Neil M. Abramson

The appellants, private practice oral surgeons, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of a hospital board's decision to cancel their operating room access and hospital privileges.

The board made the decision without a hearing, relying on s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which allows a hospital to revoke privileges when ceasing to provide a service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the board's interpretation of s. 44 was reasonable, that the termination of the specific operating room access constituted ceasing a 'service', and that the board was not required to hold a hearing or consider the appellants' affidavits.

Following a defamation trial where the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in general damages, both parties sought costs.

The plaintiffs claimed over $417,000 in substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant sought over $165,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court noted the exorbitant legal fees incurred by both sides, totaling nearly $800,000, and emphasized the principle of proportionality.

Considering the plaintiff's modest success, the failure to move the action to the simplified procedure, and the defendant's mixed success in defending the claims, the court concluded that the outcome was close to a draw.

Consequently, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

A pharmacist challenged the constitutionality of mandatory licence revocation provisions under the Health Professions Procedural Code after pleading guilty to sexual abuse of a patient based on a consensual sexual relationship.

The applicant argued the provisions were ultra vires the province because, in pith and substance, they regulated sexual morality and therefore fell within Parliament’s criminal law power.

The Superior Court held that the dominant purpose of the provisions was the protection of the public through the regulation of professional standards governing health care practitioners.

The provisions were therefore within the province’s jurisdiction over property and civil rights under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court also held the Attorney General was estopped from challenging the court’s jurisdiction because the issue had already been determined in earlier proceedings.