Miller

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving over 80mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter and in concluding that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge made no error in concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and reasonable grounds for the breath demand.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, despite a delay caused by the police facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter applications under s. 10(b), alleging police failed to assist her in contacting her counsel of choice and failed to provide adequate privacy during her consultation with duty counsel.

She also argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence regarding her impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the law, concluding the appellant's belief that she lacked privacy was not reasonably held.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson Airport with eight suitcases containing over 40 kilograms of cocaine concealed in the lining.

The accused testified that her cousin provided the luggage and she was unaware of the drugs, having inspected the bags when she became suspicious but finding nothing.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework and the doctrine of wilful blindness, concluding that the accused took reasonable steps to allay her suspicions and the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave under Rule 39.02(2) to rely on a late expert engineering report in response to a pending summary judgment motion brought by the defendant property owners.

The defendants opposed the admission of the report, arguing it was produced after cross-examinations were completed and years after the incident.

The court granted leave, finding the report relevant, responsive to issues raised in cross-examination, and that its admission would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $5,000 in costs on a set-off basis for costs thrown away.

The applicant wife and respondent husband separated after an 18-year marriage.

The applicant sought spousal support and equalization, while the respondent sought child support and equalization.

The court divided the respondent's pension at source and imputed additional income to him for post-retirement work.

The court found the applicant liable for child support arrears for the parties' adult children attending post-secondary education.

The court also found the applicant entitled to compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support.

After setting off the child support arrears against the equalization payment and spousal support arrears, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant a net amount of $7,340.14, plus ongoing spousal support.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer only had a 'suspicion' of impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court reviewed the trial judge's findings, which relied on the severe unexplained collision, the appellant's disorientation, unsteadiness, odour of alcohol, and admission of consumption.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officer possessed both a subjective belief and objective grounds for impairment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, jointly charged with firearms offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging their s. 11(b) rights to a trial within a reasonable time were breached.

The total time from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 33.5 months.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, neutral delay (including illness of counsel and accommodating co-accused's counsel), and institutional delay.

The court found the institutional delay of approximately 16 months fell within the combined Morin guidelines for provincial and superior courts.

Balancing the prejudice against the societal interest in trying serious firearms charges, the court dismissed the applications.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call reply evidence on a collateral issue regarding how he obtained an invitation to the complainant's dinner party.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the reply evidence was admissible because the issue took on new significance during the defence case.

The court also found the sentence, which included a suspended sentence and three years' probation, was not clearly unreasonable given the persistent nature of the harassment.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible.

The summary conviction appeal court agreed the statement was compelled and its use to form reasonable grounds for a breath demand violated section 8 of the Charter.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's alternative conclusion that the breath samples were admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, noting the driver's identity was discoverable through other witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party mother brought a motion to change a previous order to seek child support and contributions to post-secondary education expenses for the parties' two adult children.

The responding party father argued that his disability pension income should not be grossed up, that child support should not be payable while one child lived away from home, and that the children should bear a larger portion of their education costs.

The court found that the parties' disability incomes were fully taxable and should not be grossed up.

The court ordered the father to pay child support for both children, finding that the child living away for school was deemed to reside with the parents under a previous order, and the other child was upgrading credits in preparation for post-secondary education.

The court further ordered that the post-secondary education expenses be shared equally in thirds between the mother, the father, and the respective child.

The applicant mother sought an order permitting her to relocate with the parties' child from Halton Region to London, Ontario, to live with her fiancé.

The respondent father opposed the move, arguing it would negatively impact his relationship with the child.

The court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that the move was in the child's best interests, as it would provide financial stability, greater educational support, and more quality time with the mother.

The mother was permitted to relocate with the child, subject to a specified access schedule for the father.

The applicant, facing multiple drug trafficking and breach of recognizance charges, applied for a bail review after being detained on secondary grounds.

He argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a material change in circumstances occurred due to the withdrawal of some outstanding charges and a revised electronic monitoring plan.

The Superior Court found no error in law but agreed the withdrawn charges constituted a material change.

However, upon reviewing the secondary grounds, the court dismissed the application, finding a substantial likelihood the applicant would continue committing offences and that the proposed sureties lacked the necessary judgment to supervise him effectively.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment in a family law application seeking sole custody, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent failed to file an answer or comply with disclosure orders, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The court granted the applicant sole custody and the right to travel with the child without the respondent's consent.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on financial support from his parents and ordered him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, retroactive spousal support, and $50,000 in costs.