C. Valarezo

The accused drove a rented van down a busy sidewalk in Toronto, killing 10 people and injuring 16 others.

He admitted to the acts but raised a defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing that his Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that while ASD qualifies as a mental disorder under s. 16, the accused did not lack the capacity to rationally evaluate his actions.

He knew his actions were legally and morally wrong but chose to commit them to achieve notoriety.

The NCR defence failed, and the accused was found guilty of 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder.

The defence brought a motion for a sealing order and in camera proceedings during the testimony of their key expert witness, a US-based psychiatrist.

The expert issued an ultimatum that he would withdraw from the case unless his video recordings of the accused were sealed and shielded from public broadcast, citing concerns about copycat violence, notoriety, and stigmatization of the autism community.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that while the expert's concerns did not themselves justify a sealing order, his threat to withdraw would deprive the accused of his only defence, thereby creating a substantial risk to the administration of justice.

The court reluctantly granted the motion to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial, balancing it against the open court principle by implementing limited restrictions on public access to the video exhibits.

During a trial for multiple counts of first-degree murder and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application for the disclosure of audio and video recordings made by defence psychiatric experts during their interviews with the accused and his family.

The accused had raised a defence of not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the recordings were protected by litigation privilege, but that this privilege would be waived if the experts were called to testify or if the recordings were used by a witness to refresh their memory.

The court ordered that the recordings must be disclosed to the Crown immediately upon any of the experts being called to testify.

The offender was sentenced for his role in a violent nighttime robbery of two victims in a public park.

The offender and his co-accused used an imitation firearm and a cleaver-like knife to threaten the victims, who were also subjected to gratuitous physical violence including being pistol-whipped, kicked, and punched.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the unprovoked violence and the offender's prior record against his rehabilitative potential.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years' incarceration, less 15 months of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a further 33 months to serve.

During a criminal jury trial for multiple sexual offences including incest, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict on the incest count, arguing that penile penetration of the complainant’s anus could not constitute “sexual intercourse” under s. 155 of the Criminal Code.

The court was required to interpret the meaning of “sexual intercourse” in light of s. 4(5) of the Criminal Code and the purposes of the incest prohibition.

Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the court held that the offence aims both to prevent genetic risks associated with inbreeding and to protect vulnerable family members.

Limiting sexual intercourse to penile-vaginal penetration would undermine the protective purpose of the provision and exclude male victims.

The court concluded that sexual intercourse includes penile penetration of the anus and therefore sufficient evidence existed for the jury to consider the incest charge.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision declining to commit the accused to trial for second degree murder in the death of an infant child.

The preliminary inquiry judge had instead committed the accused for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death, finding no evidence of the intent required for murder.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded the limited role of the committal stage by weighing evidence and effectively preferring defence‑favourable inferences.

There was some evidence capable of supporting the inference that the accused intended to cause bodily harm knowing it was likely to cause death, including evidence of animus, repeated abusive conduct, and warnings about the dangers of shaking an infant.

The discharge on the murder charge was quashed and the matter was remitted with direction to commit the accused for trial on second degree murder.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault after stabbing the victim during a consensual fist fight.

The victim suffered a deep hand laceration and a serious abdominal wound penetrating the diaphragm.

The court reviewed sentencing ranges for knife-related aggravated assaults arising in consensual fights and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives.

Despite mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, supportive family, and positive pre‑sentence report, the seriousness of the stabbing warranted a custodial sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody, along with a DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, and probation.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a stabbing during a fistfight, the defence sought to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified he did not bring the knife and did not intentionally stab the victim.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to self-defence under s. 34(2) or s. 37 of the Criminal Code, as the accused's evidence of an accidental stabbing negated the requirement of an intentional act committed for self-preservation.

During a criminal trial for assault with a knife, the Crown brought an application to admit the complainant’s preliminary inquiry testimony through an audio recording rather than calling the witness at trial.

Medical evidence established that the witness had developed schizophrenia and was suffering from psychosis, paranoia, and disorganized thinking, rendering him unable to testify and likely to suffer psychological harm if required to attend court.

The court held that the requirements of s. 715(1)(c) of the Criminal Code were satisfied because the witness was unable to testify and had previously testified under oath with full opportunity for cross‑examination.

The court further found that the evidence met the principled exception to hearsay, satisfying both necessity and threshold reliability.

The prior testimony from the preliminary inquiry was therefore admitted.

The accused required a Tagalog interpreter for a criminal trial, but there were no accredited Tagalog interpreters in Ontario.

Defence counsel objected to the court conducting a competency inquiry into non‑accredited interpreters, relying on prior decisions suggesting that only accredited interpreters should be used.

The court held that s. 14 of the Charter guarantees a competent or qualified interpreter, not necessarily an accredited one, and determined that a competency inquiry into proposed interpreters was appropriate.

The matter was adjourned to allow arrangements for a conditionally accredited Tagalog interpreter who had previously interpreted at the preliminary inquiry to attend.

The accused waived s. 11(b) Charter rights for the adjournment period.