Molloy

Two young persons were tried for kidnapping for ransom using a firearm.

One of the accused was also charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The victim, who was uncooperative at trial, had provided a detailed video-taped statement to police shortly after his release.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and admitted portions of the victim's statement for its truth, finding substantial corroborative evidence of the kidnapping, the use of firearms, and the first accused's identity as a perpetrator.

The first accused was found guilty of kidnapping, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The second accused was acquitted, as the fingerprint evidence and the victim's description were insufficient to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender was convicted of ten counts of fraud and one count of defrauding the public, involving the sale of fictitious shares in gold mining companies to unsophisticated investors.

The total fraud exceeded $1.1 million.

The court sentenced the offender to five years' imprisonment, finding that the principles of denunciation and deterrence required a significant penitentiary term given the magnitude, duration, and devastating impact of the fraud on vulnerable victims.

The court also ordered full restitution of $1,100,799 and imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the same amount.

Following his conviction for multiple counts of fraud, the accused applied to reopen his trial prior to sentencing to introduce new evidence.

The proposed evidence was his passport, which contained a visa stamp he claimed supported his alibi that he was in St. Kitts when some of the fraudulent transactions occurred.

The court applied the Palmer test for the admission of fresh evidence and dismissed the application.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the due diligence requirement and, more importantly, lacked sufficient importance, as the visa stamp did not prove the accused's physical presence in St. Kitts at the relevant times and would not have affected the trial's outcome or the court's adverse credibility findings against him.

The offender, a disbarred lawyer with a prior criminal record for fraud and similar offences in the United States, was convicted of four counts of providing unlicensed immigration advice and one count of counselling misrepresentation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's sophisticated, profit-driven scheme that preyed on vulnerable immigrants and undermined the integrity of Canada's immigration system.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years imprisonment, reduced to 5 years after applying credit for pre-sentence custody, along with full restitution orders for the victims.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence seized during a police search of a motel room where he was arrested.

The accused was a casual visitor in the room, which was occupied by an acquaintance.

The court held that the accused lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room and therefore had no standing to challenge the search under s. 8 of the Charter.

In the alternative, the court found no breach of s. 8, as there were no material misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain, the seizure of clothing was authorized, and an 18-day delay in reporting the seizure to a justice did not violate the Criminal Code.

The court further held that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, including cutting his hair, removing identification from his apartment, and asking his girlfriend to change her police statement, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the evidence lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial.

The court held that the evidence was highly probative, not inherently prejudicial, and admissible, leaving it to the jury to determine what reasonable inferences could be drawn.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, sought to introduce evidence of two alternate sets of suspects at trial: a man known as 'Ammo' with an alleged jealousy motive, and associates of a man with a grudge against one of the accused who allegedly framed them.

The court applied the 'air of reality' test and found no evidential foundation for either theory.

The evidence regarding the alternate suspects lacked sufficient connection to the crime, including motive, opportunity, and propensity, and was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus for a new pre-enquete hearing after a Justice of the Peace refused to issue process on a private information alleging perjury against a police officer.

The applicants argued the Justice of the Peace was biased, lost jurisdiction by refusing to hear evidence, and denied natural justice.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error, bias, or breach of procedural fairness.

The court also noted that the application was vexatious and an abuse of process, as the applicants were attempting to re-litigate a matter previously decided by another judge.

The accused, an unlicensed immigration consultant, was charged with providing unauthorized immigration advice and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

During her jury trial, she brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not meet the statutory definitions of 'advice', 'represent', or 'counsel'.

The court interpreted the relevant provisions, finding that 'advice' involves personalized recommendations rather than general information, and that 'counselling' requires active encouragement.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence on all counts for a properly instructed jury to potentially return guilty verdicts and dismissed the motion.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to admit audio recordings made by clients of the accused and to admit the preliminary hearing transcript of a witness who refused to return to Canada for trial.

The court admitted the audio recordings, finding them highly probative and authentic, with minor edits to remove prejudicial material.

However, the court dismissed the application to admit the preliminary hearing transcript under s. 715 of the Criminal Code or the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the accused's cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing was unfairly restricted by Crown objections and judicial rulings, depriving her of a full opportunity to cross-examine.

The self-represented applicant, charged with unauthorized provision of immigration advice under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), brought pre-trial motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to prosecute her and the constitutional validity of several IRPA provisions.

The court found that the CBSA had statutory authority to investigate and prosecute the offences pursuant to s. 138(1) of the IRPA and a valid delegation of power.

The court also dismissed the division of powers argument, holding that s. 91(1) of the IRPA is a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction over immigration and criminal law, and does not improperly intrude on provincial regulation of legal professionals.

The applicant's section 7 Charter challenges based on vagueness were dismissed, with specific interpretive issues deferred to trial.

The self-represented accused, charged with unauthorized immigration consulting under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought pre-trial applications to quash a preferred indictment and challenge the constitutionality of s. 577 of the Criminal Code.

She argued the indictment was a nullity because the consent was signed by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions rather than the Deputy Attorney General personally.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the issue was res judicata as it had been previously rejected by the Court of Appeal.

In the alternative, the court held that the Director of Public Prosecutions Act deems the DPP to be the Deputy Attorney General for this purpose, and that s. 577 is constitutional.

An application to quash the indictment for lack of particularity and duplicity was also dismissed.

The self-represented accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Criminal Code, including Part 18, s. 523, s. 524, and s. 145(3).

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the challenges to Part 18 and the bail provisions had already been decided by another judge and were therefore res judicata, as well as moot since the preliminary inquiry had ended and the accused had been released on bail.

The challenge to s. 145(3) was also dismissed as moot because the breach of bail charges had been stayed.

The self-represented applicant, charged with unauthorized immigration consulting and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought pre-trial Charter applications challenging her arrests, the search of her office, and the Crown's disclosure.

The court found that the CBSA officers had reasonable and probable grounds for both the initial arrest warrant and a subsequent warrantless arrest for breaching bail conditions.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and found no breach of the Crown's disclosure obligations, noting that communications between Crown counsel and investigators are privileged.

All Charter applications were dismissed.

The Crown prosecuted three accused on sexual assault charges arising from sexual activity in a hotel room after a night of drinking among off-duty colleagues.

The central issues were whether the complainant consented and whether she was incapable of consenting because of alcohol, an unknown drug, or both.

The court applied the reasonable doubt framework and the W.(D.) approach, finding serious reliability and credibility problems in the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with prior statements, video footage, text messages, and toxicology evidence.

Although sexual activity was established, the Crown failed to prove non-consent or incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt.

All three accused were acquitted.

The appellant pleaded guilty to nine counts of fraud and was sentenced to an 18-month conditional sentence.

He later discovered this was an illegal sentence, as the maximum for a summary conviction under s. 380(1)(b) of the Criminal Code is six months, and it carried unanticipated immigration consequences.

On consent, the court extended the time to appeal and varied the sentence to nine consecutive two-month conditional sentences.

The court also corrected the trial judge's concurrent victim fine surcharges, imposing a $100 surcharge on each count but extending the time to pay until 2050 due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

Following conviction for sexual assault, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court held that the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and that the offender had demonstrated a failure to control sexual impulses, a pattern of repetitive and aggressive conduct, and a likelihood of causing future injury, pain, or other evil to women and children.

Relying heavily on forensic psychiatric evidence, extensive prior offending, deviant writings, and failed prior treatment and supervision, the court found the risk of violent and sexually violent recidivism to be unmanageable.

The court further concluded there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community under the long-term offender regime, because any effective conditions would virtually replicate incarceration.

A dangerous offender designation was therefore made and an indeterminate sentence imposed.

The accused was driving on Yonge Street and accelerated to 107 km/h to beat a yellow light, entering the intersection on a red light.

He collided with a turning vehicle, subsequently hitting and killing a pedestrian and injuring his passenger.

The court found the accused's conduct was a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person, demonstrating a wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others.

The accused was found guilty of criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

Two doctors subpoenaed to testify at a murder trial brought a motion seeking an order authorizing them to disclose the deceased child's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that no such order is necessary because a witness compelled by law to answer relevant questions at trial is not exposed to liability for breaching confidentiality.

The moving parties, two commercial establishments, sought leave to appeal the dismissal of their motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiff had sustained a severe traumatic brain injury after falling down stairs at a rented chalet following a night of drinking at the moving parties' establishments.

The moving parties argued their duty of care ended when the plaintiff reached the chalet.

The court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that foreseeability of risk and the sobriety of the plaintiff's companions were issues requiring a trial.