B. Smith

The appellant, a forensic patient with schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued that his mutism during periods of deterioration did not equate to an inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Board failed to analyze or address the appellant's central argument, rendering the reasons inadequate and preventing meaningful appellate review.

The Board's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for a rehearing.

The accused drove a rented van down a busy sidewalk in Toronto, killing 10 people and injuring 16 others.

He admitted to the acts but raised a defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing that his Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that while ASD qualifies as a mental disorder under s. 16, the accused did not lack the capacity to rationally evaluate his actions.

He knew his actions were legally and morally wrong but chose to commit them to achieve notoriety.

The NCR defence failed, and the accused was found guilty of 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder.

The defence brought a motion for a sealing order and in camera proceedings during the testimony of their key expert witness, a US-based psychiatrist.

The expert issued an ultimatum that he would withdraw from the case unless his video recordings of the accused were sealed and shielded from public broadcast, citing concerns about copycat violence, notoriety, and stigmatization of the autism community.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that while the expert's concerns did not themselves justify a sealing order, his threat to withdraw would deprive the accused of his only defence, thereby creating a substantial risk to the administration of justice.

The court reluctantly granted the motion to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial, balancing it against the open court principle by implementing limited restrictions on public access to the video exhibits.

During a trial for multiple counts of first-degree murder and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application for the disclosure of audio and video recordings made by defence psychiatric experts during their interviews with the accused and his family.

The accused had raised a defence of not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the recordings were protected by litigation privilege, but that this privilege would be waived if the experts were called to testify or if the recordings were used by a witness to refresh their memory.

The court ordered that the recordings must be disclosed to the Crown immediately upon any of the experts being called to testify.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action for damages arising from a residential oil spill.

The action was dismissed by the registrar in 2019 for not being set down for trial within five years.

The defendants conceded that the delay was explained and the deadline was missed by inadvertence, leaving prejudice as the only issue.

The court found that the defendants had early notice of the claim, evidence was preserved, and any prejudice from reviving the action was minimal.

The motion was granted and the dismissal was set aside.

The plaintiff's motion for judgment based on acceptance of an offer was previously dismissed.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found that although the defendants were successful on the motion, they were not entitled to costs because the motion was necessitated by their error in failing to withdraw the offer.

In a rare circumstance, the court awarded costs of $4,000 to the unsuccessful plaintiff.

The plaintiff commenced an action for constructive dismissal and other claims.

The defendants made a $25,000 settlement offer in a 'without prejudice' letter in 2016.

Over the next three years, the scope of the plaintiff's claims was significantly reduced through other proceedings.

In 2020, the plaintiff attempted to accept the 2016 offer.

The defendants refused, arguing the offer was not a Rule 49 offer, the acceptance was a counteroffer, and circumstances had changed.

The court found the offer was a valid Rule 49 offer and the acceptance was valid.

However, the court exercised its rare discretion to refuse to enforce the settlement, concluding it would be unjust to allow the plaintiff to profit from the defendants' error in failing to withdraw the offer after circumstances had significantly changed.

The applicant sought spousal support after the end of a 14-year relationship with the wealthy respondent.

The respondent argued they were not spouses because they maintained separate residences in Toronto.

The court found that the parties lived together in a conjugal relationship, noting they spent summers together at a cottage, wintered in Florida, and the respondent treated the applicant as his wife and financially supported her.

The court awarded the applicant indefinite spousal support of $53,077 per month and retroactive support of $421,795.12, finding a strong pattern of economic dependency.

The applicant sought spousal support, arguing that the respondent was intentionally unemployed and that an income of $66,724 should be imputed to him.

The respondent had been terminated from his employment as a stationary engineer due to performance issues stemming from cognitive decline and memory loss.

The court applied the Drygala test and found that the applicant failed to prove the respondent was intentionally unemployed, as his termination was due to an inability to perform the job, not a voluntary choice to avoid work.

The application for spousal support was dismissed, without prejudice to future claims if the respondent's circumstances change.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of a rent-to-own agreement for a home on the Whitesand First Nation reserve after the First Nation allocated the home to another member.

The plaintiff had vacated the home years earlier due to an abusive relationship but continually expressed her intent to return.

The court found that the plaintiff had not abandoned the home and that the First Nation breached the agreement by failing to address her requests in good faith.

However, the court declined to order specific performance, finding it inequitable to displace the current innocent occupant and noting the plaintiff's delay.

Instead, the court awarded the plaintiff $18,000 in damages for breach of contract and $5,000 for lost personal property.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for joint custody and equal parenting time after the respondent mother left the matrimonial home with their 16-month-old child.

The mother sought to dismiss the motion as it was brought before a case conference, contrary to Rule 14(4).

The court found it was in the interest of justice under Rule 14(4.2) to hear the motion prior to a case conference, given the 2.5-month delay until the first available date.

The court ordered an interim, interim schedule of alternating days of care for each parent until the return of the motion.

The defendant requisitioned a review of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The self-represented plaintiff sought damages against city and shelter executives regarding shelter standards and complaint handling.

The court found that the statement of claim failed to plead facts supporting a legally recognized cause of action against the named defendants.

Concluding that the action could not succeed and contained elements of a vexatious litigant, the court dismissed the action as frivolous and vexatious on its face.

The husband brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the wife's claims to set aside their separation agreement and for spousal support and equalization.

The wife alleged the husband failed to provide accurate financial disclosure regarding the value of his business, and that the agreement was signed under duress and without independent legal advice.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The court held that the wife, a lawyer who had access to the husband's financial information, chose not to investigate the values provided and could not now rely on alleged non-disclosure to set aside the agreement.

The court also found no evidence of duress or unconscionability, and upheld the spousal support release under the Miglin framework.