctrine of common mistake, as the mistake was the respondent's fault.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against a municipal election candidate.

The candidate had delivered a confidential letter to City Council referencing allegations of improper influence regarding an untendered lease agreement with the appellant's family business.

The trial judge found the letter defamatory but protected by qualified privilege, and found no express malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the communication was reasonably appropriate to the occasion and that the appellant failed to prove malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action regarding the termination of a lease.

The trial judge found that the appellants failed to pay rent and lacked the financial ability to do so.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the respondents changed their evidence from discovery to trial without providing written notice as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the change in evidence regarding the exact date of termination was immaterial to the outcome, as rent was not tendered on either date.

However, the Court reduced the respondents' costs of the appeal due to their failure to provide proper notice.

The parties' Agreement to Arbitrate provided for an appeal directly to the Court of Appeal on a question of law.

The appellant filed the appeal in the Court of Appeal, but the court held that it lacked jurisdiction, as parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement and the Arbitration Act does not provide for direct appeals to the Court of Appeal.

The court declined to transfer the matter under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, leaving the appellant to pursue remedies in the Superior Court.

The appellant was injured when the respondent lost control of his vehicle on an icy road, crossed the centre line, and struck the appellant's stopped vehicle.

At trial, the respondent did not testify, and the jury found no negligence on his part, dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that crossing the centre line in breach of the Highway Traffic Act establishes a prima facie case of negligence.

Absent any explanation from the respondent to negate this evidence, the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's determination that the respondent met the statutory threshold for serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function following a motor vehicle accident.

They also appealed the jury's award of $16,000 for past lost income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's threshold determination or the jury's modest award for past lost income, noting the trial was brief and simple.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they were not 'farmers' under the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was inadequate evidence to show the appellants were engaged in farming for commercial purposes.

The Court also rejected the argument that an earlier motion for security for costs rendered the issue res judicata.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the police and Crown attorneys for malicious prosecution, Charter breaches, and other torts following his acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The motion judge struck most of his fresh amended statement of claim under Rules 21 and 25.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by effectively conducting a summary judgment motion rather than accepting the pleaded facts as true, and by applying too narrow a test for malice at the pleadings stage.

The action was permitted to proceed against all defendants except the Police Services Board (save for vicarious liability).

The appellant appealed an order striking its claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The core issue was whether the presence of asbestos in a property was a latent or patent defect.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the defect was patent, as the asbestos was noted in an inspector's report commissioned by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party, having been committed for civil contempt and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, brought a motion to stay the sentence pending his appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, noting that whether analyzed under the civil test for a stay or the criminal provisions for judicial release pending appeal, the moving party raised serious questions to be determined and would suffer irreparable harm if required to serve the sentence before the appeal was heard.

The stay was granted subject to strict conditions, including a requirement to surrender into custody prior to the appeal hearing.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a trial judgment regarding survivor's pensions under the Canada Pension Plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, settling the formal order to reflect that survivors' estates have no rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter and are not exempt from s. 60(2) of the CPP.

The court also held that s. 72(1) of the CPP does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents.